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Abstract 
 
This research uses a mixed methods Applied Thematic Analysis to investigate 
the ‘anatomy’ of rogue trading using records from the Thames Valley Police’s 
crime recording database, from 2013. One of few empirical studies into the 
phenomenon, this thesis situates the crime within the broader academic 
framework of white-collar crime, critically exploring whether the concept 
provides an adequate framework, and examining why it has been under-
explored given the backdrop provided by extant literature which identifies the 
involvement of professional, organised criminals, and the victimisation of 
vulnerable individuals. Building on the author’s previous work (Day, 2015), this 
study investigates difficulties regarding the definition, recording and retrieval 
of rogue trading incidents, using distraction burglary (a similar offence in terms 
of offender and victim profiles) as a comparator. It also critically examines what 
police records reveal about the victimology and modus operandi of the crime 
type, and the police response it receives. This research finds that rogue trading 
is more financially damaging and prevalent than distraction burglary, and that 
an overlap exists between the two offences. It discovers that the majority of 
victims are categorised by police as vulnerable, and that financial losses are 
generally greater where vulnerable victims are involved. Service provision to 
victims is generally poor, with joint-working between police and Care Services 
inconsistent, and the installation of CCTV and use of statutory special 
measures particularly rare. Further, the findings depict a fluid and varied 
modus operandi commonly involving the carrying out of work (most frequently 
roofing) at victim’s properties and the repeated targeting of victims, sometimes 
transporting them to financial institutions to facilitate immediate financial gain. 
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This study also shows the response the police give to rogue trading to be 
routinely poor. This includes an almost complete absence of consideration of 
legislation introduced specifically to combat rogue trading, a wider failure to 
consider more mainstream offences such as theft and fraud, non-compliance 
with Home Office Counting Rules (HOCR) and National Crime Recording 
Standards (NCRS), and a frequent failure to assess the work carried out by 
suspects. This research suggests the current situation is inadequate from an 
investigative, enforcement and safeguarding perspective and that unless there 
are significant changes to the way the police deal with and record rogue 
trading, this is unlikely to improve. Finally, the study suggests that white-collar 
crime no longer provides an appropriate lens through which to view rogue 
trading and that contemporary fraud studies may provide a more suitable 
academic framework. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
 
 
There is little in-depth research exclusively exploring the issue of rogue 
trading, and fewer studies which examine the specific issue from a police 
perspective. This study therefore makes an original contribution by addressing 
this gap through the use of empirical research, the findings of which could 
enable evidence-based policy and practice decisions. In academic terms, the 
wider context in which rogue trading is situated is white-collar crime, with a 
focus too on victimology. As will be outlined throughout the thesis, terms which 
lack a definitive definition represent a significant barrier to the understanding 
and study of those phenomena both in academia and in practice. Rogue 
trading is one such term and to frame the phenomenon, its use, for the purpose 
of this study, is therefore defined as; 
 
‘Any incident where an individual, or individuals, 
targets a consumer, deliberately overcharging for 
unsatisfactory goods and/or services. This includes 
charging for unnecessary work, damaging property in 
order to obtain money or work, charging for work not 
carried out, leaving work unfinished and intimidating 
behaviour in order to extort money’. (Day, 2015). 
This definition borrows from and develops that coined by Barratt (2012, p 7) 
whose definition was restricted to cold-call incidents. The broader  
 
definition is important as it ensures the capture of instances where offenders 
utilise business cards, flyers and websites to attract consumers to call them 
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(ACTSO, 2014; Day, 2015), thereby capturing data relating to potentially more 
sophisticated and better-organised perpetrators (Day, 2015). 
 
 
Scene setting 
 
 
The researcher is a Trading Standards Practitioner, employed in a large, 
Shire County Local Authority Trading Standards department where he 
specialises in the investigation of doorstep crime. Trading Standards play an 
important role in the investigation and enforcement of doorstep crime and so 
a brief introduction to Trading Standards is required. Trading Standards is a 
Local Authority Service with statutory responsibility for the enforcement of 
criminal law in a wide framework of consumer protection legislation, 
comprising over 200 statutes (CTSI, 2013). Historically the Weights and 
Measures Department, Trading Standards now enforce areas including 
product and electrical safety, food labelling (Hutter, 2011), weights and 
measures, farmed animal health, welfare and traceability, feed labelling, 
counterfeiting and intellectual property, and the sale of age-restricted 
products. Each Local Authority Trading Standards Department is responsible 
for maintaining a fair trading environment for consumers and a level playing 
field for businesses. This is generally performed through intelligence-led 
action involving risk-based inspections of businesses, market surveillance, 
monitoring and responding to consumer complaints of criminal breaches, 
issuing business advice and guidance, issuing statutory notices, and 
prosecutions. Each Authority publishes an enforcement policy aimed at 
proportionate and effective action to ensure regulatory compliance and has, 
according to the needs and strategies, its own local priorities areas within the 
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regulatory framework. The National Trading Standards (NTS), funded by the 
Department of Business Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), the Ministry 
of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) and the Food 
Standards Agency (FSA), uses an intelligence-led approach to coordinate 
enforcement action on priority area cross-border cases regionally and 
nationally. The NTS key priorities are identified via a national Strategic 
Assessment and in 2018/19 comprised doorstep crime, fair trading issues, 
mass marketing fraud, product safety and intellectual property (NTS, 2018). 
Doorstep crime has been identified as a priority area annually since the 
establishment of the NTS in 2011/2012, and up to 80% of Local Authority 
Trading Standards give high priority to the enforcement of doorstep crime 
locally (ACTSO, 2015, p 8). 
 
Trading Standards has experienced acute cuts to funding in the wake of 
Central Government’s austerity drive, with spending nationally reduced from 
£213 million in 2009, to £124 million in 2015 (CTSI, 2017). Cuts have not 
fallen evenly, with some areas experiencing a greater then 60% reduction in 
their annual budget, resulting in four services receiving an annual budget of 
£200,000 (Silvester, 2016) and some services comprising just one qualified 
officer (NAO, 2016). This severely impacts the level to which Trading 
Standards can be expected to lead work on doorstep crime and has resulted 
in a postcode lottery of service provision, depending on the resources 
available in each Authority. The relationship each department has with the 
local police force is also impacted by geographical location and level of 
resources. For instance, the Thames Valley Police (TVP) force area includes 
separate County Council Trading Standards departments in 
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Buckinghamshire (itself a joint service with Surrey Trading Standards) and 
Oxfordshire, as well as Milton Keynes Trading Standards, and the boroughs 
of Slough, Reading, the Royal Borough of Windsor and Maidenhead, and the 
West Berkshire Trading Standards (run in partnership with Wokingham 
Borough Council). Not only are multiple contacts therefore required, 
depending upon which part of the force area in which an incident occurs, but 
there is likely to be little consistency and significant variability in the level of 
response the police can expect from each Trading Standards department. By 
contrast, the Hertfordshire police force need liaise only with Hertfordshire 
Trading Standards as their geographic remit is the same. 
 
The researcher’s Trading Standards practitioner experience, working with 
TVP, allowed the observation that knowledge of legislation relevant to rogue 
trading incidents amongst the police is generally low. Encountering police 
officers who perceive rogue trading to be a purely civil law issue, or a matter 
solely for Trading Standards enforcement is fairly common. The researcher is 
aware of instances where suspects have effectively been ‘moved along’ having 
already taken thousands of pounds from a victim by police officers 
investigating whether criminal offences have been committed, preferring 
instead to simply curtail further financial loss, whilst simultaneously labelling it 
a ‘non-crime, welfare call for assistance’ (HMIC, 2014). This response seems 
incongruous when compared with the levels of financial loss often involved, 
typically encountered victim demographics and the associated impact victims 
may experience, each of which will be discussed in detail throughout this 
study. 
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The legal framework which forms the backdrop for this crime type is such that 
the vast majority of incidents are recordable offences notifiable to the Home 
Office (Home Office, 2013). The researcher, questioning the appropriateness 
of the police approach sometimes encountered, wanted to explore more widely 
how police respond to rogue trading. From an academic perspective the study 
examines whether white-collar crime is the appropriate lens through which to 
view rogue trading. 
 
A secondary data analysis was deemed the most effective way of exploring 
these questions, because as an outsider, gaining access to willing participants 
would be challenging. Moreover, as it is a necessarily self-selecting sample, 
those that responded may be more interested in rogue trading as a 
phenomenon and their responses may not be representative of wider attitudes, 
potentially calling into question the validity and reliability of the study. There is 
also the potential for the ‘interviewer effect’ (Landsberger, 1958) to impact 
responses, with participants giving model answers rather than it reflecting true 
practice. By contrast, the secondary data provide an accurate reflection of real-
world incidents from the perspective of the responding officer.   
 
Why the study is important 
 
As discussed throughout this research, rogue trading is an under-explored 
crime from academic and practitioner perspectives. Examining police records 
enables an exploration of the circumstances surrounding incidents, thereby 
allowing for observations not simply on policing response, but also more 
broadly regarding victims, offenders, the offences and the academic backdrop. 
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As alluded to, these incidents are deemed sufficiently important by the Home 
Office for the majority to be classified as notifiable offences. The enactment of 
several laws has strengthened the nexus of legislation concerning rogue 
trading. The introduction of the Fraud Act (2006) brought most rogue trader 
incidents firmly into the realm of criminal law, where previously it had been 
more difficult to deal with the matter as anything other than a contractual 
dispute, despite precedent that deliberate overcharging can be a criminal 
matter (see for instance R. V Goldman [1997] Crim LR 894 and R. V Silverman 
[1998] 86 Cr App R 213). In practice, as the offenders routinely use false 
details, the victim’s ability to successfully identify them (and their whereabouts) 
to recover their losses via the civil courts was all but impossible. By 
unambiguously criminalising deliberate false representations in order to make 
a gain, or expose another to a risk of loss (Fraud Act, sections 1 and 2), the 
situation changed immediately. Moreover, fraud is a conduct offence rather 
than a results offence, meaning it is not necessary for a victim to be taken in 
by the false representation in order for the offence to be completed.  
The Fraud Act (Section 9) also contains a fraudulent business charge; highly 
relevant to rogue trading, as evidenced by the Crown Prosecution Service 
(CPS) explicitly recommending that the charge is considered in instances 
where, “rogue "cold calling" traders… submit inflated bills to customers for 
shoddy work (and who often target the elderly or vulnerable).” (CPS, n.d.). 
Subsequent legislation (Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 
2008) has further strengthened the hold of the criminal law on rogue trading 
matters by enacting an offence of misleading action, in large part mirroring the 
offence of fraud by false representation, except for removing the need to prove 
mens rea. It is therefore sufficient that a statement is false or likely to deceive 
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the average customer, even where it is not deliberately dishonest, for it to 
qualify as a recordable criminal offence (Consumer Protection from Unfair 
Trading Regulations, regulations 5 and 9). These Regulation also make illegal 
misleading omissions (Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations, 
regulations 6 and 10) and aggressive commercial practices (with a wide 
definition of ‘aggressive’ encompassing harassment, coercion and undue 
influence as well as outright aggression) where the trading practices are likely 
to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision he would not 
have otherwise taken (Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations, 
regulations 7 and 11). The Regulations also list 31 banned practices which the 
law considers are in all instances unfair. This includes behaviours relevant to 
rogue trading such as displaying an unauthorised trust mark, or falsely stating 
that a product will only be available on particular terms for a very limited time.  
Further legislation introduced in the same year (Cancellation of Contracts 
Made in a Consumer’s Home or Place of Work etc. Regulations 2008) provided 
consumers a cooling off period of 7 days and an opportunity to change their 
mind and cancel the contract where the contract was formed with a trader 
away from the trader’s place of business. The law also required that traders 
give notice of the right to cancel to consumers, creating an offence where they 
failed to do so (Regulation 17). Whilst this legislation has been superseded (by 
the Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) 
Regulations 2013), the newer Regulations came into force only on the 13th 
June 2014, after the end date of the data, making the previous legislation 
applicable. Since the new legislation still requires a cooling off period (now 
increased to 14 days) and provides an offence (Regulation 19) where the 
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trader fails to give notice of the consumer’s right to cancel, for the purposes of 
this study, the change is academic.   
 
Combined with legislation that requires the traders to properly identify those 
behind the entity in business documentation (for instance, the Companies Act 
2006) the legislative framework covering rogue trading is now formidable. 
Despite this, the most comprehensive research studying the police response 
to rogue trading (Steele et al., 2001) was conducted before the vast majority 
of the laws existed. Unsurprisingly the study concluded there was little police 
could do to combat rogue trading given the matter at the time mostly fell 
outside of the scope of the criminal law and therefore the police remit. As such, 
the focus turned instead to preventing the phenomenon by educating the 
public and disrupting the perpetrators through robustly enforcing criminal law 
in respect of distraction burglary, which fell more comfortably within the 
criminal law, and with which rogue trading seemingly overlapped (Steele et al., 
2001; ACTSO, 2014). With the substantial changes to the relevant criminal law 
landscape subsequent to Steele et al’s (2001) study, it is anomalous that rogue 
trading has not since been the subject of considerable further research. The 
detailed, empirical investigation of rogue trading, particularly the police 
response to it, is therefore overdue. 
 
Aims and Objectives 
 
This research aims to utilise the theoretical framework of white-collar crime to 
explore real-world empirical data to reveal findings that increase knowledge 
about the ‘anatomy’ of rogue trading. The overarching aim of the research is 
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to critically examine rogue trading and to consider whether the current 
conceptualisation of white-collar crime provides an adequate framework within 
which to situate this offence. 	
 	
There are 3 objectives for the research: -	
 	
1. To explore, against a backdrop of academic and practitioner research 
describing fraud and white collar crime as under-researched, the research 
process and detail the retrieval of the relevant dataset and the associated 
barriers to research.	
 	
2. To critically examine, using a mixed methods Applied Thematic Analysis, 
what police records can reveal about rogue trader victimisation, the modus 
operandi employed by the perpetrators and the police response the incidents 
receive.	
 	
3. To situate the findings against the framework provided by extant literature 
to contribute to and advance current academic knowledge by addressing a gap 
in the literature and improving understanding of rogue trading, potentially 
allowing for evidence-based decision-making in policy and practice.	
 
 
Thesis Structure 
 
This thesis is broadly structured around the themes that are examined, 
exploring in turn the recording and retrieval process for incidents of rogue 
trading, the victimology, the modus operandi employed by the perpetrators, 
and the police response provided to such incidents against the backdrop of 
white-collar crime and victimology.  
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Chapter 1 introduces the study, research topic and the aims and objectives. It 
provides the definition employed during the research for the term ‘rogue 
trading’ and an outline of the chapters that follow. 
 
Chapter 2 identifies the relevant extant literature, explaining where the study 
of rogue trading fits within a broader criminological framework of white-collar 
crime, victimology and fraud. It summarises the current state of knowledge 
regarding rogue trading and examines the police recording situation, the 
victimology, the actus reus itself and the police response that follows. 
 
Chapter 3 examines the research methodology, the methods employed for the 
research and the rationale for their adoption. 
 
The following four chapters then discuss the findings the data yielded, how 
they fit into the theoretical framework of white-collar crime and victimology, 
how they link back to the extant literature and how they challenge and support 
previous research, and advance our current understandings of rogue trading 
and doorstep crime. These chapters mirror the structure adopted in chapter 2, 
examining those phenomena revealed to be most interesting and rich for study 
as the research progressed, against the broadly-stated aims of advancing 
knowledge of the anatomy of rogue trading; the victimology, the modus 
operandi, and the enforcement response it receives. The structure of the 
chapters combines the results and the analysis within each theme. As the 
results and analysis are intrinsically entwined due to the research being 
theoretically informed and underpinned, separating them seemed arbitrary and 
they have therefore been presented together. 
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Chapter 4, the first reults and analysis chapter, explores the difficulties 
encountered in data retrieval, and the real-world impact of this, in academia 
and practice.  
 
Chapter 5, the second analysis chapter, explores the victimology of rogue 
trading. Utilising qualitative and quantitative methods the chapter explores 
whether (and to what extent) victims are deemed vulnerable by police as well 
as the nature of those vulnerabilities. As chapter 2 details, the field of 
victimology grew, politically at least, as a means of combatting an imbalanced 
public perception between the fear of crime and actual victimisation (Mayhew 
and Hough, 1988; Kearon and Godfrey, 2007; Walklate, 2007). Further, the 
more victim-centric focus allowed for a migration away from the police as solely 
or primarily responsible for crime prevention and detection, placing greater 
prominence on victim precipitation, with scholars and politicians casting 
individuals as ultimately responsible for their own protection and crime 
prevention (Mayhew and Hough, 1988; Daigle, 2013). The victim profile of 
rogue trading is explored against this backdrop. 
 
Chapter 6, the third analysis chapter turns the focus to the offence itself, 
analysing different modus operandi and the extent to which it remains 
consistent with that identified in previous studies, despite their relative scarcity, 
especially within academic literature (Steele et al, 2001; Gorden and 
Buchanan 2013; ACTSO, 2014). As discussed in the Literature Review 
(chapter 2), the majority of studies either deal exclusively with distraction 
burglary (Home Office, 2002; Thornton, Hatton, Ralph and Owen, 2005, Lister 
and Wall, 2006), conflate rogue trading with distraction burglary (Steele et al, 
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2001; Gorden and Buchanan, 2013), or deal more generally with either white-
collar crime (Edelhertz, 1970; Geis and Meier, 1977; Braithwaite, 1985; Daly, 
1989; Croall, 1989, 1992, 2007; Coleman, 1994) or a wider fraud spectrum 
(Doig, 2006; Doing and Levi, 2009; Button, Lewis and Tapley, 2009; Gannon 
and Doig, 2010; Button et al 2012; Tunley, M, 2014;  Police Foundation, 2018). 
Even where academic literature examines specific fraud typologies (see for 
instance; Levi, 1992; Rowlingson, Whyley, Newburn & Berthoud; 1997) the 
focus has not been on rogue trading. This chapter therefore examines the 
findings in respect of the victimology of rogue trading, as identified by the 
police, and in particular the term vulnerability, what it means and whether it 
has any effect on the way the crime is experienced or the response delivered. 
 
Chapter 7, the fourth and final analysis chapter, examines the police response 
afforded to incidents of rogue trading, using both quantitative and qualitative 
techniques. This is an acutely under-researched area with few minor studies 
cursorily considering the area of enforcement, this chapter addresses this, 
focusing empirically upon the enforcement response provided, using police 
officers’ own notes to illustrate in detail the findings. It ties into broader debates 
about the way police view and respond to certain crime types and victims 
(Smith and Freinkel, 1988; Mawby and Walklate, 2002; Walklate, 2007; 
HMICFRS, 2019a, 2019b), the nature of policing, and the police role and remit 
(Macpherson, 2001; HMIC, 2014; Punch and James, 2016; Westera, Kebbel, 
Milne and Green, 2016; HMIC, 2017; Police Foundation, 2018), particularly 
against a backdrop of deregulation and public sector austerity (Tombs, 2016) 
as discussed in chapter 2. This chapter uses officer’s quotes to explore the 
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police response and discuss the implications of the response on enforcement, 
the safeguarding and wellbeing of victims, and crime reduction. 
 
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis, drawing together the major findings, 
discussing their importance and situating them within the framework of current 
literature. It discusses whether white-collar crime provides an adequate 
conceptual backdrop by which to frame the study of rogue trading and offers 
key recommendations and highlights further research opportunities. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
Firstly, this chapter situates the subject of rogue trading within the broader 
academic literature. Using the lens of white-collar crime, it explores the 
discipline of victimology, to contextualise and provide a theoretical and historic 
perspective to this research. This promotes a wider understanding of the 
problems encountered in studying rogue trading (such as definitional 
difficulties, for instance) which are discussed throughout the study. The 
chapter explores the ‘typical’ victim in white-collar crime, fraud and rogue 
trading, and examines the resulting impact victimisation can have, along with 
the reasons for low reporting rates. The chapter then examines what is known 
of the anatomy of the crime and the motives of (and modus operandi employed 
by) perpetrators, before turning focus to the enforcement landscape; the 
agencies involved and their response to rogue trading, explaining how 
definitional and crime recording issues both impact and reflect policy and 
practice.  
This chapter at times uses distraction burglary as a comparator to inform and 
illustrate the picture regarding rogue trading, and extensive reference is made 
to several Home Office and ‘grey literature’ reports, notably Steele et al. 
(2001), ACTSO (2014, 2015). These empirical, practitioner-driven reports are 
detailed and wide-ranging, helping to increase understanding of doorstep 
crime, rogue trading and the police response to fraud respectively. Whilst not 
peer-reviewed academic works they are thorough and methodologically 
sound, making the analysis and conclusions both valid and valuable. The more 
so because these are areas of study that academia has largely overlooked 
(Gorden and Buchanan, 2013). These reports therefore give tangible, 
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evidence-based findings, contributing to an under-explored area, providing a 
benchmark and comparator against which the results of this study can be 
measured that would otherwise be absent from the discussion. Nonetheless, 
it is telling that the one extensive report examining doorstep crime from the 
police perspective (Steele et al., 2001) is approaching two decades since 
publication, and predates legislative changes reinforcing the criminal law 
landscape in respect of this crime type. 
 
Rogue trading and white-collar crime 
 
Criminologically, the study of rogue trading stems from the sphere of white-
collar crime and represents a sub-set of fraud studies (Smith, Button, Johnston 
and Frimpong, 2011), yet neither of these umbrella phenomena are 
‘mainstream’ within criminology, and both remain under-explored to varying 
degrees (Box, 1983; Doig, 2006; Croall, 2007a; Levi, 2008a; Smith, Button, 
Johnston and Frimpong, 2011), resulting in a ‘dearth’ of literature (Gorden and 
Buchanan, 2013) relating to the more specific fraud typology of rogue trading. 
Indeed, white-collar crime was originally the subject of heated debate as to 
whether its study constituted (or was relevant to) criminology (Tappan, 1947; 
Box, 1983), which was at the time predominately concerned with working class 
and street crime. Whilst the study of white-collar crime has since been 
accepted it nonetheless remained “confined to the shadows” of criminological 
research, at least until the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 (Geis, 2016, p 25). 
In part, this may be because defining white-collar crime is problematic (Croall, 
	 33	
1989; Hartley, 2008; Smith, Button, Johnston and Frimpong, 2011), with most 
attempts proving insufficient (Green, 2004) and a split between offender 
(Braithwaite, 1985) and law-based perspectives on the definitions (Albanese, 
1996). This difficulty in definitively defining white-collar crime (Newburn, 2007) 
is highlighted when one uses rogue trading as a practical example; it fits within 
some definitions employed for white-collar crime, but is excluded from others. 
Sutherland, who coined the phrase, defined it is as “approximately a crime 
committed by persons of high social status and respectability in the course of 
their occupation” (1949, p 9). Rogue trading would not fit within this definition 
given the manual labourers, tradespersons and salespersons of home 
improvements such as double glazing which perpetrate the crime type would 
not traditionally be perceived as commanding a high social status, nor, 
(according to Sutherland) would the professional offenders since ‘wealthy 
members of the underworld’ are not ‘persons of respectability’. Indeed, 
Sutherland’s work can be said to have concentrated almost exclusively on 
corporate wrongdoing (Geis, 2016, p 32). 
However, ‘unnecessary home repairs’ now fall squarely within the scope of 
study of The National White-Collar Crime Center (NW3C) in the United States 
of America (NW3C, 2006, 2010), despite it sitting uneasily within Reiss and 
Biderman’s (1980, p 4) definition of “violations of the law to which penalties are 
attached that involve the use of the violator’s position of significant power, 
influence or trust in the legitimate economic or political institutional order for 
the purpose of illegal gain”. This is because, again, it is hard to perceive rogue 
traders as occupying a position of significant power or influence within the 
legitimate economic or political order. More complicated still, rogue trading can 
simultaneously meet, and fall outside of, Croall’s definition (1992, p 9), due to 
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her use of the phrase “in the course of legitimate employment”. Here, those 
incidents where an otherwise legitimate trader succumbs to an opportunity to 
take advantage of a customer would meet the definition (so-called ‘crimes of 
everyday life’)(Felson, 2002; Gabor, 1994), whereas those where the ‘trade’ is 
merely a vehicle by which the career criminal perpetrates fraud would fall 
outside it. Ongoing disagreement as to whether white-collar crime includes 
corporate harms outside the criminal law realm (as argued by Tombs (2010)), 
state and environmental crimes captured by the regulatory or administrative 
law framework (Green and Ward, 2000) and even the ‘lawful but awful’ 
(Passas, 2005) ensures the breadth of study is vast, even whilst remaining 
under-explored. The potential wide scope of the discipline, coupled with its 
peripheral status, have ensured that more ‘traditional’ crimes such as rogue 
trading that sit near the borderline of definitions have received scant attention. 
Consequently, it is clear why debate over the definition of white-collar crime 
continues (Benson, Van Slyke and Cullen, 2016; Geis, 2016; Levi, 2019), 
variously being described as being too broad (Geis and Meier, 1977; Shapiro, 
1990; Slapper and Tombs, 1999), too narrow (Edelhertz, 1970; Daly, 1989) or 
imprecise (Pearce, 1976; Albanese, 1995). This debate is mirrored in 
discussions of rogue trading, which also suffers from the same lack of a 
definitive definition (Day, 2015). Similarly, prior to the introduction of the Fraud 
Act it was “an impossible task for police forces to account statistically for 
‘fraud’” (Gannon and Doig, 2010, p 45) more widely, because it also had no 
specific criminal definition. Defining fraud has also been problematic, with both 
legal and theoretical concepts coexisting (Smith, Button, Johnston and 
Frimpong, 2011) with the widest theoretical positions encompassing such a 
vast array of activity as to, in effect, criminalise lying (Ormerod, 2007). This 
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leaves existing sources of data with ‘weaknesses and inconsistencies’ (Levi 
and Burrows, 2008, p 298) resulting in the under-representation of 
criminological studies of fraud.  
Even where fraud is the subject of study, there are often difficulties; the 
methodologies used by some of the professional consulting firms lack detail 
and are therefore difficult to assess in terms of validity or academic rigour (Levi 
and Burrows, 2008). This is particularly so regarding fraud against private 
individuals (i.e. most rogue trading incidents), which in addition to the problems 
identified above, (and despite losses estimated at £2.75 billion)(Levi and 
Burrows, 2008) receives very little attention (Shover, Coffey and Hobbs, 2003; 
Karstedt and Farrall, 2006; NW3C, 2006) due to it being “invisible” (Croall, 
1999), and covered neither in the corporate fraud surveys nor in the public 
sector reviews.” (Levi and Burrows 2008, p 309). This is compounded by the 
underrepresentation of fraud in official crime statistics, with only a small 
proportion of frauds recorded by the criminal justice system (CJS) (Great 
Britain. Home Office, 2005a), the absence of fraud (Sutton, 2007), until 
October 2015, from the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) (Office 
for National Statistics (ONS), 2016), and a lack of reporting in the media, 
unless depicting it largely as a form of ‘infotainment’ (Levi and Burrows, 2008). 
Similarly, concerns regarding the efficacy of police crime statistics and the 
deliberate and systematic under-recording of crimes in order to improve figures 
more generally (Peachey, 2014; Barrett, 2013; Doyle, 2014; BBC, 2018) also 
harm the validity of police crime statistics regarding fraud. 
 
Levi and Borrows (2008) also identify that neglect of fraud is not simply a media 
issue. Recent research supports the view that fraud is, despite making up a 
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third of recorded crimes, not prioritised by police (Button et al., 2007; Levi, 
2008b; Doig and Levi, 2009; Smith, Button, Johnston and Frimpong, 2011; 
Button et al., 2013; Police Foundation, 2018; HMICFRS, 2019b). Levi and 
Jones’ (1985) study showing that police officers perceive low detriment 
burglary (£20) as more serious than fraud, despite public perception to the 
contrary is supportive of this. In addition, low detection rates (just 3% of 
reported incidents, set against 13.5% for all police recorded offences)(Police 
Foundation, 2018 p 4 and 30) suggest the low priority afforded to fraud (Police 
Foundation, 2018) may be adversely impacting performance. 
 
Latterly there has been greater attention paid, politically at least, to fraud, with 
its recent inclusion in the CSEW. This indicates fraud now accounts for 31% 
of all crime in England and Wales (Great Britain. ONS, 2016; 2017). The 
increase in rates of fraud can be attributed to the growth and increased 
accessibility of the internet, moving fraud from “being a corporate ‘white-collar’ 
crime dealt with by specialist law enforcement units to a volume crime affecting 
millions of individual victims, many of whom expect a local policing response 
similar to that taken in response to other types of crime.” (Police Foundation, 
2018, p 3). Whilst prevalence alone suggests that dealing with this fraud 
should be a core police function, the difficulty for police and enforcement 
bodies is that fraud does not adhere to tradition insofar as the vast majority of 
cases (78% in 2016-2017)(Police Foundation, 2018, p 3) involve a suspect 
and victim in different police force areas. Ownership of cases can become 
contentious, investigations may involve joint-working across force areas and 
the resources required to deal effectively with the investigation are often 
greater. 
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White-collar crime and victimology 
 
It is widely accepted that victimology has “largely neglected victimization from 
white-collar crime” (Croall, 2016, p 59) and that many aspects of victimisation 
remain without systematic exploration (Croall, 2007b; Whyte 2007; McGurrin 
and Friedrichs 2010; Croall, 2016). In part this neglect may be a result of 
victimisation being largely invisible and unrecognised by victims themselves 
(Croall, 2007b), such as with air pollution, or food and product safety (Croall, 
2016). Other incidents may be recognised but accepted without victims 
identifying as such and yet more may blame themselves and deal with the 
matter privately (Croall, 2016). Nonetheless, the scale of losses to white-collar 
crime is considerable with, for instance, £11 billion lost to the mis-selling of 
pensions in 1998 alone, and £130 billion lost as a result of 5 million mortgage 
frauds (Tombs and Whyte, 2010). Moreover, the wider impact of white-collar 
crime is said to be beyond that of conventional crime, with loss of employment, 
homes and retirement funds (McGurrin and Friedrichs, 2010; Croall, 2016). 
Also associated are health implications, such as pollution from environmental 
crime causing premature deaths (as well as habitat destruction and threats to 
biodiversity of the natural world), and unsafe food, products and working 
conditions resulting in deaths and injuries (Tombs, 2010), where the impact is 
said to fall “most severely on the poorest” (Croall, 2016, p 70). 
The ‘typical’ victim profile and reasons why victimisation occurs is also 
contentious for consumer fraud more specifically. Considerable debate exists 
as to whether older persons are more likely to be victimised than those of a 
younger generation (Ross, Grossman and Schryer, 2014). However, the 
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“endless array” (Cross, 2016 p 61) of ways in which fraud can manifest mean 
generalised conclusions about fraud victims are largely unhelpful. Different 
methods of approach, from mass-marketed postal communication, telephone 
or internet fraud, to more traditional face-to-face communication are likely to 
appeal to different audiences. Equally, a multitude of fraud types, including but 
not limited to advanced fee frauds such as fake lottery wins, inheritance frauds; 
fraudulent investment opportunities such as wine, diamonds, precious metals 
and crypto currencies; romance scams; property rental scams; ticketing and 
recruitment frauds may vary in their appeal to different demographics (National 
Fraud Authority (NFA), 2011). Theories on the causes of victimisation also 
differ, however, the two dominant discourses surrounding the victimisation of 
older persons both depict a negative image of victims, reinforcing and 
perpetuating the stigma associated with victimisation (Cross, 2016; Cross, 
Richards and Smith, 2016), potentially amplifying the under-reporting of fraud 
as a result. One school of thought holds that inherent characteristics of older 
persons result in vulnerability; cognitive decline makes it difficult for victims to 
discern fraudulent attempts, and physical decline leads to increased social 
isolation and potential for associated loneliness, meaning greater susceptibility 
to approaches. The prominence of frailty and helplessness in this theoretical 
perspective promotes disempowerment and stigmatisation of victims (Green, 
2007; Cross, 2013, 2015). The second discourse increases stigmatisation by 
casting fraud victims as gullible, greedy, or lacking in self-control and partly 
responsible for their victimisation (Cross, 2013, 2015), (see for instance Lee 
and Soberon-Ferrer, 1997; Holtfreter, Reisig and Pratt, 2008).  
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As outlined, the field of victimology, like white-collar crime, fraud and rogue 
trading, originally sat largely outside of the mainstream of criminology. Its 
origins and early focus on the extent to which victims could be said to be 
culpable or in part responsible for their victimisation (Daigle, 1998; Cross, 
2013, 2015) served to marginalise the discipline. Its concentration on 
identifying types of victims mirrored criminology’s early endeavours in 
attempting to identify types of criminal (Walklate, 2005). Latterly, the use of 
victimology for largely political means (Green, 2007) to highlight that public 
perception and fear of crime are often disproportionate to the likelihood of 
victimisation (Mayhew and Hough, 1988; Kearon and Godfrey, 2007; Walklate, 
2007; Green, 2007), in particular of street crime specifically amongst older 
persons and the middle-class, may also have delayed its adoption to 
mainstream criminology. The re-casting of the individual as ultimately 
responsible for their own safety and crime prevention (Mayhew and Hough, 
1988; Daigle, 2013) has proliferated, despite victimology being far more 
sophisticated and nuanced than in the discipline’s early days where victim 
precipitation, or even blaming, was prevalent. Regardless of its aspirations of 
objectivity, there is still but a small conceptual step between studying the victim 
in order to facilitate crime reduction and prevention, and accepting a ‘Just-
World’ thinking viewpoint (Staub, 1989) or harbouring “an unavoidable 
tendency toward victim blaming” (Karmen, 2013, p 132) and some have 
likened fraud victimology to that of rape and domestic abuse, in that victims 
can be perceived as “undeserving” (Button et al., 2009). Nevertheless, there 
is now a growing recognition of the “importance of studying the other half of 
the crime-victim dyad” (Daigle, 2013 p xvii). This is particularly true for offences 
such as doorstep crime incidents, since a similar victim profile is repeatedly 
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cited by researchers, and the fraudulent attempt requires that a victim engages 
in order for the crime to be successfully completed (Holtfreter, Reisig and 
Blomberg, 2006). Therefore, examining the behaviour of the perpetrator 
without also considering the reactions of victims is to miss an opportunity, in 
particular one that might have practical implications for crime reduction and 
victim safeguarding. Moreover, without concerted study and awareness 
raising, “victim services are likely to remain “precarious and under-funded” and 
their needs unassisted (Elias, 1992, p 91). A dynamic model is needed, “that 
takes into account initiatives and responses, actions and reactions, and each 
participant’s motives and intentions” (Karmen, 2013, p 120). Moreover, the 
field of victimology is broad, encompassing not just the causes of victimisation, 
but also the consequences, and how victims are dealt with by the police, CJS 
and even the media (Daigle, 1998). This has assisted in identifying the far-
reaching effects that are rarely accounted for, including wider system costs 
such as those of the law enforcement and criminal justice response, and care 
costs (whether in the form of hospital and health care or social care and mental 
health). Likewise, there exists vicarious victimisation (Daigle, 1998) such as 
family members giving up work to provide care for an elderly family member 
experiencing a loss of independence as a result of victimisation. 
 
Much victimological work has concentrated on violent and street crime, with 
white-collar crime victimisation receiving scant attention (Ganzini, McFarland 
and Bloom, 1990; Moore and Mills, 1990; Croall,1999, 2016), leading Croall 
(1999, p 30) to conclude, “the recent focus on the impact of crime on victims 
and communities has by and large not included research on the impact of… 
fraud… or many other forms of white-collar offending.”  Similarly, older victims 
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of crime have also tended to be overlooked (Brogden and Nighar, 2000; Powell 
and Wahidin, 2008) and, in keeping with many of the terms considered in this 
study, “definitional and conceptual ambiguity” (Powell and Wahidin, 2008, p 
93) cause difficulties to the study of older persons and victimisation. Research 
which does concentrate on age as a factor in victimisation tends to conclude 
that older adults are generally less likely to experience crime than those that 
are younger (Great Britain. Home Office, 2002; Thornton, Hatton, Ralph and 
Owen, 2005). Examining victimology specific to rogue trading is complicated 
not only by the lack of a definition for the phenomenon, but also due to the lack 
of an identifier for the crime type on police systems; as will now be discussed, 
this makes identification and consistency problematic.  
 
Lack of identifier for rogue trading in police systems 
 
The ambiguity and lack of definitive definition for rogue trading is a problem 
not just for academic research, but also both the practical performance-
management of, and enforcement response to, the criminality. It is a recurring 
problem within criminal justice, afflicting not only white-collar crime, doorstep 
crime and rogue trading (as already outlined) but areas as diverse as terrorism 
(Ridley, 2012, p 51) and stalking. Indeed, parallels between rogue trading and 
stalking are especially relevant considering recent findings from the HMIC 
(2017, p 7) that conclude stalking is misunderstood by police (and the CPS), 
often unrecognised and unrecorded; charges which have equally been leveled 
at rogue trading (Steele et al., 2001; ACTSO 2014, 2015; Aplin, 2015). For 
stalking, this lack of an “exhaustive definition” (HMIC, 2017, p 7) is credited as 
“a very significant contributory factor to the unacceptably low number of 
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recorded crimes and prosecutions” (HMIC, 2017, p 7) and again, rogue trading 
is analogous. 
 
Additionally, research involving rogue trading tends to share focus with 
distraction burglary, or ‘burglary artifice’ (Home Office, 2003a), with little 
literature or research specific to rogue trading. The concentration of research 
on distraction burglary is anomalous given the belief that rogue trading is more 
prevalent and more lucrative than distraction burglary (Steele et al, 2001; Day, 
2015). Furthermore, there is commonly a conflation of distraction burglary with 
rogue trading (Thornton et al, 2005; Gorden and Buchanan, 2013) perhaps 
understandably, given the considerable overlap identified between the two 
crime types (Steele et al. 2001; ACPO, 2011; Barratt, 2012). The ‘mischief’ of 
both offences is fraud, perpetrators of each are known to commit the other, 
and both are said to have a similar victim profile (Steele et al, 2001; Great 
Britain. Home Office, 2003b; Great Britain. Home Office, 2004a; Thornton, et 
al, 2005; Lister and Wall, 2006; ACPO, 2011; Barratt 2012; Gorden and 
Buchanan, 2013). However, this conflation may have resulted in an inaccurate 
or incomplete portrayal of each phenomenon, with the landscape far more 
nuanced than has been reported. For instance, the average loss resulting from 
distraction burglary has been calculated as £648.36 (Operation Liberal, n.d.), 
whereas average losses from rogue trading are £1000 (ACTSO, 2014, p 5) 
and £1280 for incidents reported to Trading Standards (ACTSO, 2015, p 13), 
and £3500 (ACTSO, 2015, p 14) to £4650 for those reported to the National 
Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) (ACTSO, 2014, p 5). In terms of evidence-
based enforcement, the conflation of rogue trading and distraction burglary 
may therefore have led to limited resources being channeled to issues 
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potentially less serious or commonplace, at the expense of those of greater 
prevalence and severity. The preoccupation with burglary artifice is likely the 
result of the difficulties in measuring and studying rogue trading. Unlike rogue 
trading, distraction burglary benefits from a Home Office definition and a crime 
code for identification and classification on police systems. Consequently the 
retrieval of data on this distinct crime type is far simpler. The definition provides 
clarity and a definitive phenomenon to study, and the crime code enables the 
swift, accurate retrieval of a relevant dataset. 
 
Rogue trading, as with white-collar crime, remains a more nebulous concept 
as a result of its lack of definition perpetuating uncertainty over what 
constitutes a criminal offence and what represents a civil law matter of sharp 
practice (Smith, Button, Johnston and Frimpong, 2011). Moreover, the lack of 
a crime code for rogue trading, or ‘flag’ to identify it on police databases, 
compounds matters resulting in problems with the retrieval of incidents (plus 
information and intelligence they may yield), leaving 62% of forces 
acknowledging they are currently unable to analyse and monitor its prevalence 
within their areas (ACTSO, 2015). Thousands of records need scrutiny to 
identify a small number of relevant incidents (Day, 2015) and police forces, 
crime researchers and intelligence analysts lack sufficient resources to make 
such searches feasible. A similar situation exists for Trading Standards where 
16,900 rogue trader incidents were reported across England and Wales in 
2014 (ACTSO, 2015), but again, conducting empirical academic research is 
problematic because of difficulties in filtering and retrieving relevant records. 
The analysis of trends, prevalence and modus operandi (M.O.) is therefore 
unfeasible, as is evaluation of any initiatives (or their effectiveness) 
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implemented to tackle the criminality (Eck and Spelman, 1987; Ekblom,1990; 
Ekblom and Pease, 1995; Eck 2005). As Levi and Burrows (2008) suggest, 
what is and what is not collected in terms of statistics can give an indication as 
to which social problems are felt by the state to be important; and the lack of 
any detailed collation and reporting of information on fraud generally, and 
rogue trading specifically, speaks for itself. Furthermore, along with the 
consequently time-consuming nature of the research providing a practical 
barrier, there also exists considerable potential for collateral access to 
sensitive or personal data within the data population. Ethical and legal 
concerns therefore also create serious obstruction to academic research on 
the subject.  
 
The concentration of research focused on distraction burglary as opposed to 
rogue trading may also result from the higher profile afforded the crime, in the 
media, public recognition and enforcement attention. This is in large part a 
result of the violent killing of an elderly distraction burglary victim in West 
Yorkshire in 1997 (Chartered Trading Standards Institute (CTSI), 2010). The 
case rapidly escalated from a distraction burglary to aggravated burglary, and 
on to murder when the victim did not acquiesce to the perpetrators’ demands 
for money. It was the violent murder which garnered attention initially, rather 
than the attempted distraction burglary which precipitated it. Ultimately, the 
victim was identified as a repeat victim of rogue traders, with numerous cheque 
stubs indicating payments for home repairs to untraceable ‘companies’; yet no 
such increase in profile of rogue trading resulted, beyond, perhaps, a failed 
private members bill to outlaw cold-calling (Home Office, 2004b). In the 
aftermath of the investigation into this violent death burglary artifice was given 
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a Home Office definition and crime code. It is partly this introduction which has 
afforded the opportunity to better empirically study the phenomenon. The 
increased enforcement attention and higher profile it received due to the crime 
code (alongside public awareness raising and crime reduction initiatives) may 
have led to offenders re-evaluating whether distraction burglary offers an 
attractive means by which to elicit criminal gain. Table 1 shows the longitudinal 
decline in the number of recorded distraction burglaries since the introduction 
of the crime code for the offence in April 2003 (Lister and Wall, 2006). 
 
Table 1: Distraction Burglary offences in England and Wales (Day, 2015 p 
192). 
 
Distraction Burglary Offences in England and Wales 
 
Financial year Number 
Recorded 
Number 
Detected 
Percentage 
Detected 
2000 just over 16,000 
 
- - 
2001-2002 18,664   747-1120  Between 4-6%  
 
2003-2004 15,113  
 
- - 
2006-2007 12,750 
 
1,358 10.65 
2007-2008 10,635 
 
961 9.04 
 
2008-2009 9,090 
 
1,192 13.11 
2009-2010 7,657 
 
1,064 13.9 
2010-2011 6,024 
 
1,132 18.79 
2011-2012 4,831 
 
1,010 21.00 
2012-2013 3,562 
 
655 18.00 
2013-2014 3,068 
 
- - 
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Importantly, at the time of the introduction of the definition and crime code for 
distraction burglary the legislative framework surrounding rogue trading was 
such that many incidents fell outside the scope of criminal law, therefore 
making the simultaneous creation of a crime code for rogue trading impossible. 
Latterly, as explained in chapter 1, this situation has altered with the 
introduction of legislation (such as the Fraud Act, and the Consumer Protection 
from Unfair Trading Regulations) ensuring the majority of incidents are now 
recordable criminal offences (Day, 2015) under Home Office Counting Rules 
(HOCR)(Home Office 2012a, 2012b). However, despite these changes to the 
legal landscape affording the opportunity, no crime code or definition has 
followed. The author posits the theory that the decline in number of distraction 
burglaries might have resulted in a corresponding increase in rates of rogue 
trading (Day, 2015) as there is an established overlap between the two crimes 
(Steele et al., 2001; Thornton et al., 2005; ACTSO, 2014), with offenders 
known to engage in both, and to switch method depending upon the situation. 
As discussed, rogue trading is typically more lucrative for perpetrators than 
distraction burglary (Steele et al., 2001; ACTSO, 2014, 2015; Day, 2015) and 
this might therefore have led to an increase in the use of rogue trading as a 
method of offending instead of burglary artifice. 
 
In addition to the lack of definition and crime code, echoing white-collar crime 
(historically seen as outside of the scope of criminality, and low priority within 
the CJS (Tappan, 1946)), further recent changes in the way fraud is policed 
have led to the potential particularisation of reporting, recording and retrieval 
of rogue trading incidents. Nationally, since April 2013 (Action Fraud, 
2013)(and since December 2012 in the Thames Valley Police (TVP) force 
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area)(TVP, no date) frauds categorised as ‘in progress’ are dealt with by the 
local police force, and recorded within that force area, whereas reports of 
frauds that have already occurred are directed to the NFIB, via the Action 
Fraud helpline and recorded centrally. The rationale for NFIB referrals was to 
have a single, central, national recording of fraud, to grow expertise about 
prevalent and emerging fraud M.O.s, and better gauge the extent of fraud 
nationally, rather than have it dissipated throughout each individual force. 
Whilst this recording protocol avoids ‘double counting’ frauds occurring across 
different force areas and may arguably help identify linked offences, the 
storage of information and reports in different locations dependent upon when 
they are reported (coupled with the lack of crime flag or code) causes further 
difficulties in the retrieval of information. Rather than centralise fraud recording, 
the move seems to have further fragmented it, with each individual force area 
recording local frauds in progress, and a further agency recording all 
completed frauds at national level. In practice the distinction may be even more 
problematic, with potential for variation and confusion as to what is retained 
and dealt with by local forces, and concerns regarding the performance of 
Action Fraud as a reporting route, with referrals being missed or delayed 
(Beckfor Thed, 2013; Police Foundation, 2018). 
 
The change in protocol for the recording and counting rules for fraud might 
also have an effect on the public’s attitude to reporting incidents of rogue 
trading. There is already concern regarding levels of under-reporting both for 
fraud generally (Button, Tapley and Lewis, 2013) and rogue trading specifically 
(Steele, 2001; Thornton et al, 2005; ACTSO, 2014; ACTSO, 2015), and if the 
multitude of report receiving bodies (Button, Tapley and Lewis, 2013) makes 
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it unclear for the public as to which agency a report should be directed, it further 
adversely impacts reporting. Similarly if an individual perceives being 
signposted elsewhere when they try to report an incident locally means it is not 
being deemed sufficiently important and is indicative of the police lacking 
interest, the reporting person may be deterred from reporting to the signposted 
agency (Button, Tapley and Lewis, 2013; HMICFRS, 2019a). This ‘mixed 
economy of support’ is all the more important given that those dissatisfied with 
the enforcement response experience more adverse effects through anxiety 
than those satisfied with the level of response provided (Great Britain. Home 
Office, 2003b). This also has a knock-on effect on the study of rogue trading, 
as has been previously recognised with elite deviance; “if there are undetected 
conspiracies, no one, no matter what their definition… will be able to study 
either the nature or impact of such deeds. All theories… rest on empirical 
measures, and without the data, there are simply no means available to study 
what takes place” (Simon, 1996, p 89). Whilst the prevailing backdrop is of a 
limited response to fraud and white-collar crime, and difficulties in studying the 
phenomenon of rogue trading have limited the current state of knowledge, 
nonetheless several themes appear consistently in the literature which indicate 
the topic of rogue trading requires further attention. This chapter will now 
identify these themes and discuss the findings, to contextualise the current 
state of knowledge around these crimes, beginning with the victim profile. 
 
The victim profile of rogue trading 
 
Despite the marginalisation of older persons in criminological research (South, 
2014, Phillips, 2016a), a topic consistently raised, with regard doorstep crime 
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generally (Steele et al, 2001; Great Britain. Home Office, 2003b; Great Britain. 
Home Office, 2004a, Thornton et al, 2005; Lister and Wall, 2006; Gorden and 
Buchanan, 2013, Age UK, 2018), telemarketing fraud (Hines, 2001) more 
broadly, and rogue trading specifically (Steele et al, 2001, p 19; Kent Trading 
Standards, 2008; ACPO, 2011; Alzheimer’s Society, 2011; Gorden and 
Buchanan, 2013), is the victimisation of older and vulnerable persons. 
Generally, crime rates indicate older people are less at risk of victimisation 
than younger individuals (Great Britain. Home Office, 2002; Thornton, Hatton, 
Ralph and Owen, 2005), but for fraud, those over 65 represent 35% of victims 
(despite making up only 18% of the population), and those aged 75 or over 
22% of victims (8% of the population) (BBC, 2015b). 
 
The age profile of rogue trader victims shows 65% of victims aged 75 and over, 
and more than 20% of all victims aged 80 to 84 years old. The gender split 
indicates females comprise 54% of victims, and 57% of victims lived alone, 
with 14% stating they did not have many people they can trust completely 
(ACTSO, 2015). Professional experience also shows a correlation between 
being a victim of rogue trading and being regarded as an ‘at risk adult’. 
Thornton et al. (2006) highlighted that 80% of doorstep crime victims were 
already known to Adult Social Care at the point of victimisation. More recent 
data indicates that 14% had formal care provision and a further 16% stated 
they would like more care (ACTSO, 2015). In particular, those with cognitive 
impairments such as dementia seem disproportionately at risk, with surveys 
identifying that 26% of victims said they, or those close to them, had concerns 
about their memory, although only 12% had received a professional mental 
capacity test. 13% of victims were experiencing a cognitive impairment such 
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as dementia, and 13% had a mental health condition, such as depression 
(ACTSO, 2015). The increased risk of victimisation of those with mental health 
issues, in particular those that are severe, is generally in line with crime 
victimisation (and repeat victimisation) amongst those with severe mental 
illness (SMI) where 45% of people experiencing SMI were victims of crime in 
the last year (Pettit et al, 2013). 
 
Those vulnerable to rogue trader victimisation are also vulnerable to repeat 
incidents, particularly given that 18% of victims indicated they would deal with 
cold callers in the future, and 23% believed they had been victim to fraud or a 
scam in the past. An additional concern is the propensity of doorstep criminals 
to share information with associates to facilitate further victimisation. Indeed, 
despite low rates of reporting and recording of repeat victimisation, 7% of 
rogue trader victims were already known to Local Authorities as repeat victims 
(ACTSO, 2015), calling into question the victim’s ability to safeguard 
themselves, and the effectiveness of the Local Authority’s response. Coupled 
with the fact that 69% of victims deemed the offenders friendly, 60% that they 
were polite and 45% that they were trustworthy (ACTSO, 2015), it is clear that 
a repeat of the scenario that led to their being victimised is possible.  
 
Loneliness and social isolation are also factors in victimisation of older adults 
(Cross, 2016), particularly with regards repeat victimisation. The detrimental 
impact of loneliness on health is recognised (Goodman et al., 2015); in 
particular the likelihood of cognitive decline in later life (Tilves et al, 2004; 
Bennett, 2006; James et al, 2011), depression (Beeson et al., 2000; Golden et 
al., 2009), poorer sleep quality (Hawkley et al., 2010b), higher blood pressure 
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(Hawkley et al, 2006; Hawkley et al., 2010a) and an increased human stress 
response (Steptoe et al, 2004). The psychological and physical effects of 
loneliness are now understood to be “comparable with well-established risk 
factors for mortality… [such as] physical activity, obesity, substance abuse” 
(Holt-Lunstad et al, 2015, p 235) yet there is little research into the effects 
loneliness might also have on decision-making. Lee and Geistfeld (1999) and 
Hines (2001) posit that lonely older adults are more likely to engage with cold-
callers, thereby making them more susceptible to victimisation as a result, and 
Cacioppo and Patrick (2008, p 16) argue that, “when loneliness is 
protracted…distorted social cognition… [means] we may become less able to 
evaluate other people’s intentions, which makes us vulnerable to manipulation 
by anyone trying to conceal ulterior motives.” It is also difficult to gauge to what 
extent the arrival of a social contact to a lonely and isolated individual may be 
welcomed irrespective of the recognition of their intention to deceive. Some 
victims “perversely see being defrauded as worthwhile by dint of the human 
interaction it offers” (Phillips, 2016b p 616). Again, victim impact surveys 
(ACTSO, 2014; 2015) illustrate the high proportion of reported victims who 
suffer from loneliness, with (41%) stating they experience loneliness, and 
(26%) describing being lonely everyday (ACTSO, 2015). Whether or not there 
is a causal link is uncertain, but social isolation and a lack of peers with whom 
to discuss decisions could be factors that increase vulnerability (Cross, 2016). 
The figures may also be skewed by offenders deliberately targeting those they 
deem to be most attractive and least able to repel their attempts due to 
vulnerabilities (Reiboldt and Vogel, 2003). Informed offenders exploiting 
loneliness is noted by Steele et al. (2001), and is discussed further in chapter 
6. 
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In terms of physical health, 43.5% of rogue trader victims had a long-standing 
illness such as cancer, diabetes or heart disease, 63% a physical impairment, 
such as mobility issues and 39% a sensory impairment and 38% of victims 
reported having falls, with 23% of those unable to get up themselves (ACTSO, 
2015). 43% of victims had a handrail, key safe or ramp providing visual 
indicators of potential vulnerability (ACTSO, 2015) and daily tasks were difficult 
for victims, with 24% unable to clean their homes, 22% unable to get to and 
from medical appointments and 20% unable to manage their shopping 
showing a significant proportion of rogue trader victims are clearly struggling 
to cope, whilst retaining a relatively high level of independence and not 
necessarily qualifying for social service support. The impact victimisation can 
have may amplify victims’ struggles, triggering increased dependency, 
physical and mental health problems and financial hardship. 
 
Victim impact 
 
In common with every facet of rogue trading the victim impact is not well 
understood and there is little literature exploring the issue. The financial cost 
of rogue trading has been considered (ACTSO, 2015), but the caveat that 
some 90% of incidents go unreported casts doubts upon the reliability of these 
figures. The study also highlights the variance in cost according to which 
agency the incident was reported to, with an average loss calculated from 
police records higher than those reported to Trading Standards (£4650 to 
£1000 respectively in 2014 and £3500 to £1280 respectively in 2015) 
suggesting a public perception of police as the more appropriate reporting 
agency for higher-value criminality. The figures also illustrate fluctuation year-
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to-year, though as no other data exists it is impossible to conclude whether 
they are anomalous, indicative of a longer-term trend, or which of the figures 
might be more representative of the ‘normal’ average. The clouded figure of 
impact, in terms of financial loss and the wider harm is reflective of the situation 
with fraud of all forms, with impact “more the subject of rhetoric than of serious 
empirical investigation” (Levi and Burrows, 2008, p 294). 
 
As discussed (see p 42), there is a greater financial loss associated with rogue 
trading than distraction burglary. Again, the validity of the average is difficult to 
gauge without annualized comparators, notwithstanding the high levels of 
under-reporting that might also undermine the figure, but nevertheless, as a 
snapshot, it bolsters the belief that the conflation of distraction burglary and 
rogue trading may obscure important information, causing confusion and 
precluding evidence-based decisions on either crime type. Intuitively, given 
house price variation nationally, there could also be wide variation in the cost 
of rogue trading depending upon geographical location, but testing this theory 
would require comparative analysis. The difficulties in average loss 
calculations raised above are due to the under-reporting, the difficulty in 
retrieving records from police (ACTSO, 2015) and the unlikelihood of Trading 
Standards, if a repeat victim is identified or financial investigation unearths 
multiple additional victims, to update their database with additional information 
regarding the detriment (ACTSO, 2015). Conversely it is also difficult to 
illustrate the financial benefit, to professional offenders, of this type of crime as 
a consequence. Thus an accurate evaluation of whether it constitutes serious 
organised crime is challenging. The calculations for average losses in respect 
of rogue trading also fail to account for any additional costs incurred by victims 
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requiring remedial work to their property, following ‘work’ carried out by rogue 
traders. This ‘work’ is often poorly executed, uses cheap materials (to 
maximise criminal gains) or results in deliberate damage as a method of 
convincing the victim of the need for further work (and additional payment). 
Moreover, there are instances of victims transferring ownership of properties 
to rogue traders in lieu of payment, when savings and funds have been 
exhausted (R. V Tomney and others, [2012] EWCA Crim 2545; Hull, 2013; 
Carswell, 2015; CTSI, 2016). It is unknown how widespread such a practice 
is, but easy to envisage the impact on the financial loss. It is likely therefore 
that the figures underestimate the true financial costs to victims. These 
additional costs are absent from burglary artifice offences (and most fraud 
typologies) further increasing the gap between the average losses of the two 
crime types (Day, 2017), again highlighting both the difficulty, and potential 
dangers, of conflating the study of the offences.  
 
In terms of impact, victims often suffer beyond the financial cost to the victim 
in distraction burglary and rogue trading cases. Having cautioned against the 
conflation of the crime types, given the premise for rogue trading and 
distraction burglary is the same, drawing a parallel is useful nonetheless, 
because research on the impact of rogue trading alone is sparse and the 
impact of victimisation might manifest similarly. Previous studies have shown 
that, as with any fraud, victims of doorstep crime suffer personal costs (Button 
et al., 2010), including the humiliation of being duped (Great Britain. Home 
Office, 2003b). The realisation of vulnerability in an environment previously 
regarded as safe can have a significant detrimental effect upon victims 
(Sixsmith, 1990), with fraud victimisation affecting their confidence, physical 
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and mental health (Spalek, 1999) and their ability to remain living 
independently in their own home (Sixsmith, 1990; Steele et al, 2001; Great 
Britain. Home Office, 2003c; 2005b; Thornton et al, 2006, Daigle, 2013). 
Doorstep crime victimisation has, in some cases, been reported as having 
such a profound impact on victims that it has been a cause of, or contributing 
factor in premature deaths (Steele et al, 2001, p 19; Hillingdon Times, 2015). 
Other research finds victims are nearly two and a half times more likely to have 
died or gone into residential care in the two years following an incident than 
non-victim peers (Great Britain. Home Office, 2003c). Older burglary artifice 
victims tend to decline more rapidly in health than non-victim peers (Great 
Britain. Home Office, 2003c; Barratt, 2012), with 10% of victims going on to 
need a hospital admission within three months of the incident (Thornton et al., 
2006) and repeat victimisation results in some victims developing post-
traumatic stress-disorder (Barratt, 2012). Moreover, the police response a 
victim receives also seems to have an effect on the level of impact they 
experience. Research shows that provision of information from, and being kept 
informed by, the police can help alleviate distress (Great Britain. Home Office, 
2003c) and that those dissatisfied with the response they receive experience 
greater anxiety, and for longer, than those who are content with the response 
(Great Britain. Home Office, 2003b). Other research has indicated that callers 
to police “were primarily concerned with how they were treated and… that the 
most memorable and helpful components of their calls to the police were the 
ways in which call-handlers conveyed empathy, understanding, interest, 
sensitivity and politeness” (Stafford, 2016, p 375). For this reason the wishes 
of fraud victims should be considered, and an understanding, interested and 
empathic response provided to avoid revictimisation and mitigate harm. As 
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well as the economic and social costs (Great Britain. Home Office, 2000a; 
Home Office, 2005b; HMICFRS, 2019a), Karmen (2013, p 168) warns of 
victims potentially becoming “bitterly disappointed with the performance of law 
enforcement agencies… if officers are reluctant to respond, don’t believe their 
accusations, [or] conduct superficial investigations”. It is worthy of note that 
90% of participants felt a single point of contact and a single official place 
where they could obtain information were both very important and that more 
than 90% of victims placed great importance on getting their money back 
(Button et al, 2013, p 55). Other important considerations for victims were 
getting their case investigated; hearing progress on their case; the fraudster 
being found guilty and tougher penalties for perpetrators (Button et al, 2013, p 
55). Confirming Stafford’s (2016) findings, a sympathetic response was very 
important to over 80% of victims (Button et al, 2013, p 55). Those factors which 
were most important to the victims are, however, unlikely to be met in light of 
reports to Action Fraud being lost, staff being ‘rude and unhelpful’ (Beckfor 
Thed, 2013), only 40% of calls being passed to police to investigate (Police 
Foundation, 2018) and an average of 54 days between a receipt of a report of 
fraud and it being allocated for investigation (Police Foundation, 2018, p 4). 
 
Whilst the offence in both burglary artifice and rogue trading involves 
deception, the specifics of rogue trader victimisation make it likely the impact 
will be felt more keenly. In distraction burglary cases, the victim need only be 
convinced of the need for the offender(s) to enter the property, consequently 
the deception and interaction are fleeting and the victim’s role essentially 
passive. This is not the case with rogue trading, where the close, personal 
nature and longevity of deception is far beyond that necessary in burglary 
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artifice and it is not unreasonable to posit that the impact to rogue trader 
victims, particularly the anger, anxiety or humiliation associated with having 
been duped (Spalek, 1999), will often be more acute (Holtfreter, Reisig and 
Blomberg, 2006) as a result. In rogue trading offences a level of affinity and 
trust needs to be garnered by the offender in order to persuade the victim not 
only of the need for property maintenance, but also that the offender is the 
person to perform it. Following that, the offenders may then attend the victim’s 
property for some time (often many days) to carry out ‘work’, during which time 
rapport is built with the victim. The victim must then be sufficiently convinced, 
either willingly or through coercion, to pay for the work and hand over the 
money, making them an active agent in their own deception. Additionally the 
higher average financial loss resulting from rogue trading might cause greater 
anxiety to these victims, particularly older victims who typically lack 
opportunities to recover lost funds (Reiboldt and Vogel, 2003; Phillips, 2016b; 
HMICFRS, 2019a). 
 
Victim impact surveys (ACTSO, 2015) show that 23% of rogue trader victims 
stated the incident affected their health, 26% said it left them feeling down or 
depressed and 38% that it had reduced their confidence. 12% of victims said 
they were left feeling afraid at home and 13% felt more afraid of crime because 
of the incident (ACTSO, 2015). 13% of victims told no-one about the incidents, 
and of those 44% said that they kept it to themselves as a result of feeling 
ashamed or embarrassed (ACTSO, 2015); key factors in the under-reporting 
of this type of criminality. Alternatively, it may be that victims do not tell anyone 
because the social contact with the offender is welcomed and the victim is 
content with the arrangement (Phillips, 2016b), whilst also being aware that 
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their family (should they find out) may not be. In such cases, it is important that 
authorities are cognisant that removal of welcomed (albeit financially abusive) 
contact has the potential to intensify feelings of loneliness and lead to 
associated physical and mental health implications. It may also increase the 
victim’s susceptibility to future rogue trader offending, if they seek to replace 
this loss of social contact. With the impacts on victims’ health, the detriment to 
some victims’ ability to continue to live in their own home, and the financial 
loss they experience, Local Authorities and Social Care providers may incur a 
cost liability where victims require additional care. With residential care being 
estimated at an average £30,000 annually (Alzheimer’s Society, 2011), this 
constitutes a considerable liability for public services already facing difficulties 
in funding and a political backdrop of cuts, austerity and anti-regulation 
(Tombs, 2016). 
 
Whilst the impact of fraud and rogue trader victimisation is often considerable, 
each individual will experience it differently (Button, Lewis and Tapley, 2014), 
depending upon their personal resilience, financial situation, support networks 
(HMICFRS, 2019a) and myriad other factors (Thornton et al, 2005; Gorden 
and Buchanan, 2013). Viewing victims as inherently and inevitably vulnerable 
risks disempowering them and reinforces social stigma (Elias, 1992; Smith and 
Freinkel, 1988; Green, 2007; Gorden and Buchanan, 2013), and older victims 
of crime generally are too often “treated paternalistically as helpless and frail 
and thus robbed of power and self-reliance” (Elias, 1992 p 92). In an effort to 
recognise the heterogeneity of older victims, Thornton et al. (2005) drew a 
distinction between what they describe as the young-old and the old-old, 
though this still risks somewhat stripping nuance from the discussion, crudely 
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categorising older victims into two, rather than one group, whose principle 
characteristic remains that of their age. 
 
Special measures 
 
Bearing in mind the reported typical victim profile and demography, it is worth 
noting the provision in law (Youth Justice and Criminal Justice Act 1999) of 
special measures for which vulnerable and intimidated witnesses (and victims) 
can qualify. The aim of these measures is to allow qualifying witnesses “who 
might previously have been considered unable to give evidence in criminal 
proceedings, or at a disadvantage in giving evidence… a proper opportunity 
to do so” (Macpherson, 2001 p 230). The measures (Youth Justice and 
Criminal Evidence Act, Section 18; Macpherson, 2001) include the witness 
being screened from the defendant whilst in Court, or having their evidence 
video-recorded (known as an Achieving Best Evidence (ABE) interview), or 
giving their evidence via video-link (thereby not requiring their attendance at 
Court). The measures are available to any witness whose “quality of evidence 
is likely to be diminished by reason of a mental disorder, significant impairment 
of intelligence and social functioning [or] physical disability”, or whose 
evidence is ‘likely to be diminished by reason of fear and distress' (Youth 
Justice and Criminal Evidence Act, Section 16 & Section 17; Macpherson, 
2001 p 231). In determining whether a witness’ evidence is likely to be 
diminished by fear and distress, courts consider the alleged circumstances of 
the offence, their age, social and cultural background, religious or political 
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beliefs, any behaviour towards the witness by the defendant, their family or 
friends, and the witness' own views. The nature of rogue trading, the fact it is 
linked to organised crime groups (OCGs)(Barratt, 2012; ACTSO 2014; Day, 
2015; Day, 2017), and the demography of victims (Barratt, 2012, ACTSO 
2014; ACTSO, 2015) suggests the majority of rogue trader victims are likely to 
qualify for special measures under either the vulnerable or intimidated 
gateways outlined above. In addition to the aim of benefitting the evidential 
value of witness testimony, the measures may, due to their increased 
sensitivity, also help to alleviate some of the adverse impact of victimisation 
(Steele et al, 2001; Great Britain. Home Office, 2003c; ACTSO 2014; ACTSO, 
2015; HMICFRS, 2019a) since the greater attention to witness or victim needs 
tend to accord with the qualities that those reporting crime value most 
(Stafford, 2016), yet there is concern the measures are not routinely employed, 
especially for older and vulnerable victims (HMICFRS, 2019a). 
 
Under-reporting 
 
The underreporting of rogue trading echoes that of fraud. As Button et al (2013, 
p 39) detail, “Many victims do not report… [fraud], some are often too 
embarrassed and feel foolish for having fallen victim to a scam, while others 
may try to report, but do not know who to report it to or [cannot] find a body 
willing to accept it”. Moreover, with fraud generally there are ‘alternative 
statutory structures’ (such as civil systems and multiple private systems which 
rarely link to the CJS, for example banks refunding victims of credit card fraud). 
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Whilst this might result in a complex landscape for victims (and victim 
trajectories illustrate it is unusual for fraud to result in satisfactory conclusion) 
(Button, Tapley and Lewis, 2013), it at least offers the opportunity for victims 
in some circumstances to recover losses, even where the fraud is not dealt 
with by the police. In rogue trading incidents, however, these alternative 
structures are all but absent. As explained, identifying and finding the offender 
is very often beyond a consumer’s ability meaning the civil system, as well as 
the myriad ‘private systems’ are inaccessible to victims. The police propensity 
to dismiss it as a civil issue (Steele et al, 2001; Aplin 2015; Police Foundation, 
2018) regardless means rogue trading is unlikely to be dealt with effectively at 
all. Compounding low rates of reporting for fraud generally, and rogue trading 
and doorstep crime more specifically, “the hidden nature of many frauds also 
means many victims do not realise they are such” (Button et al, 2013, p 47). 
As such, often the incident remains undiscovered unless or until identified by 
a third party such as the police, a financial institution, or a friend. With all 
frauds, 40% of victims were unaware of their victimisation until contacted by a 
third party, with a further 8% aware they had fallen victim, but still choosing to 
do nothing until contacted. Therefore almost half of fraud victims were brought 
into the fraud justice network by the involvement of a third party (Button et al, 
2013, p 47), leading Button et al (2013 p 48) to conclude that	“victims of fraud 
and the development of services to support them have remained obscured by 
the relative invisibility of the crime and hindered further by the reluctance of 
victims to report or tell anyone of their victimisation.” Given the demography of 
rogue trading it is reasonable to assume reporting rates may be even lower; 
frauds such as credit card fraud, for example, are more likely to be noticed and 
reported due to the indiscriminate nature of the crime, the ease of detecting 
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them via scrutiny of bank statements, and the likelihood of a refund from a 
financial institution, none of which apply in rogue trading cases. 
 
Reporting levels of between 1% and 10% (ACTSO, 2015) for rogue trading 
give another indication why offenders view the criminality as low risk. 
Exacerbating these low rates of reporting, the often unsatisfactory 
enforcement response (Aplin, 2015) to reported incidents, combined with the 
scarce use of the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA), 2002, means perpetrators 
can carry out career criminality, largely without fear of detection or meaningful 
sanction. Moreover, the unsatisfactory response of enforcement agencies 
amplifies the low rates of reporting; not only can dissatisfaction lead to anxiety 
for those victims experiencing the inadequate response (Great Britain. Home 
Office, 2003b), it also discourages victims, and potentially their peers, from 
reporting incidents in the future. Indeed, ‘believing it is futile to report’ and 
considering it inappropriate to report, are identified as major barriers to 
reporting (ACTSO, 2014). A poor service from enforcement agencies only 
heightens this perception. If those that do report are treated as having invited 
their own misfortune (Staub, 1989; Cross, 2013; Aplin, 2015; Cross, 2015) 
through poor decision-making or lack of judgement, victims may believe it 
pointless to report (Mawby, 2007; Cross, 2016), especially if those responsible 
for protecting them are perceived as revictimising them and failing to fully 
investigate the matter (Mawby, 2007). The particularisation of rogue trader 
investigation discussed earlier, with local police, NFIB and Trading Standards 
all involved also seems to have manifested in victims not knowing which 
agency to report it to (ACTSO, 2014) providing another reason why rates of 
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reporting are so low. As Button et al’s (2013) examination of boiler room victims 
shows, this is a situation faced by myriad frauds. 
 
The fear of repercussions from offenders or their associates (ACTSO, 2014) 
is also a key reason for under-reporting; due to the nature of the criminality, 
the offender(s) know where the victims live and short of moving home, there is 
little the victims feel they can do to eliminate this. Victims therefore do not 
report incidents in the hope there is no reprisal (ACTSO, 2014, 2015) 
suggesting they perceive the ability of the police and other enforcement 
agencies to protect them inadequate. The additional harm to victims’ 
confidence and wellbeing, knowing that criminals have preyed upon them and 
know where they live might contribute towards 13% of victims saying their fear 
of crime had increased and 12% being afraid in their home (ACTSO, 2015). 
The fear of getting involved in the CJS is also raised as a factor in under-
reporting of rogue trading (ACTSO, 2014). It is not only the criminals of whom 
victims are afraid, but also the court process (Criminal Justice Alliance (CJA), 
n.d.), and agencies designed to uphold the law are either feared, or not trusted 
to be able to protect them from harm. Greater awareness, amongst 
enforcement professionals and the public of the availability of the special 
measures available to assist in achieving best witness evidence for vulnerable 
or intimidated witnesses might help mitigate some of these fears (CPS, n.d.; 
HMICFRS, 2019a). 
 
With the high proportion of victims telling nobody of their victimisation (ACTSO, 
2015), it is evident there is considerable underreporting. Earlier in this chapter 
it was established victims are predominately elderly, and often infirm. Whilst 
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this group are most in need of support, conversely the fear of the loss of their 
independence if they are perceived to be unable to cope is a key factor in 
incidents going unreported. This has a wider effect as these victims self-
exclude from support agencies and services designed to protect them, 
negatively effecting their ability to perform their statutory function to provide 
safeguarding and social care to this client group. Indeed, lack of mental 
capacity is also cited (ACTSO, 2014) as a reason for low rates of reporting 
indicating the need for agencies to be more proactive in terms of engagement, 
support and effective crime prevention work. If people with support needs 
sufficiently severe to render them decision-specific mentally incapacitous lack 
the ability to either recognise their victimisation or to report incidents are being 
preyed upon, it is a failure of the care system if they are unprotected and open 
to victimisation. The prevailing public sector budgetary backdrop is only likely 
to increase this, with an estimated £2.8 billion funding gap in adult social care 
by 2020 (Richards, 2016), despite the Care Act 2014 (Section 14), compelling 
local authorities to safeguard those with care and support needs at risk of 
financial abuse. 
 
Victims often do not accept they have been victimised (Barratt, 2012; ACTSO, 
2014) and therefore have no call to report the crime. It is unclear whether this 
is because of a lack of capacity; an unfamiliarity with the method of criminality, 
or the cost, necessity and quality of property maintenance and repairs; a 
genuine belief that the offender is their friend, or simply a refusal to accept 
their victimisation courtesy of “emotionally motivated self-deception” (Fenton-
O’ Creevy, 2016 p 26). In practice it is likely to be a combination of any number 
of these and other reasons, but irrespective of the exact cause, the scenario 
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perpetuates low levels of reporting for rogue trading, leading to a large ‘dark 
figure’ (Coleman and Moynihan, 1996) of unrecorded fraud (Tunley, 2014). 
Careful consideration needs to be given to how this is addressed because 
whilst education about this type of criminality may increase reporting and 
safeguard some victims, it might harm the self-image of others who wish to 
refuse to believe they are victims. Care must also be taken not to 
disproportionately raise fears of victimisation (Gorden & Buchanan, 2013). 
Moreover, if the level of enforcement response to reports is currently 
inadequate, increasing reporting is unlikely to have any benefit and may only 
serve to further negatively impact victims whilst creating additional demands 
on already-stretched resources, potentially further adversely affecting service 
provision. 
 
Social isolation and loneliness, as well as being factors in victimisation, are 
also factors in incidents going unreported. The impact to health and wellbeing 
of loneliness and social isolation, coupled with the increased likelihood of 
victimisation, and internalising incidents creates considerable scope for harm, 
and implications for social care, safeguarding and enforcement. However, as 
another factor in non-reporting of incidents is victims want to forget about and 
ignore it, overstating the impact and harm on these groups may encourage the 
perception of victims as a homogenous group, all profoundly affected by the 
experience, whereas, as with older persons generally (Thornton et al, 2005; 
Gorden and Buchanan, 2013), victims of this crime (and fraud more broadly) 
are a varied and heterogeneous group, with diverse needs, situations and 
levels of resilience (Button, Lewis and Tapley, 2014). Whilst this section has 
considered the victim in rogue trading incidents, it is recognised that motivated 
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offenders will strike their chosen target, particularly if they perceive them 
vulnerable, whether or not the victim unwittingly makes this task easier 
(Karmen, 2013). Therefore, though victimology is important in increasing our 
understanding of rogue trading, this must not slide into victim-blaming and 
there must be an equal focus on the acts and behaviour of offenders to fully 
understand the crime type. As such it is to the perpetrator the chapter now 
turns. 
 
	
Offenders and their Modus Operandi: 
	
	
The activity of ‘rogue trading’ is hard to define succinctly (ACTSO, 2015; Day, 
2015) and clarity about the term is further hindered by its dual use to describe 
unauthorised bank trading (Day, 2015) as well as the phenomenon explored 
here. Rogue trading (as defined for the purposes of this research), 
encompasses a wide range of criminal activity and offences (hence the need 
for a ‘flag’ by which to identify it in police databases)(Day, 2015) and whilst 
there are distinct patterns and preferred modus operandi easily identifiable as 
rogue trading, there remains (despite legislative change strengthening the 
criminal law framework) a grey area betwixt criminality, and the civil law issue 
of poorly executed and overpriced work. It can therefore be difficult to asses, 
particularly for consumers (more so for those that are vulnerable or experience 
cognitive impairment) whether a trader is legitimate or fraudulent.  
 
Many rogue traders are professional offenders (Steele et al., 2001; Barratt, 
2012; ACTSO, 2014, 2015; Day, 2015) who are equally adept at being both 
opportunistic and targeted in their offending. Perpetrators are known, for 
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instance, to exploit current events such as flooding, preying on those in need 
at times of change or emergency (BBC, 2013), as well as to target their 
offending against preferred victims, namely older and vulnerable individuals 
(Steele, 2001; ACPO, 2011; Gorden and Buchanan, 2013; Phillips, 2016b), 
especially those that live alone. Latterly it has been posited that the 
discriminate nature of victimisation may have been overplayed, with some 
offenders refuting they hone in on the vulnerable, claiming instead they would 
leaflet-drop all houses in an area and carry out their offending on anyone 
(Phillips, 2016a). Set against this, recent changes to defined contribution 
pension rules (Pensions Act 2014), including the removal of the requirement 
to purchase an annuity, and allowing for the release of entire pension pots, 
potentially makes the targeting of older persons a yet more attractive 
proposition for fraudsters (Olivier et al., 2016), including doorstep criminals 
(Age UK, 2014). 
 
The anatomy of rogue trading 
 
In conventional wisdom the ‘normal’ rogue trader incident unfolds thus: the 
offender cold-calls and either identifies problems with the property, ‘you have 
some missing tiles’ or offers a deal based on mutual convenience and benefit 
‘I have some tarmac left over from another job’. The offender negotiates an 
upfront fee, and disappears with the money without carrying out any work. This 
is indeed a recognised M.O., and has been divulged by convicted rogue 
traders; “Sometimes I just ask for a deposit, or for money to buy materials and 
then never go back and do the job” (Steele, 2001, p 60). However, this M.O. 
is generally associated with the less professional offenders, who are 
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characterised as chancers, or apprentices (ACTSO, 2014; 2015, Phillips, 
2016b). Rather than disappear with ‘just’ a deposit, rogue traders will also carry 
out work for an overinflated price, aware that doing so is often an effective 
means of avoiding prosecution, however poor, expensive and/or unnecessary 
the ‘work’ is, as prisoner interviews make clear,  
“Make sure you do a little bit of work. It doesn’t really matter 
how poor the work is. As long as you’ve done a bit you can 
claim it’s not a crime, just that the householders had a poor 
deal. The police won’t get involved…” (Steele et al., 2001, p 
61).  
Furthermore, by carrying out work, it is likely the home owner may also be 
reassured that they are receiving the expected service, potentially making 
reporting to the authorities less likely than were the offender to simply abscond 
with their money. A more involved technique comprises undertaking work for 
an initially reasonable sum, then ‘bouncing’ the job (R. V Tomney and others; 
Carswell, 2015; Phillips, 2016a); identifying to the homeowner, once trust had 
been established (Phillips, 2016a), further work they claim is required but is in 
fact unnecessary or overpriced. In this final scenario, the cycle of identifying 
further work and taking payment can be carried out repeatedly, until such time 
as the homeowner becomes suspicious. Moreover, where the victim is 
reluctant to accept the claim that work is required, perpetrators are known to 
covertly cause criminal damage to the property making the work ineluctable 
and the homeowners feel pressured to have the damage repaired by the 
offenders (Steele et al., 2001).   
The repeat victimisation of vulnerable victims (Phillips, 2016b), and the 
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exploitation of loneliness through ‘grooming’ (Evans, 2014; Pennells, 2015; 
Phillips, 2016a) and befriending (ACTSO, 2014), is a calculated tactic 
ruthlessly employed by rogue traders, as shown by the prisoner quotes that 
follow;  
“People living on their own are easier to persuade. It 
doesn’t really matter whether it’s a man or a woman. 
If you smile with them and talk to them they’re glad 
to have your company. You can keep going back 
and take their money bit by bit and really you’re 
making them happy ‘cos they’re lonely.” (Steele et 
al, 2001, p 60).  
“What I really like is people who live on their own and 
have no-one to confide in. We can just keep going 
back to their house, talking to them and making them 
happy and pretending to do a bit of work. We can 
take thousands off them in a matter of weeks without 
anyone finding out and stopping us.” (Steele et al, 
2001, p 61). 
Furthermore, on how to trick victims out of the larger sums of money, offenders 
report; 
 
“It’s always by getting a confused gimmer [older 
person] with a poor memory. We just keep going back 
and getting paid over and over again for the same 
job… Some you need to keep liking you and you keep 
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saying you’ve found new faults at the house. You 
keep their trust and friendship and you can take all 
they’ve got, with others you have to be more forceful 
saying the work’s got to be done and you want paying 
only for what you’ve done. Make them feel stupid and 
that you’re doing the best for them. It’s a matter of 
judging how best to control them.” (Steele et al, 2001, 
p 61). 
The technique of ‘bouncing’ jobs (R. V Tomney and others; Evans, 2014) 
makes it harder for enforcement agencies to prove fraudulent intent from the 
outset (Maguire, 2003); if the original work undertaken by the offenders was 
done to a reasonable standard and reasonable price, it is in practical terms no 
different from an ordinary, legal, home improvement contract. Indeed, this 
offending type can also be opportunistic, rather than premeditated; if an 
otherwise legitimate trader recognises the vulnerability of a particular 
homeowner they may decide to exploit this on a whim, part-way through a job. 
This sits squarely within Coleman’s (1994, p 5) definition of ‘elite crime’: “a 
violation of the law committed by a person… in the course of an otherwise 
respected and legitimate occupation”, perhaps a crime of everyday life 
(Felson, 2002; Gabor, 1994), more akin to a criminology of the self, than a 
criminology of the ‘other’ (Garland, 2001). Equally though, career offenders 
are often known to each other, forming part of a complex network of criminals 
willing to share information about vulnerable consumers, behaviour associated 
with OCGs and a criminal ‘other’, as the below quote from prisoner interviews 
demonstrates:  
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“Another team may have been and done work there and 
found them to be a soft touch… They’ll sell us the house for 
a cut of our take or we might give them a soft touch of our 
own in exchange.” (Steele, 2001 p 61).  
 
It is apparent from Steele’s (2001) prisoner interviews that offenders were able 
to ‘justify’ their actions. The ‘techniques of neutralisation’ (Sykes and Matza, 
1957) routinely employed in interviews included denial of injury and denial of 
the victim, focusing on the victims’ perceived lack of need of the money and 
the perception that no physical harm was caused to them (Phillips, 2016a), 
thereby rationalising their actions and protecting their own self-image 
(Goffman, 1990). As Steele (2001) noted, where such offences are seen by 
the perpetrators, and those within their community and peer group as ‘morally 
legitimate’, successful rehabilitation will prove extremely difficult, particularly if 
there exists a “moral climate that encourages such types of behaviour” 
(Karstedt and Farrall, 2006, p 1030; Karstedt and Farrall, 2005). The fact that 
offenders also spoke with great clarity about incidents that occurred many 
years prior to the interviews (Steele et al., 2001), displayed a pride about their 
‘work’ (Steele et al., 2001), their ‘criminal talent’ (Phillips, 2016a), and some of 
the thrill of deception (Phillips 2016b) reinforces this belief. The video, made 
by the offenders (and subsequently played in Court)(R. V Tomney and others), 
showing the perpetrators laughing and gloating about an ‘expensive chemical 
driveway sealant’ they claimed to be using, which was in fact diluted milk (Daily 
Mail, 2011) also illustrates that for some offenders, there is a level of status 
and seduction (Katz, 1988) beyond the purely financial gain. 
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The price of the work offenders quote is often dependent not on the work itself, 
but rather on the credulity of the victim, with offenders defrauding the victims 
of the highest amount they deem possible without arousing potential suspicion 
or risking detection. Again, this tactic makes it difficult for enforcement 
agencies to prove outright dishonesty. If offenders can highlight other jobs they 
have carried out of requisite standard for a reasonable price (where they were 
perhaps dealing with more robust and astute consumers), this can be used to 
portray the higher value frauds as simply a ‘mistake’ with the quotation, or an 
anomaly, rather than a deliberately dishonest attempt to make an illegitimate 
financial gain indicative of a fraudulent business. Conversely, if a victim is 
vulnerable or perceived as gullible, the increases in demands for payment can 
be escalated to hugely disproportionate sums. Demands for tens and 
hundreds of thousands of pounds are not uncommon (Bayley, 2012; CPS, 
2013; Hunter, 2013a; Hunter, 2013b; Evans, 2014; BBC, 2016a; Hearne, 
2016; Phillips, 2016a) and some rogue traders will continue until they have 
ownership of the victim’s home transferred to them (R. V Tomney and others; 
Carswell, 2015), though the prevalence of this practice is unknown. The 
reluctance of enforcement agencies to involve themselves in complex 
investigations, (addressed in more detail in chapter 7), is also well recognised 
(Steele, 2001); its exploitation forming a recurring theme in prisoner interviews 
(Steele, 2001, p 62) as the following quotes demonstrate;  
 
“The trick is never admit anything if you get arrested. 
Always claim to be legit. Say it must have been 
someone else that swindled them. Ask for an 
id[entification] parade. The more you wriggle the less 
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chance of the police pushing it.”  
“Discredit the complainant’s ability. Pick holes in their 
accounts. It makes the police more likely to drop it and 
say it’s a civil dispute.”  
“Old people are rotten witnesses. Dispute what they 
say. The police won’t want to try a case on their 
evidence alone.”  
 
Offenders are also known to transport their victim to the bank or financial 
institution in order to facilitate an immediate financial gain (Steele et al., 2001). 
This is attractive to the perpetrator as it does not allow the victim time to 
consider and ultimately decline to provide payment (either in part or in full), nor 
does it allow them to consult with, or report the incident to, other parties 
(whether a peer, or enforcement body). As a response to the tactic of 
transporting victims to the bank, the ‘Bank Job’ (Surrey County Council, 2004), 
a partnership initiative involving police, Trading Standards and financial 
institutions) was introduced. The initiative encouraged banking staff to be alert 
for customers, especially older persons, withdrawing large amounts of cash. 
Where staff noticed unusual account activity they were empowered to make 
discreet enquiries of the customer to ascertain whether the withdrawal might 
be the result of a fraudulent attempt, and report concerns to Trading Standards 
whilst the customer was present. Latterly, the initiative has been re-branded 
and re-launched as the ‘banking protocol’ (Financial Fraud Action UK, 2017), 
with greater involvement from the police, including a pledge by them to 
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respond to any such calls, potentially enabling a more rapid and robust 
response to reports. 
 
New techniques of offending continue to emerge and the criminality is 
developing, becoming more sophisticated. Whilst offenders rely on being 
difficult to identify; “I make sure I’m difficult to identify. I have business cards 
and magnetic signs on my van but they’re just mobile numbers and can’t be 
traced to me” (Steele, 2001, p 61), they also use professional-looking flyers 
(posted through consumer’s doors to advertise and increase their ‘trade’), 
‘company’ websites, liveried vehicles and uniforms. This gives them a 
legitimate appearance and they are also known to ascribe to approved-trader 
schemes and/or use logos of professional bodies to boost their professional 
appearance and volume of ‘business’ (ACTSO, 2014; 2015; Phillips, 2016a). 
This more complex M.O. has been termed ‘legitimate guise’ (ACTSO, 2014; 
2015; Phillips, 2016a) and mirrors Friedrichs’ (1996) definition of 
‘contrepreneurial’ white-collar crime; aping legitimate business practice, in 
order to avoid raising suspicion and make it more difficult to bring enforcement 
action (Steele, 2001, p 61). Moreover, ‘career offenders’ (ACTSO, 2014; 2015) 
have also been identified as present within the area of rogue trader offending 
(Steele, 2001; ACTSO, 2014; 2015). Such perpetrators form OCGs (ACTSO, 
2014; 2015; Phillips, 2016a) and routinely launder criminal proceeds through 
third parties to avoid detection and distance themselves from the offence, 
making prosecution challenging (CPS, 2013; Colley, 2016). Quotes from 
prisoner interviews aptly highlight this tactic;  
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“Some people think they have a chance of keeping 
control if they pay by cheque. I just have them make 
the cheque payable to someone else. It might be a 
licensee or a friend. They get a cut for handling the 
cheque and they will never name me as being involved. 
They’ll just say the cheque was for a debt they were 
owed and give a false name.” (Steele, 2001, p 60).  
 
The use of ‘labourers’ to undertake the work, once it has been agreed, is also 
deployed by professional offenders to distance themselves from the offence, 
particularise each element of it and make proving mens rea or deliberate 
dishonesty more difficult. For example, if the matter is investigated, a rogue 
trader can argue that the claims he made to the homeowner when forming the 
contract were not deliberately dishonest, that at the time of making them he 
intended to provide the contracted service, and that he was subsequently let 
down by a rogue employee who was responsible for the shoddy work. It is very 
difficult to prove beyond reasonable doubt the enterprise was fraudulent from 
the outset in this scenario. The use of multiple labourers also allows offenders 
to make more money, with less effort from themselves, running more than one 
‘team’ simultaneously making it more difficult to detect the true extent of their 
criminality. With different names and descriptions provided by victims and 
witnesses, it is difficult for enforcement agencies to link offences, even where 
the lead offender is the same, especially where the offender also uses multiple 
business names and aliases. The use of labourers by criminal gangs engaged 
in rogue trading has also raised concerns that the labourers can be exploited, 
forced into servitude, working without pay for years, suffering threats and 
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violence if they do not comply with the instructions of those exploiting them 
(Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), 2013; ACTSO, 2014; Bayley, 
2012; ACTSO, 2015). Recent high profile cases indicate the extent of the 
exploitation of enforced servitude by some criminal gangs engaged in rogue 
trading (see for instance R. v Josie Connors and Others [2013] EWCA Crim 
1165; R. V Connors [2013] EWCA Crim 324; BBC, 2015a; Watkins, 2015; 
Keen, 2016; BBC, 2016b; Herts Advertiser, 2016; Grierson, 2017; BBC, 
2018a; BBC, 2018b). SOCA (2013) identified that 7% of human trafficking 
victims identified in 2012 (156 people) worked in block paving, tarmacking and 
construction. The involvement of professional offenders, OCGs and modern 
day slavery, as well as the defrauding of some of the most vulnerable members 
of society suggest this type of crime should be high on the priorities of police 
forces, the Home Office and the National Crime Agency (NCA) alike. However, 
as the chapter now discusses, literature (and the offenders) question the 
efficacy of enforcement in relation to rogue trading. Police seemingly regard 
the crime type as low priority and it may, in practice, suffer from a degree of 
‘decriminalisation’ (HMIC, 2014; BBC, 2014). 
 
The enforcement response 
 
Any discussion about police priorities and performance must acknowledge the 
political backdrop in terms of the public sector and its funding. Since 2010, the 
number of police officers in England and Wales has fallen by more than 
20,000, from 141,669 to 117,456; the equivalent of 12 forces (Great Britain. 
Home Office, 2010, 2018). Not only are police hindered by cuts to their own 
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service, this is compounded by a concomitant increase in service demands, 
particularly from the cuts and reduced provision of other public services, 
notably in the area of out-of-hours mental health provision (College of Policing, 
2015; Police Federation, 2018). Trading Standards has arguably fared worse 
from budget reductions, with total annual spend on the profession reduced 
from £213 million nationally in 2009, to just £124 million in 2015 (CTSI, 2017). 
Some areas have experienced cuts greater than 60% (National Audit Office 
(NAO), 2016) and four services now receive an annual budget of less than 
£200,000 (Silvester, 2016). Tombs (2016) argues that not only have public 
service budgets been reduced, but that successive UK Governments have 
adopted and promoted a hegemonic narrative in which public and social 
regulatory protections amount to an unnecessary and bureaucratic barrier to 
trade, prosperity and individual freedoms. The popular refrains of ‘health-and-
safety-gone-mad’, councils’ ‘snooping’ and the ubiquity of the term ‘red tape’ 
(accompanied by the call to cut or reduce it) to describe regulation 
demonstrate this. This anti-regulation/anti-enforcement narrative has created 
an environment in which Trading Standards’ budgets have reduced to the point 
where some services now comprise just one qualified officer (NAO, 2016). 
These factors undoubtedly make enforcement of rogue trading more 
challenging and create inconsistencies in different geographical locations. 
Police face competing demands for higher profile crime types, such as counter 
terrorism (CT), county lines, knife crime, child sexual exploitation (CSE) and 
human trafficking and modern slavery (HTMS). Similarly, Trading Standards 
departments are stretched, with statutory duties in over 200 pieces of 
legislation (CTSI, 2013) and other priority and high-profile work areas including 
product and food safety in the wake of deaths and injuries. Resources and 
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competing demands make partnership working challenging. As identified in 
combatting organised crime internationally, similarities exist with joint-working 
on rogue trader cases where, despite a “recognition of the need and virtue of 
sharing information and intelligence”, concerns (whether real or perceived) 
especially around data protection, often “inhibit information-flows” (Ridley, 
2008, p 213). 
The literature already discussed in this chapter has identified the involvement 
of professional offenders, OCGs and the use of forced labour, priority issues 
for the NCA and the Home Office (Press Association, 2013; Home Office, 
2014, p 6), and individual police forces (TVP, 2013; Greater Manchester 
Police, 2013). However, the limited literature on the enforcement of rogue 
trading outlines that, despite it falling within priority areas, police are often 
reluctant to fully investigate crimes of this nature (Steele, 2001; Aplin, 2015). 
The “overriding emphasis on ‘results’ [and] the imposition of performance 
indicators… operate only to reinforce the pervasive… mindset” (Loftus, 2010 
p 16); even where policy and practice changes have been attempted, these 
have been said to have been overstated, still shaped as they are by the 
broader policing culture. Consequently, enforcement of crime types not 
afforded priority becomes marginalised, in a culture Steele et al (2001 p 15) 
describes as ‘what is not measured does not get done’. With the more recent 
“ideological climate of anti-regulation and severe cuts to enforcement 
possibilities resulting from the austerity agenda” (Phillips, 2016b p 16), the 
drawing back of resources from all but the highest priority areas is inevitable. 
The reluctance to investigate complex and resource consuming cases (Levi, 
1986) is not limited to the United Kingdom, it has been seen in white-collar 
crime in the United States, where, “most law enforcement agencies tend to 
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focus upon traditional index crimes, … [making it] difficult for an agency to 
devote the resources, time, and attention required to deal with a complex 
white-collar crime case” (NW3C, 2006). Nonetheless, it is curious that officers’ 
stated perception of what the job of policing is, or should be – primarily fighting 
crime (Charman, 2017, p191), making a difference and helping people 
(Charman, 2017, p 254), as well as their preference for helping ‘genuine 
victims’ (Charman, 2017, p 335), is so at odds with the enforcement response 
rogue trader crimes seemingly receive. 
The instruction to refer cases other than ongoing incidents to NFIB via Action 
Fraud may exacerbate the perception (amongst both police and the 
public)(ACTSO, 2014) that investigation of rogue trader incidents is not an 
issue for local police forces, negatively affecting rates of reporting and 
recording. This may result in and further legitimise a ‘signposting’ approach by 
individual force areas, rather than an investigative one, create confusion about 
the level of response required amongst local officers, and dilute the ownership 
of investigations (Police Foundation, 2018). Moreover, even where no such 
confusion exists, the existence of Action Fraud may be being used by over-
stretched local officers as a convenient signposting mechanism in order that 
they can avoid responsibility for cases that they perceive as low-priority, 
complex and lengthy investigations which they do not feel they have capacity 
to take on. It also inevitably splits reported incidents between the agencies, 
making prevalence estimates difficult and downplaying the level of the crime 
type. Coupled with a backdrop of concerns over some criminality being 
effectively ‘decriminalised’ (HMIC, 2014) through a lack of police response, 
due to other priorities and limited resources, and crimes involving older victims 
being ignored or reframed as a welfare issue (Green, 2007, p 97; HMICFRS, 
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2019a) the appetite for in-depth investigation of rogue trader incidents may be 
scarce. The practice of offending over wide areas, comprising different police 
force areas, also plays a part in the reluctance to invest resources in rogue 
trader investigations, as has been noted with fraud more broadly and police 
services lacked an overall strategic response to such crime, primarily as a 
result of management reluctance to commit resources to ‘out of force’ 
investigations (Phillips, 1996). 
Whilst Sklansky (2007, p 20) believes researchers sometimes experience 
‘cognitive burn-in’ and continue to report previous negative cultures despite 
the situation having since changed, Aplin (2015), is acutely critical of the police 
response to rogue trading. She argues that rather than either legal ambiguity 
or budgetary and resource constraints, it is negative police culture that results 
in a superficial investigation of rogue trader incidents. This includes the 
premature finalisation of investigations due to both low priority and complexity, 
filing incidents as civil disputes, failing to comply with National Crime 
Recording Standards (NCRS), and middle-management complicity in poor 
practices; resulting in an inadequate provision of service to vulnerable, elderly 
victims of crime. This led to dysfunctional outcomes such as placing culpability 
on the victims for having been duped, in a parallel with the ‘denial of the victim’ 
(Sykes and Matza, 1957) and victim precipitation, and legitimising the 
offenders via describing them as “roofing contractors” and ‘tradespersons’. 
The perpetrators’ belief, identified earlier, that carrying out ‘work’ provides an 
opportunity to avoid prosecution is, unfortunately therefore, borne out in this 
police response. This is despite all the most common offences involved in 
rogue trading being notifiable, recordable crimes (Home Office, 2011a; 2011b; 
2012b; 2013). The only legislation covering offences common in rogue trading 
	 81	
incidents absent from the list of notifiable offences (Cancellation of Contracts 
Made in a Consumer’s Home or Place of Work etc. Regulations), relates to 
non-provision of the statutorily required cancellation rights and cooling off 
period. Furthermore, this absence is inconsequential in practice since the 
same conduct is a recordable offence mutatis mutandis by virtue of it being a 
misleading omission (Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations, 
Regulations 6 and 10). 
 
The Trading Standards response to rogue trading has also been examined 
(ACTSO, 2014; ACTSO, 2015), and the very low number of prosecutions of 
offenders (an average of one per authority, per year)(ACTSO, 2015) means 
the effectiveness of Trading Standards responses must also be questioned. 
Whilst there are pockets of good practice (Phillips, 2016b), with fewer than 20 
local authorities (out of 166 in England and Wales) regularly prosecuting 
doorstep criminals (ACTSO, 2014) and just 15% of all Local Authorities having 
taken two or more prosecutions against rogue traders (ACTSO, 2015), 
broadly, Trading Standards enforcement mirrors that of the police in that it 
does not demonstrate a high-priority area. There appears therefore a similar 
dissonance within Trading Standards as with the police between stated 
priorities and actions in practice, with only 11% allocating 21% or more of their 
budget to it, despite 80% claiming it to be a high priority area (ACTSO, 2014). 
Additionally, resource constraints experienced by local authorities led to a 
reduction to 62% in the number of authorities giving high priority to doorstep 
crime enforcement, although 96% stated they would like to allocate high 
priority to it, if resources allowed (ACTSO, 2015). The police’s lack of 
ownership (Police Foundation, 2018) of rogue trader cases and the ‘batting off’ 
	 82	
of serious fraud offences to Trading Standards (Aplin, 2015) seems even more 
questionable in light of this lack of efficacy of the response then provided by 
Trading Standards. Moreover, the number of local authorities using POCA 
(2002) is a concern, with just 46% (ACTSO, 2014; 2015) utilising the 
confiscation provisions and only 31% conducting money laundering 
investigations (ACTSO, 2015). The police use of POCA is unknown, however, 
because asset recovery is easier via drugs than fraud (Gannon and Doig, 
2010) it may be uncommon. Given the primary motivation for rogue traders is 
financial gain, the authorities’ failure to routinely use relevant legislation 
(POCA, 2002) seriously damages the opportunity to provide a meaningful 
deterrent or effective sanctions, particularly when coupled with the very low 
number of prosecutions. Compared with bank robberies, for example, where 
on average perpetrators are caught on the fourth robbery, having gained more 
than £36,000 (Reilly, Rickman and Witt, 2012), it is easy to see why rogue 
trading, from a rational choice theory perspective (Homans, 1961; Scott, 2000; 
Hochstetler, 2005), makes a less risky, more lucrative criminal career. 
 
Crime prevention initiatives have often been the go-to response to rogue 
trading, in recognition perhaps that crime control options are limited by low 
rates of reporting, and the opportunity for offenders to reap substantial financial 
gain. Whether crime prevention activity is conducted by Police, Trading 
Standards, or Community Safety and Crime and Disorder Reduction type 
partnerships, the strategies employed are rarely evidence-based or assessed 
in terms of effectiveness or outcome, and there exists a gap between 
academic findings and police practice (Buerger, 2010), even where relevant 
findings have been published. Gorden and Buchanan (2013), for instance, 
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argue that the prevention strategies may have the effect of disproportionately 
increasing the fear of crime amongst older people and simultaneously 
erroneously giving the impression the criminals are easily identifiable 
‘monstrous figures’, or ‘bogeymen’, with the unfortunate result that the very 
initiatives employed to reduce victimisation are more likely to increase it. 
 
In conclusion, the ‘dearth’ of literature (Gorden and Buchanan, 2013) and 
research specific to rogue trading, estimated reporting of only 1 in 10 incidents, 
routine premature closure and non-recording by police (Steele, 2001; Aplin, 
2015; ACTSO, 2014; ACTSO, 2015, Fisher and Hamilton, 2017) of those 
incidents which are reported (coupled with a paucity of research into ‘non-
crime’ incidents and the focus by practitioners and policy-makers on crime and 
crime control)(Kenny, 2016), means that the current state of knowledge is 
confused and incomplete. As a result of under-reporting, the available 
evidence base upon which to draw is likely to be considerably lower than 10% 
of incidents, making firm conclusions difficult. However, the involvement of 
professional criminals, OCGs and forced labour on the one hand, and the 
demography of those routinely targeted and victimised and the harm (financial, 
and to victims’ mental and physical health) on the other, make this an area in 
need of further research. The disconnect between the high priority that police 
(and Trading Standards) claim they give these issues compared with the actual 
response provided (including the resources allocated and low prosecution 
rates) is also worthy of closer examination.  
 
Of the number of incidents that do get reported, only a small percentage 
(around 3%) can expect to result in successful detection (Police Foundation, 
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2018). Even where the incident does lead to prosecution, the time it can take 
to arrive at this decision is lengthy (an average of 514 days from report to 
charging decision in fraud cases)(Police Foundation, 2018). When one factors 
in the time it can take to get a court date and progress to and through to a 
conclusion of any trial, it is likely that, owing to factors such as the demography 
of the typical victim (the majority of victims are over 75 years old)(ACTSO, 
2014) and the adverse impact of victimisation on the health of victims, many 
victims may have died prior to any case concluding. Given that the response 
victims receive from enforcement agencies is crucial in mitigating the harm 
caused by victimisation, it is eminently possible the current level of response 
provided is responsible for aggravating the victims’ harm. As this literature 
review highlights, drawing on relevant research in fields as diverse as 
neuropsychology, medicine, social care, public health, the emerging field of 
law enforcement and public health (LEPH)(Van Dijk & Crofts, 2017; Punch and 
James, 2016) and of course, criminology and criminal justice, there is an 
opportunity within a single study to create a substantive contribution to 
research across a range of fields. 
 
 
Conducting the Literature Review 
 
The process of identifying relevant extant literature initially began via searches 
of Google, Google Scholar, Ethos (to search for any related emerging research 
in the form of theses and dissertations) and Discovery, as well as consulting 
the considerable amount of ‘grey’ sources compiled in my professional role. 
Keyword searches were used (doorstep crime, rogue trading, rogue trader, 
bogus caller, distraction burglary, burglary artifice) to identify relevant 
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literature, before the search was broadened to a wider academic base with the 
inclusion of fraud, victimology and white-collar crime. Individual Journal 
archives in fields relevant to crime, criminology and criminal justice, community 
safety, older adults and victimology were also searched, and websites of 
criminal justice and third sector organisations viewed. Each time a relevant 
piece was identified, the bibliography was examined for further relevant 
literature, in a type of snowball sample, augmented by repeated searches and 
wider reading around fraud, white-collar crime plus conference attendance and 
networking amongst academic and non-academic contacts. The literature 
review proved an important tool in identifying key research topics (Hart, 2001, 
p 3), and the relative paucity of literature as well as in informing the research 
design and methodology. It also enabled identification of white-collar crime as 
the overarching academic foundation for its study, albeit it one that has its 
limitations and that there was scope for the objectives of the research to be 
met in making an original contribution to knowledge relating to the academic 
framework and the anatomy of rogue trading. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
The chosen method for this research was a secondary data analysis of the 
records from the TVP crime recording database, using a mixed methods 
Applied Thematic Analysis (ATA). The data, provided by TVP as a 
spreadsheet, comprised notes from crime records in the crime recording 
system (CEDAR) from 2013, and contained information about the incident, the 
date and time of the case, and how it was recorded and disposed. Each case 
was then categorised by the researcher along various criteria that would assist 
in the analysis of the incidents and identification of relevant and appropriate 
themes, such as whether the victim was recorded as vulnerable, whether the 
incident involved work being conducted to the property and so on (further 
discussion regarding the mechanics of undertaking the study is provided later, 
see p 93 - 97). The categorised data were then uploaded to Nvivo to facilitate 
further exploration and analysis from both a quantitative and qualitative 
perspective. As Thematic Analysis (TA) is a method widely applicable across 
the epistemological and ontological spectrum, this chapter explores its 
philosophical and methodological underpinnings. It also critically discusses the 
research design, methods employed to undertake the research, the rationale 
for the choice and the ethical considerations inherent in conducting the 
research. 
 
 
At the outset, it is important to acknowledge that all methods have both 
strengths and weaknesses, and this body of work by no means claims to be 
without limitations. Firstly, it is difficult to generalise from the findings or make 
bold claims as to the findings being representative (Bowen, 2009) because the 
	 87	
data comprises records from only one police force area, resulting in a localised 
study. Consequently, the findings and the conclusions that can be drawn are 
more cautious as a result. Secondly, as the research involves a degree of 
interpretation, there is the potential for others to disagree with the findings 
and/or adopt alternative conclusions based on different interpretations of the 
data. Nonetheless, relative to the aims of the research, the desire to influence 
policy and practice, the intended audience and the nature and scope of the 
data, a qualitatively-driven mixed methods ATA was considered to be the most 
suitable and appropriate method of analysis. The logic for choosing which 
methods to select was thereby, “governed by the questions [or aims] that drive 
the research” (Mason 2006, p 14). This chapter documents why the decision 
was made, and the steps taken to make the study as strong and as valid as 
possible. 
 
The objectives of the research, as outlined in the introduction, were to use the 
lens of white-collar crime to explore, against a backdrop of academic and 
practitioner research describing fraud and white collar crime as under-
researched, the retrieval process of the relevant dataset and the associated 
barriers to research. Alongside this, the research aims to critically examine, 
using ATA, what police records can reveal about rogue trader victimisation, 
the M.O. employed by the perpetrators and the police response the incidents 
receive. Finally, the findings from this research are situated within the 
framework provided by extant white-collar crime literature to contribute to and 
advance current academic knowledge, addressing a gap in the literature and 
improving understanding of rogue trading, potentially allowing for evidence-
based decision-making in policy and practice. 
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Methodology and methodological position 
 
 
Ontologically, the research ascribed to the social concept theory – believing 
that all knowledge is socially constructed; the police service was seen as a 
socially constructed phenomenon and an interpretive approach was necessary 
to understand it. This fits with the structure and nature of the CJS more broadly, 
as one can see for instance by the case of trial by jury, or the use of discretion 
by police officers, and requires an interpretivist approach to understanding 
social phenomena.  
 
Epistemologically, the work adopted a pragmatic approach in that the focus of 
the research is on the task (Talisse and Aikin, 2008 p 1) and the research was 
designed around the data: what could be accessed, what method did it best 
suit and what was there time and scope to do with it. This rationalist 
pragmatism (Brandom, 2001 p 11) accepts, “We have no alternative to 
proceeding on the ‘working hypothesis’ that… our truth is the truth… Given our 
nature as a creature that makes its way in the world by use of information we 
have to do the best we can” (Rescher, 2003, p 36). The adoption of a pragmatic 
approach does not, however, negate the need for reflective study, and 
“presumptive reasons do not justify unqualified assent” (Talisse and Aikin, 
2008 p 51). As such, one’s own background, beliefs and potential biases need 
reflection so they do not cloud analysis. That is not to say that having a position 
on the subject damages the work per se, nor should it lead to greater criticism, 
since, “researchers always ‘take sides’; the challenge is to ensure that 
unavoidable sympathies with our research participants do not render our work 
invalid” (Noakes and Wincup, 2004 p 30). In order that readers can evaluate 
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the work to assess the credibility of the findings, the analysis has been written 
with quotes supporting the assertions. Additionally, acknowledging a stake in, 
and a passion for, the topic studied should not be cause for surprise. The 
dedication and effort such a project require makes passion all but a 
prerequisite. The growth of practitioner research (Fuller and Petch, 1995; 
Robson, 2001) supports that knowledge and interest in a given subject can be 
beneficial and not a reason for discrediting research (Noakes and Wincup, 
2004). 
 
The use of a quantitative analysis, having acknowledged the absence of 
absolute truth, may appear at face value to be divergent. However, quantifying 
an issue is an important first-step in exploratory research (Neuman, 2000) and 
the pragmatic philosophy holds, “explanations do not have to be internally 
consensual and neatly consistent to have meaning and to have the capacity 
to explain... [after all] if the social world is multi-dimensional, then surely our 
explanations need to be likewise?” (Mason, 2006, p 20). 
 
The pilot study and lessons learnt 
 
Conducting a small-scale pilot study enabled the assessment of the feasibility 
of wider research. It trial-ran the request for access to the data and the 
participation in the research of TVP, and ethical approval for the undertaking 
of the research. It enabled a scrutiny of the data and refinement of research 
parameters and exclusions, informing the choice of method and data analysis. 
Finally, it afforded the opportunity to feedback to the gatekeeper and 
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permissions holder the results of the study, demonstrating my credentials as a 
researcher capable of producing high-quality original research outputs of use 
to the organisation. An inductive (Cresswell, 2003, p 132-133) approach was 
necessarily adopted since initially it was unknown what the data would hold 
and therefore the “firm theoretical base that is called for [in the hypothetico-
deductive approach was] just not there” (Robson, 1993, p20). It was also 
important to gather an impression of what the data comprised before 
identifying the precise direction of the research, or which approach and method 
would best suit the study.  
 
The proposal to TVP for the purposes of accessing the data was broad enough 
to enable decisions to be based on the content of the data, with the analysis 
process beginning with “studying the raw data… and making evidenced-based 
inferences” (Finfgeld-Connett, 2014, p 342). By doing so it was possible to 
“obtain the sense of the whole through reading the transcripts several times… 
before proceeding to the next stage of data analysis.” (Vaismoradi, Turunen 
and Bondas, 2013, p401). A quantitative exploration could also uncover issues 
such as the number (and proportion) of victims of rogue trading that could be 
classified as ‘vulnerable’, how many incidents resulted in suspects being 
charged by the CPS and whether this revealed anything of interest. It would 
also potentially enable the opportunity to learn more about the financial 
detriment to victims (and conversely the criminal benefit to the perpetrators), 
and which trade types were used most frequently by perpetrators. Statistical 
and quantitative analysis of police data and crime reports is an established, 
accepted and valued means of pure, applied and practice-facing research 
(Hibberd, 1990, p116). It is prevalent in a considerable number of studies of 
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similar topics around crime recording, crime prevention, and repeat 
victimisation (Great Britain. Home Office, 1988; Great Britain. Home Office, 
1999; Great Britain. Home Office, 2000b; Morgan, 2001; Farrell, Sousa and 
Lamm Weisel, 2002) and can provide useful empirical evidence and inform 
further research. 
 
It was clear from scrutinising the content of the data that they were far more 
detailed than a quantitative analysis alone could describe, explore or 
adequately explain and only a more in-depth, qualitative analysis would draw 
this out. TA was used because it allows for a qualitative and quantitative 
analysis and “enables scholars, observers, or practitioners to use a wide 
variety of types of information in a systematic manner that increases their 
accuracy or sensitivity in understanding and interpreting observations.” 
(Boyatzis, 1998, p 5). A spreadsheet had been used to analyse and compare 
recurring and important themes for the pilot project, however, it was decided 
for this larger piece of research (suspected to contain in the region of 100 
cases), bespoke qualitative database software would also be required, to keep 
control of the findings and ensure important nuances and themes were not 
marginalised or unwittingly omitted. 
	
 
Access negotiation and ethical issues (the challenges of real-world 
research) 
 
 
 
The researcher’s practitioner role within Trading Standards ensured a 
recognition of the importance of police support and involvement with 
enforcement of this crime type. With ACTSO reports (2014, 2015) recently 
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examining rogue trading incidents reported to, and the response from, Trading 
Standards, less research had been done on incidents reported to the police, 
and their response to the phenomenon. This study aims to redress this and by 
conducting research distinct and separate from my professional role within 
Trading Standards there was less potential for role conflict. However, access 
negotiation was initially approached with some trepidation; with uncertainty as 
to whether the police would permit access not only on ethical and legal 
grounds, bearing in mind the potential content of the data, but also on 
professional grounds. Would the police welcome an ‘outsider’ (Merton, 1972) 
researching and analysing their domain, and would I be trusted? Moreover, in 
meeting with senior police, I also wondered whether the topic would even be 
deemed worthwhile or important amongst other, perhaps higher priority, areas 
competing for limited resources. 
 
Undertaking a professional doctorate, as opposed to a traditional PhD, may 
have assisted with permission since its focus on research capable of 
benefitting the practitioner realm (Usher, 2002; San Miguel and Nelson, 2007; 
Bourner, Bowden and Laing, 2010), and the empirical nature of the proposed 
research fitted with the College of Policing’s (2014) drive for evidence-based 
policing. As Reiner (2000, p 220) notes “the material researchers can obtain 
from the police will be affected by who they are, and their relationship to the 
force.” And the ‘inside outsider’ (Brown, 1996) nature of my role, working 
closely with police as a practitioner, enabled me to demonstrate my 
professionalism.  
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I am a Senior Trading Standards Officer and the Chartered Trading Standards’ 
Lead Officer for Doorstep Crime, Scams and Consumer Vulnerability and have 
specialised in the investigation of rogue trading for over a decade. My role 
involves using a range of legislation to investigate incidents, providing redress 
for victims and achieving convictions against perpetrators. This has resulted in 
custodial sentences relating to offences including under the Consumer 
Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations, the Companies Act, the Fraud Act, 
and the Proceeds of Crime Act. I worked with a warranted TVP officer on a 
daily basis for several years, gaining an appreciation of the pressures and 
experiences of the police generally, and in respect of rogue trading specifically. 
I have supported numerous police forces and the CPS with the investigation 
and successful conviction of rogue traders, working towards facilitating a more 
integrated partnership approach between Trading Standards and the police, 
making me well placed to conduct this research.   
Additionally, the pilot study (and the published article which followed) instilled 
confidence in my credibility, assisted in securing the relevant data for this 
research and led to the Detective Chief Superintendent acting as gatekeeper 
to state, “undoubtedly the work you are doing is of benefit to policing 
nationally.”  
 
Once permission was agreed in principle, advanced access negotiations were 
completed collaboratively, working with the police to identify the minimum 
information required to carry out the study and eliminate the potential for 
collateral intrusion or personal data being shared. Learning from the pilot 
project also enabled additional research parameters to be included, so that the 
final data were restricted to the following crime codes or occurrence types: - 
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Table 2: Crime categories relevant to rogue trading 
Crime categories relevant to rogue trading 
Action Fraud CRI – Call for Service 
 
Harassment (all offences) 
 
Action Fraud CRI – National Fraud 
Intelligence Bureau referral 
 
Distraction burglary (attempts) 
 
Adult Protection (non crime incident)  
 
Distraction burglary (excluding 
attempts) 
 
Criminal damage to dwellings 
 
Burglary in a dwelling (attempts only) 
 
Harassment (1st single offence) 
 
Burglary in a dwelling (excluding 
attempts) 
 
 
Furthermore, a number of exclusions were built into the data retrieval, 
eliminating incidents unrelated to doorstep crimes and further safeguarding 
what could foreseeably contain sensitive information. 
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Table 3: other exclusion criteria 
Other exclusion criteria 
Offences flagged as ‘honour based violence’ 
 
Offences flagged as ‘FGM’ (female genital mutilation) 
 
Offences flagged as ‘domestic incidents’ 
 
Offences flagged as ‘child abuse’ 
 
Offences flagged as ‘CSE’ 
 
Offences flagged as ‘hate crimes’ 
 
 
Further limiting criteria were also included: 
§ The premises/scene of the incident were limited to ‘dwelling 
accommodation’. 
§ Offences where the relationship between the victim and the offender is 
classified as ‘familial/intimate’ were excluded. 
§ Offences where the ‘from’ and ‘to’ time of the incident is limited to 
overnight hours (between 22:00 – 08.00) were also excluded. 
 
These parameters were incorporated because doorstep crimes take place at 
the home, with the overwhelming majority during daytime hours (the majority 
occur during office hours)(Steele et al., 2001) where the offender and victim 
are not related. Minimal data from each crime record was shared, only that 
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necessary for the aims and outcomes of the research to be met, this took the 
form of: -  
 
§ A unique identifier for each record (created for the purpose of the 
research and different from the police crime report number, ensuring 
the incident could not be identified). 
§ The offence classification (which of the 10 different crime codes the 
incident was recorded against). 
§ The date and time of the offence 
§ The disposal method of the report (i.e. the result of the 
investigation/report) 
§ The offence notes (i.e. the notes of the record logged by the responding 
officer detailing the facts of the case, actions taken etc.) 
 
In addition to these parameters a Memorandum of Understanding was agreed 
jointly between TVP and the researcher and a Confidentiality Agreement was 
signed. This ensured no-one would be identified by the research and the data 
would be stored and managed securely, and restricted so that no-one else 
could view it. 
 
 
Data from 2013 was chosen for two key reasons. Although using the most up-
to-date available data was desirable, one of the areas of interest to the study 
was the disposal route of the case, and specifically, whether the case had 
resulted in a suspect being charged. Given that cases of this nature can be 
lengthy (fraud cases take, on average, 514 days from reporting to charging, 
(Police Foundation, 2018, p 4)) this necessitated an older data-set being used. 
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Moreover, in 2014 TVP migrated from using the recording system Cedar to the 
use of the Niche system. Whereas the case notes field in Cedar is 
anonymised, this was not the case with Niche. On a legal and ethical level 
therefore, data access to newer data would have been rendered impossible by 
the change in recording protocols that accompanied the database change. 
  
Ethics approval  
 
 
The project proposal put to TVP was transparent in its aims and investigation 
parameters and set out clearly the small potential for reputational damage, 
should the data reveal poor practice. To counter this, the offer of anonymity 
(declined by TVP) was extended. Despite the parameters, and the steps taken 
to ensure legally and ethically sound research, gaining access to the data was 
not without difficulties. Notwithstanding the protocol stating that crime record 
notes should not contain personal information, and a quality assurance scan 
(following agreement in principle to access and share the data) of a sample of 
the data by the Information Management Unit for Hampshire Constabulary and 
TVP not revealing any personal information, that this could not be guaranteed 
was a barrier for ethical approval. The police felt the transfer of the data would 
be legally compliant with the Data Protection Act 1998, by virtue of the 
exemptions for research contained in Section 33 (in that the Memorandum of 
Understanding and the Confidentiality Agreement would ensure the data 
would be sufficiently protected, would not be identified, and would not result in 
any detriment to the data subjects). Nonetheless, the University of 
Portsmouth’s Ethics Committee felt additional safeguards were required and 
imposed an additional requirement; the data could not be transferred or taken 
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off-site unless or until it was fully anonymous. Whether or not this was legally 
required, it was a reasonable precaution to ensure the research was ethically 
conducted and there was no chance of detriment to any data subject. It was 
certainly not an onerous requirement aimed only at protecting the University 
from reputational damage or restricting research it considered as politically 
charged or unwelcome (Hedgecoe, 2016). The only practical way to ensure 
full anonymity and to conform to the requirement was to visit police 
headquarters and work through the data to ensure they were fully anonymous, 
and this was facilitated by TVP. 
 
 
Research Design and Method: How the study was conducted 
 
 
The research comprised “The reanalysis of data that were previously gathered 
for other purposes” (Hagan, 2006 p 249). This secondary data analysis of 
rogue trader incidents contained parallels with Brookman’s (1999) research 
which used police murder files as a qualitative research source. The files 
contained “events surrounding the homicide and… details of offenders, 
victims, circumstances leading up to the homicide” (Brookman 1999, p 47); 
similar information to that contained in the crime records examined for this 
study.  
 
This research used adaptive theory; a pilot project and the literature informed 
the likely themes for the study, but this did not blind the researcher to other 
themes. As detailed in respect of the pilot project, the research was mixed 
methods. The mix of methods employed a qualitatively-driven approach. Such 
an approach offered, “enormous potential for generating new ways of 
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understanding the complexities and contexts of social experience, and for 
enhancing our capacities for social explanation and generalization” (Mason, 
2006, p 10) via an acknowledgement of the “multi-dimensionality of lived 
experience” (Mason, 2006, p 11). In so doing the research can transcend 
boundaries between the qualitative and quantitative elements and provide a 
mixture of theoretical paradigms reflecting Ponterotto, Mathew and Raughley’s 
(2013, p43) perspective that “mixed methods designs integrate not only 
specific quantitative and qualitative procedures, but also variant underlying 
research paradigms”. The limitations of each type of analysis are mitigated and 
the strengths bolstered (Anchin, 2008; Gelo, Braakmann, & Benetka, 2008; 
Lonner, 2009); a quantitative study would tell us, for example, more than is 
currently known about the financial loss rogue trading causes victims, but 
would fail to explain how the police understand this type of crime or their 
response to it. Similarly, though a qualitative approach cannot provide the 
quantification perhaps necessary to enable prevalence comparisons with other 
crime types, it can explore how it manifests, the particular vulnerabilities of 
individual victims, and the police response; providing a richer overall picture.  
 
A mix of both methods can therefore identify the number and nature of rogue 
trader incidents recorded by police and the enforcement response and how it 
is understood and recorded. The two approaches were therefore effectively 
being used to address slightly different and specific issues (Bryman, 2006, 
p110), to ensure the “end product is more than the sum of the individual 
quantitative and qualitative parts” (Bryman, 2007, p8). The model developed 
over time (Ely et al., 1997) and was adjusted between the pilot project and the 
beginning of this research; and even during the research. Qualitative analysis 
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guidelines were applied flexibly to fit the research questions and the data 
(Patton, 1990), and Braun and Clarke’s (2006) model of TA was used, 
precisely because it allowed for such flexibility, recognising that, “analysis is 
not a linear process where you simply move from one phase to the next. 
Instead, it is a more recursive process, where you move back and forth as 
needed, throughout the phases.” (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p 86). This reflects 
the real-world situation where empirical research, like experiential learning for 
reflective practitioners, often involves a “messy indeterminacy” (Schoen, 
1983). In keeping with this flexibility, the research adopted an exploratory ATA, 
because “eschewing a compartmentalized view of qualitative research and 
data analysis” (Guest, MacQueen and Namey, 2012 p 4) held considerable 
appeal, and chimed with the pragmatic approach to the research, the nature 
of the data and the proposed analysis. As Boyatzis (1998, p 11) states, 
“Communication of the “meaning” of the findings, observations or results may 
require translation into a format accessible to other researchers… It may also 
involve a conversion into quantitative data, which is easily done through 
thematic analysis”.  
 
It was this more balanced and nuanced view of research, seeing qualitative 
and quantitative research as potentially collaborative and supportive rather 
than necessarily oppositional (Silverman, 1998; Noakes and Wincup, 2004), 
and the resistance of an assumption of a particular epistemological foundation 
which was welcomed. For instance, given the data being explored (crime 
records) were an entirely socially-constructed phenomenon and the recording 
officers were subject to personal pressures, influences (such as crime 
detection rates), and experiences, seeking absolute truth or complete 
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objectivity in socially-constructed records, would have been of limited value. 
However, notwithstanding this social construct view, it was recognised that 
much can be learned from quantifications and patterns. They can increase 
understanding and hold important implications for practice and practitioners, 
provided they are not claimed as “necessarily precise, accurate or complete 
recordings” (Bowen, 2009, p 33) and so to overlook this on purely academic, 
philosophical grounds seemed obtuse.  
Analysis is like a continuum (Rolfe, 2006, p 304), anywhere along the length 
of which one can situate research. Neither need this be a fixed point; the data 
may require, or benefit from, analysis from any number of given points, or 
sliding anywhere along the full range of the continuum (Boyatzis, 1998, p 29). 
Acknowledging this is more conducive to useful and relevant findings than 
simply listing attributes “as if they are exclusive or necessary features of 
qualitative research… despite the fact the listed attributes are (a) not always 
present in qualitative inquiry and (b) can also be true of quantitative.” (Guest, 
MacQueen and Namey, 2012 p 5).  Moreover, choosing a method based on 
practical considerations (Noaks and Wincup, 2004, p10) such as the 
maximisation of findings from the data and the ease by which the research 
could be understood by a lay audience also avoided a situation whereby the 
choice of approach and method was agonised, and avoided considerable 
energy spent on philosophical details with little to do with what researchers 
actually do (Sandelowski, 2010). It also ensured avoidance of the pitfalls of 
Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA), for instance, where research 
can become mired in interpretation and relativity in an attempt to “understand 
the subjective processes and meaning-making“ (Murray and Holmes, 2014). 
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The adoption of Braun and Clarke’s (2006) model of TA provided enough of a 
framework to give the work academic rigour, and afforded a systematic 
framework of analysis (see table 4, p 103), giving order and structure to the 
analysis, whilst remaining flexible and data-driven. This is in contrast with 
Grounded Theory, which was rejected in part because, despite attempting 
latterly to be less prescriptive (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Corbin and Strauss, 
2008) the method is (whether fully justified or not) often perceived as 
‘programmatic and over-formulaic’ (Melia, 1996), and can result in difficulties 
in analysis, and irrelevant inquiry that closes off research (Kendall, 1999; 
Heath and Cowley 2004).  
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Table 4: Braun and Clarke’s (2006, p 87) 6 stage method of TA.  
Phase Description of the Process 
1. Familiarising yourself with your 
data: 
 
Transcribing data (if necessary) reading 
and re-reading the data, noting down 
initial ideas. 
  
2. Generating initial codes: Coding interesting features of the data in 
a systematic fashion across the entire 
data set, collating data relevant to each 
code. 
 
3. Searching for themes: Collating codes into potential themes, 
gathering all data relevant to each 
potential theme. 
 
4. Reviewing themes: Checking the themes work in relation to 
the coded extracts (Level 1) and the 
entire data set (Level 2), generating a 
thematic ‘map’ of the analysis. 
 
5. Defining and naming themes: Ongoing analysis to refine the specifics 
of each theme, and the overall story the 
analysis tells; generating clear 
definitions and names for each theme. 
 
6. Producing the report: The final opportunity for analysis. 
Selection of vivid, compelling extract 
examples, final analysis of selected 
extracts, relating back the analysis to the 
research question and literature, 
producing a scholarly report of the 
analysis. 
 
 
Table 4 shows the phases of analysis in the Braun and Clarke TA model. In 
practice, stage 1 of the process (familiarization with the data) was initiated in 
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this research during the data sweep at TVP headquarters, whilst the data were 
being checked for anonymity; some phenomena, such as the use of roofing as 
a trade type were immediately obvious and would go on to form initial codes. 
Some of stage 2 (generating initial codes) had been undertaken with and 
following the pilot project. Various factors were quickly identified as they were 
repeatedly evident, such as the tactic of offenders carrying out work to victims’ 
properties, and the cost of work increasing as incidents unfolded, whereas 
others, like the installation of CCTV to safeguard and target-harden victim’s 
properties took longer to recognise as they appeared less frequently. Some 
initial codes that subsequently became important within overall themes, such 
as references to special measures or statutory cancellation rights became 
notable primarily because of how rarely they appeared. The task of generating 
initial codes and further familiarisation with the data was also performed 
through categorising each case on a spreadsheet, according to various factors 
relevant to those areas that met the objectives of the research; to study the 
victimology, the modus operandi involved in the offences and the enforcement 
response it received. For instance, the level of financial loss experienced was 
categorised as were whether the victim was vulnerable (and if so, the nature 
of the vulnerability), and whether criminal damage was caused. Compiling the 
spreadsheet amounted to a distillation of the data and the categorisations were 
uploaded (as was the whole sample of the data supplied to me by TVP, 
following anonymisation) to the qualitative data analysis software Nvivo as 
‘attributes’ to facilitate further analysis and cross-comparison. 
  
This spreadsheet was necessary because, whilst the study was qualitatively-
driven, it was quantitatively augmented. Qualitatively It was only possible to 
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code in Nvivo that which appeared in the data meaning that incomplete or 
unrecorded data were absent. Therefore whilst it was possible to code for 
financial loss, quantifying how many cases resulted in a financial loss, and how 
many cases there were in which police failed to record whether or how much 
financial loss resulted (and therefore enable an accurate calculation of a mean 
average) was more difficult. Similarly, coding for increases (and decreases) in 
the cost of an incident provided a quantitative number of how many times costs 
were raised (or lowered), but did not easily show how many cases to which 
this related. The spreadsheet enabled identification of how many cases 
resulted in an increase or decrease, and better showed	where there were 
multiple alterations within a given case providing more clarity and accuracy to 
the analysis. 
 
Codes were refined and clustered into relevant themes in phase 3, for instance 
the codes ‘superficial investigation’ and ‘failure to identify criminality’ were 
gathered into the overall theme of ‘poor police response’. The use of NVivo 
enabled an organised and methodical approach to the analysis, enabling the 
efficient identification, and verification (via text-searches, for example) of 
codes, and a better overall picture of which of these codes were important, and 
which were linked, so that they could be formed into identified themes. For 
example, identification of the extent to which financial loss was impacted by 
levels of perceived vulnerability of the victims, and whether perceived levels of 
victim vulnerability impacted on provision of crime prevention measures such 
as CCTV were important tools in assessing themes relating to victimology. 
Nvivo therefore represented a useful tool to support the study, but one which 
would still “leave the analyst firmly in charge” (Fielding and Lee, 1998). 
	 106	
Because the “researcher must interpret the information and themes in a way 
that contributes to the development of knowledge” (Boyatiz, 1998, p 11), it was 
important that readers were able to assess the interpretations being made of 
the data. The officers’ understandings are shown in the study through quoting 
their words. Whilst there is still a degree of interpretation required on the part 
of the researcher, this interpretation is transparent and open to question by the 
later reader of the work (Robson, 1993; Patton, 2002). Reflective practice was 
used to ensure interpretations were reasonable and driven by the data and 
what they contained, but nonetheless, the framework provided by the ATA, 
coupled with the ability of the reader to evaluate the findings are paramount to 
demonstrating credible research and analysis. Phase 4 (testing and reviewing) 
ensured that the themes were valid; with consistent coding and content and 
representative of the wider sample. For instance, a potential theme involving 
the proactive identification of victims by offenders was removed, as the sample 
size (only 2 cases) and detail within the records was such it could not be shown 
to be definitive or reflective of the data overall. As outlined, the research 
process was recursive (Braun and Clarke, 2006) so, in practice stages 3 and 
4 were conducted alongside each other. Rather than identify themes until 
exhaustion prior to then reviewing them all simultaneously, themes were often 
verified in turn as they were identified. Similarly, stages 5 (defining and naming 
the themes) and Phase 6 (the writing of the report) overlapped; as the research 
was written up phase 5 was returned to, ensuring the analysis and the themes 
were precise, that their labels sufficiently described them and that they were 
clearly and accurately presented in the thesis. Nonetheless, as with any 
method, there are potential weaknesses with the method and a discussion of 
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these now follows, along with the steps taken to mitigate them and the 
justification for using the method. 
	
 
Methodological weaknesses 
 
 
Because of the reductive nature of qualitatively-driven ATA, it is possible to 
miss some of the more nuanced data (Guest, MacQueen and Namey, 2012, p 
17). However, the data secured was not so rich or detailed that this was 
necessarily a problem. This was not, for example, life histories or in depth 
interviews containing elusive themes, sometimes more implied than 
expressed. The analysis was thorough, to avoid the potential of missing 
nuance, but it did not suit as in-depth a method as IPA, for instance, because 
the level of detail was insufficient to “access an individual’s cognitive inner 
world’’ (Biggerstaff and Thompson, 2008 p 216) or look in detail at “how 
individuals talk about the… situations they face, and how they deal with them, 
and by close considerations of the meanings they attach to them” (Smith, 
1996). On the reverse of this, another potential weakness of TA is realised if 
the data “lacks richness and nuance”, because “the analysis will be similarly 
lacking.” (Guest, MacQueen and Namey, 2012, p 36).  
To ensure the data was suitable for the method to be employed, it was 
“important to conduct quality checks to see whether the data is sufficiently 
detailed” (Guest, MacQueen and Namey, 2012, p 36). These quality checks 
were undertaken through the implementation of the pilot study, and then re-
run with the wider data-set during the initial sweep of the data, and then 
confirmed during the phase of immersing oneself in the data (Braun and 
Clarke, 2006, p 87). Whilst the data was deemed appropriate for the use of the 
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method, it can nonetheless be a difficult ‘Goldilocks’ assessment as to whether 
the data is sufficiently detailed to provide meaningful analysis, but not so rich 
as to result in the loss of nuance in the analysis and the reporting of the 
findings. Similarly, a further potential weakness relates to the way and the 
extent to which knowledge of the subject area influences interpretation. Again, 
this is something of a balancing act; over familiarity with a subject can lead to 
researchers ‘filling in the blanks’ whereas a lack of familiarity can lead to 
researchers directing their attention to the manifest level. Boyatzis (1998, p 
13) claims “appropriate levels of familiarity allow useful projection” though fails 
to acknowledge in his implicitly positivistic account (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p 
97) that what is deemed either appropriate or useful is both impossible to 
define in practical terms, and, in itself wholly subjective.  
	
The data were not collected for the purposes of research, as has been noted, 
and consequently they sometimes lacked detail which would otherwise have 
been included (Robson, 1993), for example, the financial loss to victims was 
not always recorded. Additionally, it was hard to assess causal relationships 
(Robson, 1993) or reach definitive conclusions about why a course of action 
was either decided upon, or discounted, by officers, because whilst the actions 
were noted, often the rationale for them was not. This made the interpretation 
of some of the findings difficult and consequently, they had to be somewhat 
tentative and qualified, at times potentially reducing the impact (and validity, if 
interpretations are made which others feel are unjustified). One of the principal 
criticisms of TA relates to the method being poorly defined; perhaps as a result 
of the method being broad and fitting with a wide range of methodologies. 
Whilst this may make the verification of the method as applied in any given 
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study more complex, it nonetheless allows for a flexible approach which can 
be turned to a wide range of research studies, potentially increasing 
knowledge in phenomena that would otherwise remain unexplored. Moreover, 
the assessment of a body of work, and its credibility, on its own terms rather 
than on its slavish adherence to a set-in-stone method is not necessarily a 
negative. 
	
	
Finally, one of the oft-repeated criticisms of TA, whether explicit or implied, is 
that it is a somewhat basic method, employed sometimes because the 
researcher can not grasp the more complicated methods of analysis. This is a 
point detailed by Braun and Clarke (2006) who explain: 
 
“Thematic analysis currently has no particular kudos as 
an analytic method – this… stems from the fact it is poorly 
demarcated…, yet widely used. This means that thematic 
analysis is… or appears often to be, what is simply done 
by someone without the knowledge or skills to perform a 
supposedly more sophisticated – certainly more kudos-
bearing - ‘branded’ form of analysis like grounded theory, 
IPA or DA.”  
(Braun and Clarke, 2006, p 97). 
	
	
Nonetheless, despite these potential weaknesses, looking from a pragmatic 
perspective the research advances knowledge and understanding in the topic 
area, in an original way. Moreover, many of the criticisms of TA “depend more 
on poorly conducted analyses or inappropriate research questions, than on the 
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method itself.” (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p 96) and any method, if poorly 
applied, will lack the requisite reliability and validity. Furthermore, some of the 
perceived weaknesses (which in any event affect all forms of qualitative 
research) can be recast as potential strengths; for instance the perception that 
‘anything goes’ (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p 78) is little more than a negative 
framing of the utility and flexibility of the methodology when applied with 
requisite rigour.  
 
 
The mixed method ATA adopted afforded an exploration of data and a topic 
area which have previously been largely closed to (or overlooked by) 
researchers and provided the opportunity for original research and insightful 
findings potentially of interest to practitioners, academics and policy-makers 
alike. All methods have flaws and the strengths, which I will now go on to 
outline, outweigh the potential negatives. 
 
 
Methodological strengths 
 
ATA as a method matches the aims of this research, to give voice to the data 
and explore it in detail to enhance knowledge. The method “draws from a 
broad range of several theoretical and methodological perspectives, …  [and] 
its primary concern is with presenting the stories and experiences… as 
accurately and comprehensively as possible.” (Guest, MacQueen and Namey, 
2012 p, 15-16). This makes it particularly suitable for a mixed method 
qualitatively-driven research instrument providing as it does a match between 
the problem and approach, whilst meeting the aims (Cresswell, 2003) and 
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objectives. In this instance, the aim was to consider whether white-collar crime 
provides an adequate conceptual framework in which to situate rogue trading, 
and the objectives were to explore the research process and critically examine 
what police records can reveal about rogue trader victimisation, the M.O. that 
was used, and the police response they were afforded. The applied nature of 
the method is beneficial, allowing a flexible approach, borrowing “the more 
useful techniques from each theoretical and methodological camp” (Guest, 
MacQueen and Namey, 2012, p 15). In this way the analysis can borrow from, 
but not be too constrained by, a range of methods such as grounded theory, 
positivism, interpretivism, and phenomenology. The flexibility of the method 
also makes possible a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis, 
bolstering each strand through the use of the other and “potentially enrich[ing] 
the eventual analysis and understandings” (Berg, 2001, p 182). Additionally, 
this enabled different aspects of the data to be analysed with the instrument 
that would explore the data most appropriately. In some instances, this was 
with a quantitative counting of the data – such as with the comparison between 
rogue trading and distraction burglary, the financial detriment, or the number 
and proportion of cases involving victims identified as vulnerable. In other 
aspects, the analysis can “move beyond counting explicit words or phrases 
and focus on identifying and describing both implicit and explicit ideas within 
the data” (Guest, MacQueen and Namey, 2012, p 10), such as exploring of the 
enforcement response to rogue trading. 
 
The method allows the use of officer’s own words, enabling an exploration of 
that which they feel is important (and by extension, that which they do not) 
(Brocki and Wearden, 2006, p 88). This means the research was grounded in 
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the data (Guest, MacQueen and Namey, 2012, p 97), using real-life data, from 
actual cases to provide real-world findings that could uniquely benefit 
practitioners and policy-makers. Furthermore, crucially, because the data were 
not collected for the purposes of research, it is unobtrusive (Bowen, 2009, p 
31) without the chance of a ‘Hawthorne effect’ (Landsberger, 1958) whereby 
participants, knowing they are being studied, may modify their behaviour, 
effectively providing ‘model answers’ and skewing results (Roethlisberger and 
Dickson, 1939). This enables an in-depth study of genuine real-life culture, free 
from political, moral or organisational influence beyond that experienced by 
the officer in their day-to-day environment. 
 
Research audience  
 
In choosing the method of analysis, I was mindful that previous research has 
identified both a cultural divide between academia and the police (Rosenbaum, 
2010; Honey, 2014), and a reported lack of intelligibility of academic texts to 
practitioners and public policy makers (Armstrong, 1980; Stephens, 2010; 
Rosenbaum, 2010). As Guest, MacQueen and Namey (2012, p 242) assert, 
“probably the single most important principle… [is that] who the audience is… 
should guide everything.” As such, particular regard was given to choosing a 
method that would meet the aims of the research and appeal to policy makers 
and practitioners as much as to academics. The requirement of a professional 
doctorate is, after all, to “undertake research aimed at making a contribution 
to the knowledge of professional practice” (Bourner, Bowden and Laing, 2010, 
p 71; Usher, 2002), with a “high value placed on generating practice-based 
knowledge to address ‘real-world’ problems” (San Miguel and Nelson, 2007, p 
73). Bearing in mind Buerger’s thinking too, that police research must “speak 
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in the language police understand if they are to be adopted” (2010, p 136) it 
was felt that rather than it representing a weakness TA is perceived as a 
somewhat basic method, its adoption was designed to make the research as 
engaging and accessible as possible. Similarly the exploratory quantitative 
analysis deliberately avoided a complex statistical analysis, opting instead for 
an analysis accessible to a wider audience. 
 
The data could, for instance have been used to perform an interesting study, 
from a social constructivist perspective using Discourse Analysis, to explore 
the social consequences in terms of police response to rogue trading incidents 
of the “social construction of knowledge and truth” (Burr 1995 p 5; Gergen, 
1985). However, notwithstanding the lack of detail in some data which would 
have been a barrier to a cogent analysis, the study would have resulted in 
findings with a more narrow field of focus, and, due to the constructivist 
epistemology may have been more suited to an academic audience, 
potentially alienating the policy maker and practitioner audience. The choice 
of a mixed methods ATA therefore resulted not from methodolatry (Holloway 
and Todres, 2003), but from careful consideration of the data, the aims of the 
research, and the intended audience and this chapter has attempted to both 
identify the strengths and weaknesses, and explain the reasoning and 
rationale behind the choice. 
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Chapter 4: Still ‘lost in the system’: An exploration of the retrieval of 
rogue trader incidents from a police database. 
 
To recap, the definition employed for rogue trading throughout the research is: 
  
‘Any incident where an individual, or individuals, 
targets a consumer, deliberately overcharging for 
unsatisfactory goods and/or services. This includes 
charging for unnecessary work, damaging property in 
order to obtain money or work, charging for work not 
carried out, leaving work unfinished and intimidating 
behaviour in order to extort money’. (Day, 2015). 
 
As explained in chapter 1, the definition of the term is necessitated as no 
definitive, universally accepted definition currently exists. This proves 
problematic, as chapter 2 demonstrated, in building a reliable or consistent 
evidence base (ACTSO, 2014, 2015; Day, 2015, 2017; Police Foundation, 
2018) and has hampered the study of rogue trading on many levels. Chapter 
2 also introduced the notion of the dark figure of unrecorded crime (Coleman 
and Moynihan, 1996; Steele et al, 2001, Thornton, Hatton, Ralph and Owen, 
2005; Tunley, 2014; Police Foundation, 2018) and the difficulty in retrieving 
records relating to rogue trading, created by recording practices which fail to 
distinguish rogue trading from other crimes (Day, 2015), and compounded by 
the lack of a legal definition for rogue trading. As one of the objectives of the 
research is to explore the retrieval process by which a relevant dataset was 
gathered, along with associated barriers to research, it is therefore with this 
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retrieval process that the analysis chapters begins, building on the process 
described in chapter 3, explaining the difficulties encountered in retrieving a 
relevant sample from a wider population of police-recorded incidents. 
 
The data were crime records from 2013 from the TVP crime recording 
database and parameters were included prior to data extraction to exclude as 
many records outside the scope of the research as was possible (see p 95 - 
97 for the full list of parameters). However, because of the lack of an identifier 
(such as a ‘flag’)(Day, 2015) for rogue trader incidents in police databases 
there were ten crime codes against which rogue trader incidents could likely 
be recorded and which it was therefore necessary to include within the data 
population. The crime codes in which incidents could conceivably appear 
were; Action Fraud CRI (Call for Service), Action Fraud CRI – NFIB referral, 
Adult Protection (non crime incident), Criminal Damage to dwellings, 
Harassment (1st single offence), Harassment (all offences), Distraction 
Burglary (attempts only), Distraction Burglary (excluding attempts), Burglary in 
a dwelling (attempts only), Burglary in a dwelling (excluding attempts).  
 
The numerous crime codes, despite the inclusion of delimiting parameters, 
returned 11,826 records, all of which required scrutiny to determine whether 
or not the record related to a rogue trading incident. This task alone took 
around 40 hours to complete and resulted in the actual number of relevant 
records that made up the data sample of just 95, or 0.8%. of the population 
being retrieved. The 95 rogue trader cases identified included instances in 
which properties were damaged in order to necessitate work, overcharging for 
work carried out, completing work of little or no value, and taking money 
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upfront as a deposit without any subsequent work completed or materials 
supplied. It is important at this stage to remember that, due to under-reporting 
and potential under-recording, as well as other reporting routes (such as Action 
Fraud) the figure of 95 recorded incidents does not represent a prevalence 
estimate for rogue trading in the TVP area. 
 
Table 5: The retrieval picture for rogue trading records held by TVP 
 
 
Given this landscape, it is clear why a high percentage of police forces are 
unable to monitor or analyse rogue trading incidents (ACTSO, 2015; 
HMICFRS, 2019b); indeed the real surprise is that 38% feel equipped to do so 
(ACTSO, 2015). With fraud and rogue trading seen as low priority and under-
resourced (Aplin, 2015; Police Foundation, 2018; HMICFRS, 2019b) and, as 
highlighted in chapter 2, a plethora of high-profile priorities competing for 
Retrieving Rogue Trading records from the TVP crime recording 
database (2013) 
Number of police records that required analysis. 11,826  
Number of crime occurrence types necessary for 
inclusion. [Action Fraud CRI (Call for Service), Action 
Fraud CRI – NFIB referral, Adult Protection (non crime 
incident), Criminal Damage to dwellings, Harassment (1st 
single offence), Harassment (all offences), Distraction 
Burglary (attempts only), Distraction Burglary (excluding 
attempts), Burglary in a dwelling (attempts only), Burglary 
in a dwelling (excluding attempts)] 
10 
Number of records that related to rogue trader incidents. 95  
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resources, in an era of public sector spending cuts (HMIC, 2013), it is 
inconceivable resources will be allocated to such a task. This creates a 
situation whereby police are largely operating without an existing retrievable 
evidence base to explore, examine or learn from. Similarly, it is understandable 
that rogue trading is under-explored in academia and research, when, quite 
apart from the legal and ethical difficulties in gaining access to police data per 
se, a relevant dataset is so difficult to disentangle from a large amount of 
personal (and irrelevant) data. Juxtaposing the crime recording situation with 
distraction burglary proves illustrative. The juxtaposition is useful given that, 
as explained in chapter 2, the crimes are often conflated and distraction 
burglary is a ‘like offence’, involving face-to-face dishonesty at a victim’s home. 
Moreover, the described overlap of rogue trading and distraction burglary by 
offenders (Barratt, 2012) and the similar victim demography (Day, 2017) make 
comparisons valid. 
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Table 6: A comparison of the recording situation for rogue trading and 
distraction burglary 
Comparison of Distraction Burglary and Rogue Trading records 
from the  
 
TVP crime recording database (2013) 
	
	 Total 
number 
of 
incidents 
Number of 
crime 
categories 
necessary to 
search 
Number of 
records that 
required 
analysis 
	
Percentage 
of records 
within the 
population 
which were 
relevant to 
the sample 
Rogue 
Trading 
95 10	 11,826 (to 
identify 95 
incidents of 
the 95 in 
total) 
	
0.80%	
Distraction 
burglary 
81	 2 
	
71 (to 
identify 69 
incidents of 
the 81 in 
total) 
	
97.10%	
 
As shown in table 6, issues were identified in the accuracy of recording of 
some distraction burglary incidents. 12 incidents were mis-categorised in crime 
code categories other than the distraction burglary codes, and 2 incidents were 
recorded against distraction burglary without meeting the definition (one an 
example of ‘mate crime’ and the other a sponsorship fraud). Nonetheless, the 
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ability to recall a relevant dataset, albeit incomplete since it retrieved only 69 
of the 81 incidents (85%), is almost instantaneous. This contrasts sharply with 
the retrieval process of rogue trading incidents. The manual retrieval 
necessary due to the lack of a relevant crime code, or flag, meant that no 
incidents were missed. All 95 of those that occurred were identified, at a 
considerable time expense identifying relevant incidents from the wider 
population. 
 
Previous research (Day, 2015) raised the notion of introducing a crime flag by 
which to identify rogue trading incidents (as is currently in place for domestic 
violence). Domestic violence proves a useful comparator as, like rogue trading, 
it manifests in multiple ways which would require recording against different 
specific crime types; harassment, theft, or physical or sexual assault for 
instance, each requiring recording under a different specific crime code. 
Without the crime flag from which domestic violence and abuse benefits, the 
records would be dispersed amongst a number of crime codes making 
analysis hugely impractical. The flag enables the swift retrieval of all incidents 
regardless of which particular crime code it is recorded against. To 
demonstrate the multiple ways rogue trading can manifest, let us consider 
case 5 from within the corpus of 95 cases within the data:  
 
“3 men have knocked on callers door and asked to look at 
the roof. Two men had already climbed up and pulled the 
ridge tiles and felting off causing damage. They tried to 
charge aggd [aggrieved] £3000 to fix the damage they had 
caused.” Case 5. 
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This case was accurately recorded by police as an incident of ‘criminal damage 
to dwelling’. However, the case could feasibly, and equally accurately, be 
recorded against an occurrence type, or crime code, of either ‘Action Fraud 
Call for Service’, or ‘Action Fraud NFIB referral’. Hypothetically, had the 
suspects also threatened, or made repeated demands for payment, it may 
have also been recordable against the crime codes ‘Harassment (First Single 
Incident)’, or even ‘Harassment - All Offences Under Harassment Act’. This 
illustrates how an incident of rogue trading can be categorised in multiple ways 
under current recording practices. On another day, another officer might very 
well have recorded it differently, (and no less correctly) against one of the other 
identified crime codes/occurrence types. 
 
As such, the recording of rogue trading is, as it stands, inarguably 
particularised. Moreover, the introduction of a crime code may only serve to 
further hinder the recording of such crimes by exacerbating the already 
confused and fractured nature of the crime recording process, simply by virtue 
of creating yet another crime code category against which the incident could 
feasibly, and accurately, be recorded. By contrast, the introduction of a crime 
flag would remedy this because, irrespective of the specific category it was 
recorded against, it could be ‘flagged’ as a rogue trading incident, thereby 
forming an instantly retrievable dataset of all such incidents. Furthermore, 
given the link between rogue trading and burglary artifice (Steele et al 2001; 
ACPO, 2011; Barratt, 2012) the introduction of a flag rather than a crime code 
would be the appropriate option. Where cases of distraction burglary overlap 
with rogue trading, a crime flag for rogue trading would enable officers to 
record them against the distraction burglary crime codes, whilst still flagging 
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them as involving rogue trading. A separate crime code for rogue trading, 
however, would inevitably result in the arbitrary cleaving of these overlapping 
incidents between the rogue trading and distraction burglary crime codes, 
again making any analysis of the incidents or their respective prevalence 
problematic. 
 
Therefore, if the aforementioned (chapter 3) College of Policing’s (2014) 
commitment to evidence-based policing is to come to fruition, then a definition 
and crime flag for rogue trading are crucial tools to facilitate it. Simple retrieval 
not only allows for scrutiny of the accuracy of crime recording practices (Great 
Britain. Home Office, 2000b) and performance management as routine, but 
also paves the way for more detailed study (academically and in practice) and 
targeted initiatives.  
 
Further comparison between rogue trading and distraction burglary shows that 
as has been tentatively claimed (Steele et al 2001; ACTSO, 2014; Day 2015; 
Day 2017) the prevalence of rogue trading is greater than distraction burglary. 
It is also likely that this under-represents the difference in the numbers of 
incidents because the comparison is not quite like-for-like. As can be seen 
from the occurrence types, distraction burglary has a crime code by which to 
record ‘attempts’, even when unsuccessful, encouraging the recording of such 
incidents. Without such a category to record unsuccessful attempts of rogue 
trading, it is likely that attempts are under-recorded; absent from the records 
perhaps as a result of having been wrongly written-off as a civil issue (Steele 
et al, 2001, Smith, Button, Johnston and Frimpong, 2011; Aplin, 2015; ACTSO, 
2014, Police Foundation, 2018) or a non-crime (Kenny, 2016). Moreover, as 
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will be explored in chapter 6, of the 81 distraction burglary incidents, 12 
involved rogue trader offending as well as distraction burglary, meaning that 
only 65 incidents were exclusively related to distraction burglary, including 
those that were ultimately unsuccessful. 
 
Detection rates 
 
Despite the higher levels of rogue trading than distraction burglary, 
notwithstanding the likely under-representation of rogue trader incidents, it is 
noticeable that the number of incidents resulting in a suspect being charged 
with a criminal offence are lower for rogue trading than for distraction burglary. 
Not only is this counterintuitive given the numbers, but as chapter 2 identified, 
commonsense suggests that the level and longevity of deception is necessarily 
greater in incidents of rogue trading than is required for distraction burglary. 
One might therefore intuitively expect to see a higher detection rate for rogue 
trading than for burglary artifice. Figure 1 illustrates this direct comparison 
between rogue trading and distraction burglary incidents, including those 
resulting in a suspect being charged with a criminal offence. 
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Figure 1: Rogue trader and distraction burglary comparison: case numbers and 
detections 
 
 
 
Summary 
This chapter describes how the lack of a definitive definition for rogue trading 
makes the phenomenon nebulous. The findings from this study show how the 
lack of a crime flag makes retrieving rogue trader incidents from police 
databases problematic. Consequently, academic study and evidenced-based 
policy and practice initiatives suffer. It explores how a crime flag would remedy 
this situation and enable longitudinal and comparative study. The comparison 
between rogue trading and distraction burglary employed in this study proves 
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illustrative, revealing rogue trading to be more common, yet with fewer 
detected incidents than burglary artifice, and further highlights the need for an 
identifier for rogue trading. The chapter also explains why a crime flag is the 
appropriate solution to retrieval difficulties and how a crime code would 
potentially further cloud the issue. The following chapter now leads on to 
examine in further detail the victimology of rogue trading. 
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Chapter 5: An exploration of the victimology of rogue trading. 
 
Chapter 2 critiqued victimology as a discipline, raising the political backdrop of 
a transference of responsibility from the state to the individual victim (a theme 
that will be returned to in chapter 7 when examining the police response to 
rogue trading), and the initial focus upon the victims actions and behaviour by 
scholars as akin in some cases to victim blaming. However, the discipline’s 
evolution to a more nuanced study of the victim’s perspective, and needs, is 
essential for a study such as this. As discussed, fraud (especially confidence 
fraud) generally and rogue trading specifically require the victim to play a part. 
Any findings that identify themes that have potential learning points for policy 
makers and practitioners, as well as improving the current understanding and 
state of academic knowledge of the phenomenon are important and meet the 
objective for this research in critically examining the victimology of rogue 
trading. As noted repeatedly (Steele et al., 2001; Police Foundation, 2018), 
offending cannot be halted through enforcement action alone. Therefore crime 
prevention measures, based upon empirical evidence are vital. Equally 
findings might help ensure that such measures increase the focus on rogue 
trader victimisation, a subject not currently the focus of victimology, and 
especially of older people’s victimisation – a group generally marginalised or 
invisible in criminological research (South, 2014, Phillips, 2016a). Moreover, 
evidenced-based findings could ensure fear of crime is not stoked 
disproportionately, thereby avoiding “profound negative effects upon ‘potential’ 
victims” (Gorden and Buchanan, 2013, p 2). It might also help bring more 
nuance to a discussion which can be in danger at times of falling into the trap 
of disempowering victims or potential victims, (particularly ‘older victims’), by 
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labeling them as an inherently vulnerable, homogenous group. (Smith and 
Freinkel, 1988; Thornton, Hatton, Ralph and Owen 2005).  
This chapter therefore looks initially at the perceived vulnerability of victims, 
before exploring the nature of those vulnerabilities identified by police. It then 
turns to explore, from the victim perspective the scale and extent of financial 
loss, including whether vulnerability of victims is a factor in levels of loss. It 
also investigates repeat victimisation, including whether or not this correlates 
with perceived vulnerability and further examines the use, or lack thereof, of 
‘special measures’ of video recorded interviews (VRI) with witnesses in order 
to support ABE, and CCTV cameras to support victims. 
 
Victim vulnerability 
 
Conventional wisdom indicates that rogue trading is a crime predominately, if 
not exclusively, perpetrated against vulnerable, older members of society 
(Steele, 2001; ACPO, 2011; Gorden and Buchanan, 2013; ACSTO 2015; 
Phillips, 2016b), with only Phillips (2016a) cautioning that offending may be 
more indiscriminate than previously held. The data were examined to ascertain 
to what degree victimisation related to those categorised by police as 
vulnerable. Those records deemed to involve victims perceived as vulnerable 
were those that were either recorded against the occurrence type (or crime 
code) Adult Protection, involved a referral by the officer to Adult Care Services 
on the victim’s behalf, or explicitly described the victim as vulnerable within the 
case notes. 
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Figure 2: Police officers’ perception of victim vulnerability in rogue trader cases 
 
As seen in figure 2 above, 55 of the 95 rogue trader incidents involved victims 
that were deemed vulnerable by the responding officer. 38 cases explicitly 
described the victim as vulnerable within the record’s notes, 26 cases were 
recorded under the ‘adult protection’ occurrence type, and 32 cases were the 
subject of a referral to social care services. Understandably, there was 
considerable overlap between cases explicitly categorising a victim as 
vulnerable, those recorded against the adult protection code and those that 
involved a social care referral, hence the total number greater than the 55 
cases where vulnerability was deemed apparent. 
This (55 cases) represents a small majority of cases recorded by police, 
meaning rogue trading can be said to more often than not involve victims 
defined by police officers as vulnerable. Previous studies describe elderly and 
55
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vulnerable individuals being proactively targeted by perpetrators (Steele, 
2001; ACPO, 2011; Gorden and Buchanan, 2013; Phillips, 2016b) and certain 
vulnerabilities potentially making individuals more susceptible to victimisation 
(Alzheimer’s Society, 2011; James, Boyle and Bennett, 2014). Furthermore, 
older persons beyond retirement age and those whose vulnerabilities 
(especially mobility issues) ensure they are more likely to spend longer in their 
own home, put them more at risk (Lader et al., 2006; Phillips, 2016b) of 
indiscriminate cold-calling (Phillips, 2016a) than working-age or more mobile 
counterparts, compounding the risk of victimisation so this is unsurprising. It is 
also possible that 55 is the minimum number of cases involving a vulnerable 
victim, because there may be further victims within the dataset experiencing 
vulnerabilities not immediately or easily apparent to a police officer not trained 
in (Wilson and Segrave, 2015), adept at, or attuned to, identifying a range of 
vulnerabilities (HMICFRS, 2019a), and concerns about their ability to 
recognise and respond to vulnerable people. Findings from the comprehensive 
review of fraud (Police Foundation, 2018, p 52) acknowledging “a widespread 
lack of clarity among practitioners in the police, and partner agencies, about 
how to identify vulnerability in the context of fraud” suggest this is a plausible 
theory. Police culture studies discovering officers aggrieved at both having to 
carry out ‘social work’ type activities, which by and large they do not see as 
‘their job’, and for which they deem they have insufficient training (Wilson and 
Segrave, 2015) further support the theory. Moreover, it may be that the dark 
figure of unrecorded crimes contains a higher proportion of the more 
vulnerable victims. There are two factors in this; firstly, those victims who are 
most vulnerable may be least likely to recognise their victimisation. Secondly, 
where reports are received by police for cases involving the most vulnerable, 
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they may be more likely to be dismissed prior to being recorded, particularly if 
the victims are unable to provide sufficient information for officers to satisfy the 
NCRS (Home Office 2011b; 2012b). Furthermore, officers may perceive the 
most vulnerable victims may not make credible witnesses (perhaps because 
of memory or cognitive impairment) and so may avoid recording incidents 
where they suspect the crime will remain undetected. As will be discussed (see 
chapter 7), findings support the notion that police appear keen to avoid 
recording incidents, where possible. On the other hand, if officers hold pre-
conceived stereotypes about victims’ characteristics and capabilities, 
particularly in cases where the level of financial loss is high, they may 
consequently record victims as vulnerable where they are not. Within the data 
were 9 incidents that the responding officer recorded as requiring an adult care 
referral in which the referral was subsequently declined due to insufficient 
detail within the notes for said referral to be competed. This might support the 
belief that vulnerability is being attributed to victims by police where it is not 
necessarily the case. Nonetheless, caution needs to be used when raising 
such a possibility, because it may be that the victim was in some way 
vulnerable, and the officer simply failed to record the reason for the 
vulnerability in sufficient detail to ensure a referral. The tangible result of this 
is that vulnerable persons who may otherwise qualify for further support from 
social care services would be denied this opportunity. Findings indicating an 
often superficial response given by police to incidents of rogue trading, 
discussed in chapter 7, where referrals by police to other agencies are 
explored in more detail, support this need for caution.  
This discussion demonstrates that taking at face value the number of incidents 
involving vulnerable victims based on the data is inadvisable. What it highlights 
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is the difficulty in assessing the extent of victim vulnerabilities, particularly 
based upon judgments made by police officers stretched for time (both in 
responding to the incident initially, and then recording the circumstances of it 
on the police system later) and who are not necessarily trained in identifying 
vulnerabilities. Despite caveats relating to accurate identification and recording 
of vulnerabilities (whether under-represented by virtue of having been missed, 
or over-represented by virtue of having been assumed) and the under-
reporting of incidents by victims with perhaps the most acute vulnerabilities, 
the number of cases involving victims perceived as vulnerable is nonetheless 
lower than might be expected in light of previous studies consistently 
identifying older and vulnerable persons as the most-oft victimised (Steele et 
al., 2001, ACPO, 2011, ACTSO, 2014; ACTSO, 2015).  
Given the proportion of vulnerable victims is below that which might be 
expected, it raises further questions about the number of cases within the 
sample that resulted in a suspect being charged with a criminal offence. Since 
almost half of victims are not vulnerable and concerns (whether real or 
perceived) do not exist about their performance as witnesses or their memory 
recall, one might reasonably expect the proportion of rogue trader cases 
resulting in a suspect being charged to be broadly in-line with other property 
offences (around 14%)(BBC, 2010). Indeed, since rogue trading offences 
necessitate far more interaction between victim and suspect than traditional 
property crimes such as burglary or car crime, (where offenders tend to avoid 
being seen) a correspondingly higher detection rate may be anticipated in 
rogue trading cases. However, as shown in chapter 4, only 4 cases (4.2% of 
incidents within the sample) were recorded against disposal categories 
relating to an offender being charged. 
	 131	
These victim profile findings are also important in terms of public awareness. 
Identified barriers to reporting rogue trader incidents include people feeling 
ashamed, stupid, or embarrassed (ACTSO, 2014; HMICFRS, 2019a) with a 
stigma attached to having been victimised, perhaps due in part to previous 
findings establishing it as a crime type afflicting older people, the vulnerable, 
naïve, or gullible (Cross, 2013, 2015). Evidence that highlights victims are 
almost equally likely to be victimised whether vulnerable or not may help 
destigmatise and encourage increased reporting from non-vulnerable victims 
who may previously have preferred to privately write-off their loss, believing 
themselves partly culpable for having been duped, or too embarrassed to 
report. Despite the lower than expected proportion, vulnerable victims still 
made up more than 50% of recorded incidents of rogue trading and further 
examination of those incidents revealed interesting findings. 
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Exploring vulnerability 
 
Figure 3: Victim vulnerabilities as recorded by officers 
 
As figure 3 shows, the most commonly noted concerns as to types of 
vulnerability related to ‘elderly’ or ‘vulnerable’ and these descriptions were also 
commonly employed in tandem (14 cases). The categorisation by police of 
victims as elderly and/or vulnerable, particularly where no additional 
descriptive detail was present, is indicative of a perception that elderly and 
vulnerable are inherently related. It may also suggest a superficial assessment 
of the victim and their needs by the officer. The next most common source of 
vulnerability identified in the records related to memory loss or dementia 
(whether suspected or confirmed). This tends to validate fears that people with 
dementia are disproportionately likely to be victim of financial abuse 
(Alzheimer’s Society, 2011; Age UK, 2015). Including those 3 incidents where 
victims were said to be ‘very confused’ in this category means more than 1 in 
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5 of rogue trader victims were said by police to be experiencing cognitive 
decline or impairment. Living alone was also commonly noted and again 
correlates with wider findings regarding loneliness and isolation being 
indicative of susceptibility to fraud and financial abuse (Olivier et al., 2016; Age 
UK, 2015, Age UK, 2018). These vulnerabilities comprised the vast majority of 
those recorded by police, as can be seen by figure 3, with only nine other 
vulnerabilities specified, each with only a small number of incidents. Given the 
majority of cases in the sample involved victims deemed by police as 
vulnerable, one might expect specific provisions for vulnerable witnesses 
would be routinely considered, if not employed, as a result. The following 
section examines this by looking at the use of recorded interviews for victims. 
 
Achieving Best Evidence through Special Measures 
 
As outlined in chapter 2, The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act (1999) 
effected certain means for enabling vulnerable or intimidated witnesses 
(including victims) to provide the best evidence that they can. Given that the 
majority of victims (at least 55) would appear prima facie to qualify for special 
measures as a result of being classified as in some way vulnerable, one might 
expect the consideration of special measures to be reasonably commonplace 
for rogue trader incidents. The potential under-representation of vulnerable 
victims, as previously discussed, may be resulting in the exclusion of victims 
that would otherwise qualify for statutory provisions designed to support them 
throughout the CJS process, in the same way as has been discussed for social 
care services. Furthermore, it is also likely that additional victims may also 
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qualify for special measures under the provision for intimidated witnesses, 
even where they are not vulnerable, though it is unclear from the records as to 
how many this may pertain. However, this study identified only 3 cases within 
the 95 incidences (cases 8, 73 and 74) where special measures for witnesses 
or victims were mentioned. 
 
“PC [redacted]… has submitted telephone numbers for 
subscriber checks and an ABE interview has been arranged 
for one of the aggd. There are items submitted for SOCO 
analysis. Trading Standards are leading on this 
investigation.” (Case 8). 
 
Because of the very low number of cases identified in which special measures, 
video recorded interviews (VRI) or achieving best evidence (ABE) were used, 
a text search was used to validate the findings using these terms. The findings 
verified that consideration of these provisions is far lower than might be 
expected. Discounting cases in which these words appeared outside the 
relevant context (for instance if an officer used the word “video” to describe 
checking for the availability of CCTV evidence of an incident), there were no 
cases which referred to special measures, video or VRI and only 3 incidents 
(cases 8, 73 and 74) which mentioned ABE (Achieving Best Evidence). 1 of 
the cases which mentioned this went on to discount the possibility (case 74), 
meaning that only 2 of the 95 incidents of rogue trading contained in the data 
resulted in the application of special measures. This is highly surprising, 
particularly in light of Macpherson’s (2001, p 234) findings that “it could hardly 
be easier for a witness to be eligible as vulnerable, so widely drawn are s.16 
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to 18 [of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999]”.	Case 74 initially 
considered special measures in the form of a video recorded interview instead 
of a written statement. 
 
“Will contact aggrieved tomorrow to speak to them about 
incident and see if ABE is required… decided that ABE may 
not be appropriate and niece of aggrieved happy for MG11 
[written statement form used by police] to be completed with 
aggrieved at their h/a [home address].” Case 74. 
 
Whilst it is encouraging that consideration was given to the prospect of an ABE 
interview, it is nonetheless worrying that it seems the decision not to conduct 
one has been made by the officer, in conjunction with a relative of the victim, 
without apparent input or consultation with the victim. This is despite the 
express instruction in the legislation (Youth Justice & Criminal Evidence At 
1999, S16(4) & 17(3)) that the witness’s views should be considered. It is 
unclear from the data why there has been a near total failure to consider 
recorded interviews as a special measure. Whatever the reason; lack of 
knowledge of the legislation and the provisions contained within it, the 
erroneous assumption it is not relevant to rogue trader cases, or perhaps a 
lack of trained officers able to undertake specialist interviewing, it should be 
urgently addressed. Systematically overlooking legislation specifically 
intended to ensure greater access to the justice system for vulnerable victims, 
whatever the reason, is cause for concern. Having considered the scarcity of 
cases in which special measures were applied, this research also explored 
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another measure with potential to safeguard victims and reduce their fear of 
crime; the installation of CCTV.  
 
CCTV cameras 
 
As a tool for target hardening and crime prevention, especially for a crime type 
where the sharing of information about victims, and the repeat victimisation 
and targeting of the vulnerable are known phenomena (ACPO, 2011; ACTSO, 
2014; Phillips 2016b), the installation of CCTV cameras at victims’ properties 
may be of benefit. The presence of CCTV may provide victims a measure of 
reassurance, decrease their fear of future victimisation and carry an evidential 
benefit, particularly if the camera is capable of capturing audio as well as visual 
footage, in the event of further offending. The cost attached to this may make 
it a measure reserved for those deemed most vulnerable, most at risk of further 
victimisation, or those unable to self-fund such a measure. However, cases 
where CCTV, or memo cams (a covert version of a CCTV camera capable of 
recording audio and visual footage) were installed were few, with only 6 cases 
(cases 32, 38, 43, 44, 74, 84) where it was installed. 
Case 44 provides an example of a case where a camera was installed: 
“Individual circumstances of this investigation are such that 
there is a belief that the victim may be subjected to further 
offending. It is therefore both necessary and proportionate 
that the police fulfill their responsibility to protect victims and 
investigate the crimes reported to them and take additional 
reasonable steps to catch those responsible. The victim of 
the crime has been consulted and consents to the 
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installation and use of surveillance equipment within their 
premises. The victim of the crime has been briefed in 
respect of minimising unnecessary intrusion by guiding 
lawful visitors to the premises away from the area subject to 
the surveillance without compromising the activity.” Case 
44. 
Again, it is difficult to envisage there were only 6 cases in which the 
circumstances led to the belief the victim may be subject to further offending, 
particularly in light of previous literature regarding repeat victimisation 
(ACTSO, 2014; ACTSO, 2015; Phillips, 2016b) and the fact that over half of 
the sample was deemed vulnerable, with 32 victims referred to adult care 
services as a result of concerns about their vulnerability. Furthermore, in case 
45, which was originally put forward by the officer as being suitable for a 
camera, the request is declined on review, in part because the ‘meeting’ (with 
what is described in the notes as “some sort of scam or rogue trader”) was 
pre-arranged rather than during a cold-call. This rather crude conclusion 
seems to lack understanding of the methods employed by doorstep criminals 
(examined in chapter 6) and the victim’s potential vulnerability to financial 
exploitation. This is especially the case given the incident is recorded within 
the Adult Protection occurrence type and references the victim being “very 
confused”, unable to recall much about the incident and “showing signs of 
Alzheimer’s”. 
Generally, the correlation between officers identifying victims as vulnerable 
and requesting the installation of CCTV be installed is strong, with 5 of the 6 
incidents where CCTV has been installed recording the victim as vulnerable, 
and only 1 case where the victim was not recorded as vulnerable (nor was the 
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victim referred to Adult Care or recorded as an adult protection case). 
Nonetheless, given 55 cases involved victims recorded as vulnerable, that only 
5 of these benefitted from the installation of CCTV leaves room for 
considerable improvement in terms of utilising target hardening and crime 
prevention measures to protect vulnerable victims. A similar picture emerges 
when examining the number of victims identified as experiencing repeat or 
ongoing victimisation, with 39 cases recorded (as will be later explored), but 
only 3 of these incidents resulting in the installation of CCTV. The size of the 
losses incurred by rogue trader victims (and conversely the criminal benefit to 
offenders) is often such that safeguarding those victims at particular risk of 
rogue trader victimisation, especially through either vulnerability or repeated 
and continuing victimisation, is an important consideration. A more detailed 
exploration of the associated financial harm caused by rogue trading now 
follows. 
 
Financial loss 
 
The size and scale of financial loss to rogue trading is under-researched and 
difficult to identify. Average losses of between £1000 and £1280, and £3500 
to £4650 have previously been ascribed to reports logged with Trading 
Standards and the police respectively (ACTSO, 2014; ACTSO, 2015). Whilst 
concerns exist around the veracity of crime statistics in relation to fraud 
generally (Shover, Coffey and Hobbs, 2003; Great Britain. Home Office, 
2005a; Karstedt and Farrall, 2006; Police Federation, 2018), and, as this 
research and others highlights, this crime type in particular (ACTSO, 2014), 
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these estimates are of limited use. This study discovered only 58 of the 95 
incidents where the notes of the crime record included a figure for losses. This 
means the calculation for financial loss is incomplete and provides a worrying 
indication of a superficial response being provided by police to this crime type. 
Given that the financial value of a fraud is a factor in determining sentencing 
upon conviction (Sentencing Council, 2014), it ought to be recorded as a 
matter of routine. That it was not recorded in 37 incidents (some 39% of the 
sample) is therefore troubling. 
The 58 recorded cases of the financial cost included 15 incidents where no 
loss resulted. In one such incident the reason why there was no financial 
detriment is unclear, with the other 14 split between intervention (by financial 
institutions, police, family or neighbours) frustrating the criminal attempt (6 
cases), and the intended victim refusing to part with monies (8 cases). Of those 
incidents where offending was interrupted by a third party 4 were as a result 
of intervention from the victim’s financial institution, saving a combined 
£33,062 for the victims, showing the importance of vigilance of staff. 
Additionally, case 32 references a saving of £100,000 as a result of 
intervention by the victim’s family. Although the victim still experienced 
financial loss in this case, the large saving resulting from intervention from 
family shows the importance and potential financial value of intervention and 
support networks. 
Compounding the financial losses experienced by victims, there were 11 cases 
recorded against the criminal damage occurrence type and a further 7 in which 
it was explicitly mentioned that the incident resulted in criminal damage, or the 
notes referred to a cost for remedial or repair work as a result of that which 
was carried out by the rogue trader. In none of those 18 incidents was the cost 
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of the necessary repairs recorded. Whilst this does not represent a financial 
gain for the perpetrator, it is nevertheless a cost borne by the victims, albeit 
one which remains incalculable. Moreover, case 60 involved the victim 
bequeathing an offender 50% of his property in lieu of payment once his 
savings had been exhausted. Again, the level of financial loss (albeit 
subsequently overturned by the intervention of a neighbouring police force) 
remains incalculable. However, with high average property prices in the South 
East of England and the Home Counties being high, it is easy to envisage this 
representing a substantial amount. 
As can be seen in figure 4, the average calculable financial cost of rogue 
trading in the 58 incidents where loss was recorded was £3,441. This figure 
included those where a loss was avoided, but excluded the unknown cost or 
repairs subsequently required, the value of the share of the property 
transferred, and the loss where this was attributable to a distraction burglary, 
even where this was part of a rogue trading incident. It also excluded an 
incident where the loss was disputed by a trader (case 1), because it could 
not be ascertained from the record whether or not this had been paid. The 
calculation therefore likely represents an under-estimate of the true financial 
cost to victims of rogue trading. Figure 4 also illustrates the average cost of 
successful or completed incidents, excluding those which were frustrated 
(excluding the additional incalculable losses, distraction burglary losses and 
disputed loss as described above), showing an average loss of £4,641. 
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Figure 4: Average losses to rogue trading, whole sample and successful 
incidents only 
Average financial losses to rogue trader incidents 
Average cost of whole sample of rogue 
trader incidents (including frustrated 
attempts) 
Average cost of the 
completed/successful rogue trader 
incidents only 
£3,441 £4,641 
 
The total loss to rogue trading in the 58 records where a level of financial loss 
was recorded was £199,568, and there was a range of £0 to £40,000. 
Assuming a similar average value in the 38 records where no financial loss 
was recorded would mean a loss of £326,885. Whilst intuitively this may result 
in an overestimate of loss, as one would hope those cases involving significant 
loss would be more likely to be recorded, it provides a useful guide, particularly 
as no account is taken of the additional cost of repairs necessary as a result 
of offending. 
Tentatively accounting for the estimated levels of underreporting (between 1 
in 10 and 1 in 100 incidents reported)(ACTSO, 2015) would suggest a loss to 
rogue trading, in the TVP area, of between £3.26 million and £32.6 million. As 
large as these figures are, they are still likely to be at the lower range of 
estimates as they work on only those cases recorded by police, not all those 
reported. As discussed, there is likely to be an unknown number of reports 
closed prior to being added to the crime recording database which remain 
unaccounted for. The figures also take no account of the value of properties 
where ownership is bequeathed or transferred. Whilst the prevalence of this 
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practice is unknown, it is not without precedent (R. V Tomney and others; 
Carswell, 2015; CTSI, 2016) and did appear within the data (Case 60). Even 
at face value, the scale of losses identified for rogue trading is far greater than 
from distraction burglary, notwithstanding that with only 30 incidents where a 
financial amount (or attempted loss) was recorded, and 16 where there was 
an actual loss from distraction burglary, the sample size is small. The total loss 
recorded resulting from distraction burglary was £18,355. Assuming the same 
average loss for those where none was recorded as for those where it was 
recorded would give a loss of £49,567. 
Figure 5: Rogue trader and distraction burglary average loss comparison  
 
The identified losses shown in figure 5 broadly align with previous average 
loss findings for distraction burglary (£648.36)(Operation Liberal, n.d.) and 
rogue trading (£4650 for NFIB reports, £1000 for reports to Trading 
Standards)(ACTSO, 2014). This study therefore strongly supports previous 
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research suggesting that rogue trading is higher value than distraction burglary 
(Steele et al, 2001). Intuitively, there will be greater losses resulting from rogue 
trading, as distraction burglaries are limited in their gain to the money being 
kept at home by the victim, and with cash usage becoming less the norm, this 
could yet fall further. Conversely, if a rogue trader can convince a victim of the 
need for work, they can require payment beyond the amount normally kept 
within the home. This can be done via a bank, as seen within the data (and 
discussed in chapter 6), or increasingly, as internet banking becomes more 
prevalent, immediate electronic transfer (using a third party bank account if the 
perpetrators wish to avoid leaving a forensic trail). Moreover if this tactic is 
successful it can be repeated, as discussed in chapter 2, by ‘bouncing the job’ 
(R. V Tomney and others; Carswell, 2015; Phillips, 2016a) until the victim 
recognises the fraud. The relative prevalence and comparative levels of 
financial loss between the two crime types further suggests it is anomalous 
that distraction burglary benefits from a definition and crime code rather than 
rogue trading.  
The number of incidences likely to involve life-altering losses is also far greater 
in rogue trader cases than burglary artifice cases, as is shown in figure 6.  
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Figure 6: Financial loss comparison of successful rogue trader and distraction 
burglary incidents 
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Figure 6 shows that, for distraction burglary, but for one outlier at £10,000, all 
other incidents were at or below £3,000 loss. The majority of incidents (18) 
where a financial loss was recorded (30 cases in total) involved a loss of £50 
or less. This contrasts with rogue trading where there were 14 incidents 
involving over £3,000 loss, including 4 incidents with losses greater than 
£20,000, the greatest being £40,000. In addition, case 60, where £30,000 was 
lost also involved the bequeathing of ownership of 50% of the victim’s property, 
potentially hugely increasing the financial loss were it calculable and had it not 
been reversed. There were 6 rogue trader incidents (£40,000, £30,000, 
£25,998, £21,000, £14,000, £12,950) involving greater financial losses than 
the most costly distraction burglary (£10,000). Moreover, whereas the majority 
of distraction burglary incidents involved losses of £50 or less, the majority of 
rogue trader incidents involved losses of £300 or more. For completed 
offences involving a financial loss the majority of rogue trader cases resulted 
in a loss of £800 or more, whereas distraction burglary led, in the majority of 
cases to a loss of £200 or less. The cost of repairs required as a result of rogue 
trader cases (were they calculable), would further widen the disparity between 
the financial losses for the two crime types. 
Vulnerability and financial loss 
Further exploration of the financial losses reveals that whilst victims are 
marginally more likely to be vulnerable than not, the level of loss between 
these two groups is quite different. Generally speaking, it seems the greater 
the level of vulnerability the higher the financial loss. 
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Table 7: Financial loss to rogue trader incidents by level of vulnerability 
Financial loss to rogue trader incidents by vulnerability 
 Whole 
sample of 
rogue 
trader 
victims 
Explicitly 
vulnerable 
Deemed 
vulnerable 
No  
 
vulnerability 
 
mentioned 
Average rogue trader 
incident (including 
frustrated attempts) 
£3441 £4740 £3722 £2980 
Average 
completed/successful 
rogue trader incident 
£4641 £6583 £4963 £4098 
 
As is shown in table 7 above, average losses tend to correlate with 
vulnerability. Those who lose least are not identified as vulnerable and their 
losses represent less than the average of the entire sample. Those deemed 
vulnerable by officers (recorded as an Adult Protection case, or involved an 
Adult Care referral recommendation) lose more than victims not recorded as 
vulnerable, with completed incidents costing more than the average financial 
loss, and victims that were explicitly described as vulnerable lose the most. 
The averages may be affected by the presence of some particularly high-value 
losses to vulnerable victims, as the figure below suggests. Moreover, it may 
be that where an officer identifies a high level of financial loss, they record the 
victim as vulnerable primarily on the basis of the scale of their loss more than 
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the presence of any identifiable underlying vulnerability (though this is not 
necessarily unfounded since significant financial exploitation might be a 
valuable indicator of vulnerability). Regardless, it would appear the offenders’ 
view that “it’s always by getting a confused gimmer [older person] with a poor 
memory” (Steele et al, 2001, p 61) that enables the defrauding of higher 
amounts is borne out in the data, and is illustrated by figure 7. 
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Figure 7: Recorded financial losses in rogue trader incidents by vulnerability 
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Figure 7 also highlights the importance of early third party intervention, with 
the role of financial institutions crucial (Age UK, 2018), especially when linked 
with police follow-up. The higher value losses most often require withdrawal of 
monies from banks, cheque payments or bank transfers. This offers an 
intervention opportunity which, if acted upon successfully, could save victims 
from losing potentially life-changing sums, particularly where the victim is 
vulnerable and less able to identify the criminal attempt themselves (or recover 
lost funds, (Phillips, 2016b)). Equally, greater awareness of rogue trading 
amongst care professionals, particularly in light of the Care Act is key to the 
safeguarding of vulnerable victims. The chapter will now move on to discuss 
in more detail the findings in respect of repeat and continuing offences, which 
also highlights the potential importance of safeguarding and third party 
intervention. 
 
Repeat and previous victimisation, and continuing offences 
 
Bridgeman and Hobbs (1997) define repeat victimisation as occurring “when 
the same person or place suffers from more than one incident over a specified 
period” (p 1). It is usual to limit the definition to a definite period; the Office of 
National Statistics and the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW), for 
instance, use a year as the time frame within which incidents must occur before 
they can be termed repeat victimisation (Great Britain. ONS, 2013). Whilst this 
is both necessary and understandable for studies of repeat victimisation to be 
meaningful (particularly annual crime statistics), there was no record of the 
date of the previous incident in any of the records within the data and an 
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absence of research to inform the period over which repeated incidences of 
rogue trading are likely to, or usually, occur. Therefore, repeat or previous 
victimisation is defined here as any case that mentioned another incident of 
rogue trading to which the victim was subjected. Additionally, where an 
incident was more prolonged than a single visit, involving offences on more 
than one occasion even where it was part of the same incident, that was 
deemed as a continuing offence. As with vulnerability, the levels of repeat or 
previous victimisation within the data are likely to be under-recorded. Police 
responding to reports of a crime understandably focus upon that incident, 
rather than delve into other previous similar incidents to which the victim had 
been subjected. Under-recording of repeat and continuing incidents is 
therefore to be expected. Despite this, as figure 8 shows, there were 39 
incidents within the data that referenced repeat or continued victimisation. 
Figure 8: Nature of rogue trader incidents; one-offs or repeat or continuing 
victimisation 
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The rogue trader cases mentioning repeat or continuing victimisation 
comprised 24 cases that mentioned repeat victimisation and 18 that involved 
continuing offending (with 3 cases experiencing both). 
Case 26 gives an example of a repeat rogue trader incident 
“Aggd has had 2 males knock on the door and state that 
they did the roof earlier in the year and said they could see 
a few tiles missing. Aggd was concerned and let them in. 
They went into her attic. One came back down with some 
soaking loft insulation and handed it to the second male who 
gave it to the aggd who put it in the bath. Aggd has gone up 
to look and come down. Males told aggd it will cost £7000 if 
she uses a proper builder but they'd do it for £5500. Aggd 
was shocked and it then dropped to £5000.” Case 26. 
And case 22 provides an example of a continuing offence: 
“Sus[pect] has attended the aggd[’s] home on a cold call and 
offered to carry out work on the roof. The aggd party has 
organised cash of £4200 and then paid this to the sus[pect]. 
The only works carried out is a five foot run of pointing. The 
sus[pect] has then contacted the aggd again asking for a 
further £1700 to pay for the rental of a lorry to collect 
materials.” Case 22. 
In addition to the continuing offences present (involving the same perpetrator) 
in the sample, there were also 9 incidents that referenced repeat offending by 
the same perpetrator. This ties in with wider findings regarding white-collar 
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crime victimisation (Croall, 2016) and with rogue traders grooming victims for 
repeated financial exploitation (ACTSO, 2015; Phillips, 2016b) and suggests 
that perpetrators do not consider it a significant risk to return to the scene of 
their crime. Case 30 provides one such example; 
“Aggd has been… shopping on her own. She was 
approached by unknown male . This male… [stated] he had 
done work on her roof over a year ago… [and] she still owed 
him money... [she] disputed this initially however she has… 
[withdrawn] £450. The offender was waiting outside and 
collected the money from her as she left.” Case 30. 
The incidents where victims experienced more than one offence within a 
continuing incident demonstrate that offenders will continue to ‘bounce the job’ 
(R. V Tomney and others; Evans, 2014) prolonging and developing a 
continuing offence for maximum financial gain, as case 38 demonstrates. 
“Aggd has had rogue trader calling at her house stating that 
they are carrying out work for her. Over a period of time she 
had paid out about £12,950 to them. They have come in 
several vehicle to the address and there are at least 5-8 
different people.” Case 38. 
Case 62 provides an illustration of both repeated and continuing offences, all 
seemingly by the same offender; 
“The aggd had some work done on his roof two years ago. 
On 22/05/13 the builder knocked on his door and asked to 
check the roof to make sure that there were no problems. 
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The builder said to the aggd that this was under guarantee 
and that there would be no cost. When the builder looked on 
the roof he advised the aggd that there were other problems 
that would cost £5000 to repair. The workmen wanted cash 
so the aggd went down to the bank and took the money 
out… the builder left and came back on 24/05/13 to complete 
the work. When… [he] arrived he looked at the roof and 
advised the aggd that there were more problems which 
would cost another £5,000 to put right. Once paid the man 
left.” Case 62. 
The results indicate victims of rogue trading are at risk of being targeted 
repeatedly, with 40% of victims experiencing more than a ‘one-off’ episode and 
therefore likely experiencing a higher financial loss as a result, though the data 
were incomplete and the sample too small to test this. Nonetheless, a more 
robust enforcement and safeguarding response could prevent considerable 
future harm. In addition to the greater financial cost of repeat victimisation, 
victims’ mental health, wellbeing and sense of self may also suffer 
correspondingly. With victimisation having an impact (Sixsmith, 1990; Steele 
et al, 2001; Great Britain. Home Office, 2003c, 2005b; Thornton et al, 2006; 
Barratt, 2012) on older persons, the greater the level and longevity of the 
interaction, the more keenly felt the deception is likely to be. Since repeat 
distraction burglary victimisation can lead to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD)(Barratt, 2012) and the deception involved is less elaborate than in 
rogue trading, failing to safeguard victims of rogue trading could have a 
profound negative effect upon them. Placing evidence-gathering tools at 
premises already known to be targeted is likely to yield positive results, 
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especially as 27 of the 55 (49%) victims deemed vulnerable experienced either 
repeat or continued offending. Moreover, detecting future offences may unlock 
the potential detection of previous incidents where no suspect could be 
identified if perpetrators are returning to the scenes of previous crimes. If a 
victim is able to positively identify the offender as the same as from previous 
incidents, or if cameras capture audio of the perpetrator referencing previous 
work he has carried out at the property, it might enable detection and 
proceedings retrospectively. The high rates of repeat victimisation, especially 
amongst vulnerable victims further call into question the very small number of 
cases that benefited from the installation of CCTV (explored earlier). 
Particularly since only 3 of the 6 instances where CCTV was installed were 
instances where the victim was known to be a repeat or continuing victim. 
 
Summary 
 
This chapter has explored the victimology of rogue trading, explaining how 
financial losses vary greatly, with an average loss of £3441, or £4641 where 
the incident is successfully completed. Rogue trading is found to be 
considerably more financially detrimental to victims than distraction burglary, 
for which the average loss is £612, or £1147 for successfully completed 
incidents. It describes how there is potential for life-altering losses with 4 cases 
involving losses of over £20,000 and how victims are more often than not 
deemed vulnerable by police. The average financial losses experienced by 
those explicitly recorded as vulnerable are found to be greater than those not 
deemed vulnerable and vulnerabilities were most commonly associated with 
being elderly, experiencing memory loss or living alone. Repeat or continuing 
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victimisation are relatively common and offenders are seemingly willing to 
remain at, or return to, a property where they envisage it will result in financial 
gain. 
 
Despite the majority of victims being deemed vulnerable by police, measures 
designed to reduce or prevent crime, and support and reassure victims are 
rarely utilised. CCTV was only installed in 6 cases; 1 of which was in a case 
where the victim was not recorded as vulnerable, meaning that only 5 of 55 
vulnerable victims were safeguarded via the installation of CCTV despite 
almost half experiencing repeat or continuing rogue trader incidents. Similarly, 
only 3 incidents where CCTV was installed were known to be the subject of 
repeat or continued victimisation (despite 39 cases mentioning repeat or 
continuing offences). Moreover, there were only 3 cases in which special 
measures were considered, with only 2 in which measures were subsequently 
employed. Having explored elements of the victim profile, the inevitable 
counterpoint to this is the behaviour of the offenders. These results have 
already exposed their preference for targeting those that are vulnerable, and 
the next chapter explores in greater detail the way they carry out their 
criminality. 
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Chapter 6: An exploration of the actus reus and modus operandi in rogue 
trader cases. 
 
As highlighted within chapter 2, little attention has been given to the study of 
rogue trading in academia (Gorden and Buchanan, 2013) or practice. Fraud 
more generally is afforded a relatively low-status by police (Levi and Jones, 
1985; Levi and Burrows, 2008) and within this low-priority crime type, emerging 
threats such as mass marketing fraud (Olivier et al, 2016) and cybercrime 
(Police Foundation, 2018), compete for limited resources. This chapter 
therefore aims to begin to redress this imbalance, meeting the objective of 
critically examining the modus operandi in order to advance the current state 
of knowledge about how rogue trading is perpetrated. It begins with an 
exploration of the dynamic, varied and fluid behaviour demonstrated by 
offenders in carrying out their offending, before exploring alterations to quoted 
costs; overlaps between rogue trading and distraction burglary; requiring 
immediate payment, including transporting victims to their bank and the trade 
type employed by the offender in carrying out the criminality. 
 
Dynamic and varied offending behaviour 
 
The data analysis revealed a fluidity and variability of the modus operandi in 
rogue trading incidents and there were a multitude of ways in which offences 
were committed. There were 2 examples of the proactive targeting of 
vulnerable adults (cases 30, see p 152, and 68), and instances which seemed 
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indiscriminate in nature. As has been raised in the preceding chapter, this 
study revealed examples of repeat incidents and continuing offences involving 
the ‘bouncing’ of jobs, as well as one-off incidents. Conversely, in addition to 
those incidents where the job was bounced and the money required by 
offenders increased, there were also incidents where the initial demand for 
payment was reduced. There was a split between incidents of theft or 
advanced fee fraud where offenders absconded without carrying out any work 
or providing any materials, and those where some work was carried out. 
Amongst those where work was undertaken, this study identified a broad range 
of trades employed by offenders to conduct their criminality. There were also, 
as stated in chapter 5, 18 incidents where offenders caused criminal damage 
to properties to invoke the need for work to be carried out. The wide variety in 
methods of offending revealed by the analysis demonstrates the manifold 
ways in which rogue trading manifests, including via an overlap between rogue 
trading and distraction burglary. This chapter now examines the ways in which 
offending was carried out and demonstrates the spectrum of behaviours used 
to commit offences, beginning with whether offenders carried out works to a 
property, or involved straightforward theft where the offender took an upfront 
payment without then providing any goods or services. 
  
	 158	
Figure 9: Nature of rogue trader incidents; whether the offender carried out 
work 
 
 
As shown in figure 9, of the 95 cases of rogue trading from TVP in 2013, at 
least 44 incidents involved the offender undertaking work to the property 
(including 18 where this ‘work’ involved causing criminal damage to the 
property). The quality and necessity (or otherwise) of the work is impossible to 
evaluate in the vast majority of incidents due to the paucity of relevant detail in 
the notes. This was the most prevalent offending method recorded, indicating 
it is perhaps the preferred option for perpetrators. By contrast, there were 31 
incidents of advanced fee fraud or theft in which no work was carried out by 
the trader, following receipt of an upfront payment or deposit for claimed works 
from the victim. There were 23 incidents in which the notes did not record 
whether or not work was undertaken, or where the incident was rebuffed, 
31
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making it impossible to identify whether the offender intended to carry out 
work. There were also 3 instances of repeat or continuing offending where a 
victim had been subject to a rogue trade where the offender both carried out 
work and absconded having taken payment without carrying out any work 
(cases 29, 30 and 86). The results are somewhat counter-intuitive since one 
might imagine that the greater engagement between the offender and victim, 
the higher the chance of the offender being identified (by either the victim, or 
by other potential witnesses) and brought to justice. However, there are two 
reasons why the preference might be for conducting work. Firstly, it may be 
that there is the opportunity for higher financial gains in carrying out work. For 
instance, where an offender convinces a victim of a need for roofing work, 
taking a ‘deposit’ would normally restrict the gain to a proportion of the quoted 
‘cost’; payment in full upfront is less common and might arouse suspicion. 
Representing to carry out that work (irrespective of its necessity, amount, or 
quality), therefore better enables the full amount to be gained. Secondly, the 
criminals’ belief, communicated to Steele et al. (2001), that carrying out work, 
regardless of how little is completed, represents a viable means of avoiding 
enforcement attention may be common (see p 68 for quote). Whether this 
perception is accurate is impossible to judge as the sample did not reveal 
whether prosecutions or enforcement action was successful and in any event, 
with only 4 incidents recorded as resulting in the CPS charging a suspect, the 
sample size is too small to be valid. It is likely that a combination of both 
reasons; the opportunity for greater financial gain and the belief (whether 
accurate or otherwise) that it is less likely to attract enforcement attention result 
in the greater number of incidents that involve the performance of a trade than 
those where no work is conducted. It is also likely that the M.O. is fluid and 
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dynamic depending upon the level of perceived susceptibility of the potential 
victim to the approach. If the offender detects, for instance, that the victim (or 
an on-looker) is becoming suspicious about their activity, then even had they 
originally intended to carry out work to a property, they may subsequently 
decide to abscond immediately upon receipt of an upfront payment. Moreover, 
if an offender adjudges a victim to be acutely vulnerable, he may decide the 
need for work to facilitate high financial gains becomes redundant. Case 29 
for instance, involved £6,700 loss to a rogue trader that carried out no work, 
by a victim described as being repeatedly targeted, living alone, who was 
known to Safeguarding Vulnerable Adults and who was described as maybe 
having dementia. Case 32 also details an incident where no work took place 
in which the victim, who was also said to be living alone with dementia, lost 
£6,500. Further, whilst case 33 does not involve the police recording any form 
of vulnerability, it involved a £25,998 loss for a one-off incident where no work 
was conducted and it may be that the perpetrator adjudged the victim to be 
vulnerable, even if the responding officer subsequently did not. The fluidity in 
offending behaviour was also evident in the supposed cost levied by the 
perpetrator with increases and decreases (and both increases and decreases 
in the same incident) occurring within the data. 
 
Altering quoted costs: Increasing the price 
 
The previously discussed tactic of ‘bouncing the job’ (R. V Tomney and 
others), claiming to identify further necessary work, or exaggerating the 
severity of the issue and requiring a higher cost to ‘rectify’ it once work has 
begun, is common. 27 incidents of the 44 cases that involved work being 
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performed, where this modus operandi was available, involved an increase in 
the amount that the offender charged their victim. This technique has the 
benefit for perpetrators that potential victims are unlikely to be as wary of 
having minor, inexpensive works conducted to their property as they would 
were they to believe they are facing considerable expense from the outset. 
After initiating work the offender can then hope to increase their gain by 
requiring more money, once they are satisfied they have engendered the trust 
of their victim. Moreover, having secured access to the property by convincing 
the victim to accept their offer of work, the offender is well-placed to cause 
intentional damage, thus creating an additional need for ‘work’ for which they 
can charge, as is the case in 18 incidents within the data. If the need created 
is for urgent work, for instance where a property is left vulnerable to the 
elements, the victim is often effectively presented a fait accompli, as the 
prisoner interview quote from Steele et al. (2001, p 60) demonstrates; “If it’s 
work to the exterior and they say they want to think about it you just demolish 
a bit of it that’s in good condition. They have got to give you the job then”. 
Additionally, the tactic of increasing the price as the offending progresses also 
has the benefit for offenders that if apprehended early on in the offending by 
law enforcement, before the amounts they have taken become extreme, this 
obfuscates matters for officials, potentially enabling offenders to claim they are 
legitimate (albeit expensive) traders completing home-improvement contracts. 
There is also the opportunity to simply complete more work to a higher 
standard if they are concerned the victim is becoming suspicious or that there 
is potential for enforcement attention. 
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Altering quoted costs: Reducing the price 
 
Conversely, there were 10 incidences where the initial quote was reduced. 
Perpetrators in these instances have either quoted a high price in order to 
suggest to the target they are getting a bargain upon subsequent reduction, or 
else, they have misjudged what they can require of the victim and reacted to 
the rejection of their initial price by reducing it. This enables the offender to still 
make a gain, albeit smaller than initially earmarked. Through this method the 
offender can gauge the credulity of the victim which can have the benefit that, 
should the victim fail to recognise the initial price as too high, it could lead to 
them gaining far more than would ordinarily be viable or likely in a short time-
frame. The fact that there are 5 examples in which there is both a reduction 
and an increase in the original price suggests that even where the initial price 
is unacceptable to the intended victim, this does not deter the offender from 
subsequently attempting to increase their gain as the incident unfolds. It also 
strengthens the claim that offenders’ behaviour is dynamic and attuned to the 
specific situation and intended victim. Nonetheless, the indication is that rogue 
traders are more likely not to initially attempt to maximize their gain and price 
themselves out of a job, potentially arousing the suspicion of their intended 
victim, but increase their financial gain as the offending unfolds. The fluidity of 
this offending is not restricted to the tactics employed within the rogue trading 
incidents, it also involved an overlap between rogue trading and distraction 
burglary. 
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The overlap between rogue trading and distraction burglary 
 
There were 12 incidents of the 95 in which both rogue trading and distraction 
burglary were committed, and case 80 provides a pertinent example, first 
describing the rogue trading incident, then revealing the discovery of the 
distraction burglary: 
“Offender knocked on aggd door asking if any building or 
structural work was required to be done… suspect… had 
completed work at offloc [offence location] a year 
previously… work was agreed and suspect requested £200 
up front for materials. It was agreed that aggd and suspect 
would walk to the local cashpoint. However prior to doing this 
suspect asked if he could use the toilet. He went upstairs 
and aggd heard the bathroom toilet flush. Aggd and suspect 
have then walked to the cash machine where suspect has 
watched aggd place in his pin number and has then leant 
over and typed in the amount of £250. Aggd objected 
however suspect explained he required an extra £50… upon 
returning home aggd discovered stolen items missing from 
within his bedroom. The only person to have been within the 
house was suspect and he had no permission to enter any 
other room apart from the bathroom.” Case 80. 
Additionally, case 91 (a distraction burglary incident) hints at a potential 
hierarchy of offending, with rogue trading being the primary aim and distraction 
burglary employed as a fallback. This is logical, given the potentially greater 
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rewards (Day, 2015) available through rogue trading, as demonstrated by the 
comparative gains for each crime, shown in Figure 5. Furthermore, the 
opportunity for repeat victimisation is far greater in an incident of rogue trading 
than in distraction burglary. 
“The aggd opened the door and the offender explained he 
has been working at the neighbours house doing some work 
on the roof and stated that the aggd had the same problem 
and need the work doing. The aggd told the offender that his 
wife deals with everything to do with the house and he was 
not going to have anything done. The offender told the aggd 
to go and get a pen and paper to write down the offenders 
number so he could phone when his wife was back. The 
aggd left to go and get the pen and paper and then returned 
to see the face running away passed the window. He then 
realised the wallet was missing.” Case 91. 
Here, the initial approach by the suspect to conduct work to the roof of the 
property is rebuffed, leading him to improvise, transforming the incident into a 
distraction burglary via the instruction for the victim to retrieve a pen. This again 
shows flexibility in the offender’s way of operating, and commitment to 
exploiting the victim for financial gain, whatever form that may need to take. 
Additionally, there were also examples throughout the data of offenders 
transporting victims to the bank in order to secure their immediate financial 
gain, another long-recognised M.O. (Steele et al, 2001) detailed in chapter 2, 
and these will now be explored. 
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Requiring immediate payment, and transporting victims to financial 
institutions 
 
Victims were transported to the bank by the offender in 11 of the 95 cases 
comprising the sample, with a further case involving the perpetrator 
accompanying the victim to their local bank on foot, and 2 more incidents in 
which the victim was followed by the offender to the bank without their 
knowledge and intercepted as they made their way home. Finally, another 2 
cases involved the offender instructing the victim to go to a bank to facilitate 
payment immediately upon completion, rather than have to wait for payment 
and risk the victim having time to reconsider and refuse to pay, or, revisiting to 
collect payment, thereby increasing the opportunity for them to be 
apprehended. That 16 cases involved immediately securing a financial gain 
greater than that which was available in the victim’s home may further explain 
why rogue trading is both more financially beneficial to offenders and more 
prevalent than distraction burglary. Requiring immediate payment is not a 
normal way for legitimate traders to behave, much less transporting customers 
to a financial institution to secure it. This M.O. should raise suspicions for care 
professionals, enforcement officers and financial institutions alike. It is in all 
likelihood an aggressive commercial practice (Consumer Protection from 
Unfair Trading Regulations, Regulations 7 and 11) as it is likely to significantly 
impair the average consumer’s freedom of choice, through the use of coercion 
or undue influence. Because this is likely to cause the victim to take a 
transactional decision they would not otherwise have taken (i.e. immediate 
payment to the offender) all elements of the offence are completed. 
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Case 50 provides an example of incidents in which victims were transported 
to the bank by offenders:  
“Unknown suspects have knocked on aggd front door and offered 
to fix the guttering and roof... Suspects have asked… if he has 
money in the house… [and] stated they needed the money for 
materials before they could start work. Suspects have… [taken] 
aggd… to the bank… in their car to withdraw the money... The 
aggd has then given £3000. During the journey back to offloc the 
suspects have asked to look at the remaining £1000 which has 
been given to them and have not returned it to the aggd. Suspects 
have dropped aggd around half a mile away from… [his home].” 
Case 50. 
Likewise, case 80 also illustrates how the tactic is employed successfully: 
“Offender knocked on aggd door asking if any building or 
structural work was required to be done. Aggd recognised suspect 
as someone who had completed work at offloc a year previously. 
Based on this, work was agreed and suspect requested £200 up 
front for materials. It was agreed that aggd and suspect would 
walk to the local cashpoint.” Case 80. 
Case 35 differs slightly in that it also illustrates the potential difference in 
outcome where an incident is dealt with by bank staff, attuned to the possibility 
of financial exploitation, or perhaps aware of the Bank Job (Surrey County 
Council, 2004) initiative: 
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“Possible fraud from elderly vulnerable adult. Mrs. [redacted] has 
had solar panels fitted to her house which [she] did not want they 
have then escorted her to the bank to draw out over £8,000. The 
bank held the cheque and would [not] pay out.” Case 35. 
 
In contrast to cases 50 and 80 in which vulnerable victims were successfully 
defrauded, here the intended victim has been saved over £8,000 and the 
perpetrators have been arrested. This shows the value of third party 
intervention, but also calls into question the efficacy of the multi-agency 
initiative, the ‘Bank Job’ (Surrey County Council, 2004), (involving police, 
Trading Standards and financial institutions) aimed at combating it. The re-
launched initiative, under the name the Banking Protocol led to 101 arrests 
and savings in excess of £9,000,000 nationally in its first year (Finance Fraud 
Action UK, 2017), suggesting the tactic seemingly persisted despite, and well 
beyond, the original scheme. 
 
A broad range of trade types, with roofing the most common 
 
A significant aspect of rogue trading incidents relates to the trade type 
employed by the perpetrator. The data were explored to see which specific 
trades were utilised by offenders with results showing a broad range of trades. 
As the chart below shows, some trades involved provision of a service (such 
as domestic cleaning, window cleaning, acting as a carer, and tree surgery) as 
well as those requiring the supply of goods or materials (for instance windows 
and door replacement or fitting, building work, or roof and chimney repairs). 14 
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of the cases involved more than 1 trade type, with 3 trades the most that were 
carried out in any incident. Also evident was that roofing represented by far the 
most commonly utilised trade. The preference of offenders for trades not easily 
viewed or checked by either victims or law enforcement (Steele et al, 2001, p 
60) may account for the high proportion of cases involving roofing work. 
Additionally, with the roof being integral to the weatherproofing and structure 
of a property, the need for urgency of repair work can probably be more easily 
peddled to prospective victims, playing on the visceral influence 
(Langenderfer, and Shimp 2001) of fear. Moreover, logically people are 
prepared to pay more for repairs to the fabric of a property such as a roof 
(particularly if it is perceived to require specialist skill, or it is ‘marketed’ as a 
means to limit the damage and future, higher, costs) than would be the case 
for unskilled (gutter cleaning), purely cosmetic (driveway cleaning), or less vital 
work (such as to a driveway or garden). 
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Figure 10: Trade types used in rogue trader incidents 
 
Figure 10 shows that, not only was roofing work by far the largest single trade 
type, but there were further works associated with the roofing trade present. 
Including guttering and fascia work (4) and gutter cleaning (2) as well as roof 
cleaning (3) and work to chimneys (3) with the roofing cases (37), there are 49 
cases (constituting just over half of all the 95 recorded incidents) involving work 
associated with the roofing trade. This builds on previous findings (ACTSO 
2015) where incidents involving roofing, fascias and soffits represented 43% 
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of the total sample and strongly suggests that roofing continues to be the 
preferred trade type employed by rogue trader offenders. 
The relatively high number of incidents involving window cleaning provides a 
striking contrast with the roofing trade. This represents the ‘chancer’ or 
apprentice offending typology identified in chapter 2 (ACTSO, 2014) 
comprising a trade that is wholly cosmetic, and easy for homeowners to assess 
in terms of the quality of the service. The value of the work, as discussed 
previously, is also capped at far below what could be gained from other trades 
and it needs no particular skill, materials or qualification unlike the majority of 
other trades. The presence of quite a high number of such incidents may well 
be something of an anomaly, since the majority (at least 6 were explicitly linked 
in the records) were attributable to a series carried out by the same 
protagonist, who admitted to them at interview under caution so they could be 
Taken Into Consideration (TIC) in Court.  
The list of trades illustrated in figure 10 shows that perpetrators do not possess 
the ‘status’ required to qualify as white-collar criminals (Sutherland, 1949). 
What was also conspicuous was the relatively low number of incidents (9 of 
95) relating to work undertaken inside a victim’s property. This suggests that 
offenders prefer not to work within a property. Since offenders seem to have 
little concern about being seen by witnesses outside a property, it is likely the 
greater potential for scrutiny by the homeowner inside a property is what 
dissuades the perpetrators from undertaking work within a victim’s property 
the majority of the time. The fact that 2 of the cases involving work to the 
interior of a property involved work within a loft may support this theory as 
scrutiny of work within a loft is also unlikely. It is noticeable that there was only 
1 incident involving trades in which one might reasonably expect accreditation 
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or registration with a Government or industry scheme. The case (case 1) 
involved electrical and plumbing work, which generally require registration with 
the National Inspection Council for Electrical Installation Contracting (NICEIC) 
and Gas Safe respectively. It seems therefore that evidencing competency, 
and the efforts necessary to gain accreditation and registration onto a 
professional scheme, present a barrier for doorstep criminals. Equally, 
offenders may not wish to be more easily identifiable or locatable as they could 
be were they required to submit their details to a professional or trade body. 
These findings, coupled with the financial loss resulting from these incidents 
of a minimum of £199,568 (and anywhere between £3.26 million and £32.6 
million accounting for under-reporting and under-recording) suggest an 
accredited, statutory scheme for the building (including roofing) trade would 
help to prevent considerable harm. Whilst this runs counter to the prevailing 
hegemony of free trade and ‘reducing burden’ on business (Tombs, 2016), the 
presence of only 1 incident involving trades that require such registration within 
the data tends to support the suggestion’s efficacy. The potential reduction of 
financial and societal costs would make such a register worth the regulation 
and administration. Moreover, consumer confidence in the trade sectors may 
be boosted, benefitting legitimate businesses. 
The breakdown of financial loss according to trade type involved too small a 
sample size for most trades for it to be able to be reliable. However, in respect 
of roofing, it highlights the potential for considerable financial gains. Four of 
the 5 largest financial losses within the sample related to roofing work 
(£14,000, £21,000, £30,000, £40,000). Roofing incidents accounted for a 
financial loss of £138,590, comprising 69% of the £199,568 overall financial 
loss, whilst making up only 39% of the overall sample. The average completed 
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or successful roofing rogue trade led to a financial gain of £8,662 against the 
sample average of £4,641. From these figures it is evident why roofing is the 
most commonly utilised trade within the sample and it would be interesting to 
explore whether the amount charged in the incident reflected the amount or 
quality of the work provided, and the proficiency with which the trade and work 
were carried out. However, this was not possible owing to gaps in the data and 
whilst this is an issue examined further in the following chapter exploring the 
police response to rogue trading, suffice it to say at this juncture, the paucity 
of incidents involving trades with high levels of registration with accredited 
bodies may infer a lack of requisite skill. Likewise, the 11 records recorded 
against the criminal damage occurrence type and the 7 further records which 
recorded that the incident resulted in a cost for additional repairs also suggest 
a lack of care and skill in these instances. It is recognised that causing criminal 
damage might not necessarily equate to a lack of skill (it may after all have 
been that the offender meant to subsequently satisfactorily repair the damage 
deliberately caused), but it is a reasonable theory. Nonetheless, it remains 
largely unknown whether the trades performed represent those in which the 
offender had a reasonable level of skill, or whether they were merely a vehicle 
by which unskilled individuals conducted their criminality. 
 
Summary 
 
This chapter explored how the act of rogue trading manifests, examining its 
fluid and varied offending strategies and a common overlap between rogue 
trading and distraction burglary. There are numerous trades employed in the 
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commissioning of offences, but those that mostly require membership of a 
professional trade body are all but absent from the data, and the most common 
(and by far the most lucrative) of trades employed is roofing. Offenders 
typically carry out work rather than abscond with payment without carrying out 
any work, and it is common for perpetrators to escort victims to financial 
institutions to secure immediate payment, and commit criminal damage 
thereby creating a need for the victim to have repair work completed.  
What is striking about the records in terms of M.O. is how closely they mirror 
those which emerged from the candid interview responses given to Steele, by 
offenders almost 20 years ago (Steele et al 2001). Equally the overlap between 
distraction burglary and rogue trading provides a salient example of an 
unaltered M.O., with Steele et al. (2001, p 45) concluding that the rogue traders 
interviewed in his work “were prepared to take any opportunity to also commit 
distraction burglary”. Likewise, the commission of criminal damage to create a 
necessity for work highlighted above was also a tactic about which prisoners 
were open at interview. The increase in requirement of payment as incidents 
progress, and lowering of initial quotes were also both identified by offenders 
during interview; “I sometimes quote an exorbitant charge to see their reaction. 
If it’s bad I can drop it and they think they’ve got a bargain even though I’m still 
ripping them off”, and, “we often quote low prices, say for example seven 
pounds and then ask for £170… you can bump up the charge easily” (Steele 
et al., 2001, p 60). The dynamic and fluid method of offending also reflected 
findings where 19 of the 21 offenders interviewed “varied their M.O.s selecting 
the one which would work best within the circumstances” (Steele et al., 2001, 
p 45). 
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The data show that the primary, if not sole, motivation for the offenders is 
criminal financial gain; indicating deliberate, premeditated, professional 
offending. This is important because it provides a counterpoint to the way in 
which police have, as described in chapter 2, sometimes effectively legitimised 
the activity through language that describes perpetrators as ‘traders’ and their 
criminality as contractual disputes (Aplin, 2015). It is also apparent that whilst 
there are some commonalities with white-collar crime, for instance in the 
repeat victimisation of victims, the trade types are such that the perpetrators 
cannot be said to hold ‘status’ and they do not therefore fit with one of the 
central tenets of Sutherland’s (1949) definition of white-collar criminals. Having 
now examined the victimology of rogue trading and the the way in which the 
offending is conducted, the exploration now turns to explore policing response. 
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Chapter 7: An exploration of the poor police response to rogue trading 
incidents 
	
The police response to rogue trading is all but unexplored in academic 
literature, with only ‘grey literature’ (such as Steele et al., 2001; ACTSO, 2014; 
2015;) dealing with the issue, and only peripherally. Parallels can be drawn 
with the policing of fraud and white-collar crime more generally (since these 
are, as has been explained, under-explored)(see for instance Button et al., 
2012). However, much literature concentrating on police performance in 
respect of fraud more generally concentrates predominantly on mass 
marketing and volume fraud, or types of cyber-enabled fraud where the 
offender is divorced geographically from the victim and the offence location 
(Police Foundation, 2018). It is logical therefore that the conclusions formed in 
these cases overwhelmingly advocate crime prevention measures (Police 
Foundation, 2018), as the prospect of enforcement action in cross-border 
cases where offenders are outside of the investigating jurisdiction is remote. 
Moreover, particularly in cases involving cyber-enabled fraud, a level of 
proficiency or specialism in investigative techniques specific to such crimes 
(which the majority of police do not necessarily possess)(Police Foundation, 
2018) is essential. Rogue trading is markedly different from these frauds in its 
performance, making research that uses empirical data to focus on the police 
response to it extremely important if the current state of knowledge regarding 
the crime type is to be advanced. 
	
As such, this chapter focuses on the objective of critically examining the police 
response to rogue trading incidents concentrating upon key findings in 3 areas. 
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The superficial investigation (including a lack of consideration of cancellation 
rights and written contracts) and the failure to recognise criminality in rogue 
trader incidents, the lack of consideration given to the work conducted by 
offenders, and the number and nature of referrals to other agencies, namely 
Trading Standards and Adult Care Services. The first of these areas explored 
is the detection rate for rogue trader offences. 
 
Failure to recognise criminality and superficial investigation  
 
As outlined in chapter 5, 37 of the 95 rogue trader cases did not include a 
record of the financial loss involved, this is indicative of a superficial 
investigation or write-up and hinders collection of a strong evidence-based 
figure for the cost to victims of rogue trading. Perhaps the most telling 
illustration of poor police performance and an inability to identify recordable 
criminal offences comes from another quantitative enquiry. Chapter 1 
described the implementation of legislation designed to protect the public from 
cold-calls and doorstep criminals, and how the offences created by these laws 
are recordable under the HOCR. To recap, specific laws introduced a cooling-
off period and cancellation rights; duties on traders to trade fairly, give material 
information to customers in a clear and timely manner, and not to mislead 
them. (Cancellation of Contracts made in a Consumer’s home or place of Work 
etc. Regulations; Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations). 
During data analysis it was clear that little heed was paid by police to this 
crucial legislative framework. 
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A lack of requisite detail within the records resulted in difficulties assessing 
with certainty the exact number of cases that would legally require cancellation 
rights and a cooling off period. That in itself provides sufficient cause to 
reasonably infer that police are failing to identify, or at least record, relevant 
information regarding potential rogue trader incidents necessary to properly 
assess under the NCRS (Home Office 2011a; 2011b; 2012a; 2012b) whether 
a crime should be recorded. For instance, in addition to its financial value, 
whether the incident resulted from a cold-call, and where the ‘contract’ was 
formed are key enquiries necessary to ensure an informed decision can be 
made as to the presence or otherwise of a criminal offence. Notwithstanding 
this difficulty, it was possible to ascertain that the majority of cases, 
unsurprisingly given the aims of the legislation, would qualify for provision of 
cancellation rights, as shown in figure 11. 
 
Figure 11: Rogue trader incidents requiring statutory cancellation rights 
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Given the majority of incidents qualified for cancellation rights and a cooling 
off period, as shown in figure 11, it was striking how few records mentioned 
them. Allowing for the fact that in those incidents where cancellation rights and 
cooling off period were not required, their presence may have been considered 
and remained unmentioned by police because they were deemed 
unnecessary, they would still be expected to have been mentioned in at least 
52 cases (potentially up to 81 cases) out of the sample of 95. Even a broader 
consideration of the contract or paper work was rarely mentioned, despite the 
fact that the identity, trading name and geographical address of the trader are 
all legally required to be given to customers by virtue of the Consumer 
Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations (Regulation 6(4)). Failure to do so 
could constitute an offence under Regulation 10 of the aforementioned 
Regulations.  
A text search run in Nvivo sought to definitively establish in how many cases 
the terms cancellation right, cooling off period, contract, or paper work or 
paperwork were used. The results were clear, returning only 4 incidents where 
these phrases were used. 
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Figure 12: Consideration of cancellation rights, cooling off periods or paper 
work, by police, in rogue trader cases. 
 
 
Figure 12 indicates a near-total lack of consideration for a key legislative 
requirement and shows police routinely failing to consider, let alone identify or 
investigate, aspects of criminality highly relevant to rogue trading. Whilst this 
remains the case, victims of crime will be let down, perpetrators will go 
unpunished and police crime statistics relating to rogue trading will be 
inaccurate and of limited use. Not considering the paper work and contract 
damages the identification of a cancellation rights offence (Cancellation of 
Contracts made in a Consumer’s Home or Place of Work etc. Regulations) 
(since replaced by the Consumer Contracts Information, Cancellation and 
Additional Charges Regulations, Regulation 19), as well as having wide-
ranging practical consequences. Failure to provide cancellation rights as and 
when required would, as outlined in chapter 2, also qualify mutatis mutandis 
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as an offence of a misleading omission (Consumer Protection from Unfair 
Trading Regulations, Regulations 6 and 10), being a failure to provide 
information required as a result of a Community obligation enacted under the 
aforementioned legislation (Cancellation of Contracts made in a Consumer’s 
Home or Place of Work etc. Regulations). Moreover, if it can be proven that 
the omission of cancellation rights was dishonest (for instance if the offender 
knew of the requirement to provide them but failed to do so regardless, in order 
to make a financial gain), this would be a matter of fraud by virtue of failing to 
disclose information which is legally required (Fraud Act, Section 3) (see for 
instance R. V Armstrong [2018] EWCA Crim. 2363).  
 
That police are failing to make enquiries in the majority of cases for matters 
which might therefore amount to fraud is concerning. Even without the element 
of deliberate dishonesty, a misleading omission is a notifiable offence 
according to the Home Office (2012b) (Consumer Protection from Unfair 
Trading Regulations, Regulation 6 and 10). Without sufficient consideration of 
this type of offending, the police are entirely unable to properly comply with 
HOCR or the NCRS (Home Office 2011a; 2011b; 2012a; 2012b). Furthermore, 
the ramifications in respect of overlooking contracts and paper work also 
include damaging identification of other potential offences such as making 
false claims as to the trader’s (or offender’s) identity; or the nature, extent and 
value of work being carried out. Again, this is as relevant to the Fraud Act (in 
particular Section 2 relating to fraud by false representation and Section 9 
pertaining to participation in a fraudulent business) as it is to the Consumer 
Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations. Even where difficult to prove to 
the criminal burden of proof, it is reasonable to posit that the motive of financial 
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gain exists for most offenders, indeed in many cases it is self-evident. As 
outlined in the introduction, the most tangible difference between the offence 
of misleading action (the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading 
Regulations) and fraud by false representation (the Fraud Act) is that the latter 
requires the false representation to be dishonestly made, where the former 
does not. The actus reus is in itself no different and so for police to be 
overlooking these potential offences routinely is inexplicable. The lack of 
consideration for cancellation rights, contracts and paper work is not solely an 
issue of failing to identify potential offences; it also blinds officers to reasonable 
lines of enquiry which they are obliged to follow (Criminal Procedure and 
Investigations Act 1996 (CPIA), S 23(1))  that may assist in identifying the 
perpetrator. For example, business names, addresses and contact numbers 
could potentially be traced, (or linked to other offending) and forensic checks 
on documents may yield fingerprints by which a suspect can be identified. 
Case 65 provides an example of a record lacking sufficient detail to assess 
whether legally required paper work was provided; 
 
“Offenders unknown have come to callers address to do 
some guttering work. They have provided a service by 
cleaning some of the gutter but havnt [sic] done a very good 
job. Aggd has paid them £60 in cash. Officers have 
confirmed that not a very good job has been done.” Case 
65. 
 
In this case, it is only through discovering whether the required cancellation 
rights and contractual information including trader identity and address have 
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been provided that it can be properly adjudged whether this incident amounts 
to a civil law issue of unsatisfactory quality work, or a criminal matter of rogue 
trading. Whilst perhaps the enquiry regarding paper work, contracts and 
cancellation rights may have been made without being recorded, that itself is 
problematic; without recording it, it is impossible to know with certainty whether 
NCRS and HOCR have been complied with. Moreover, a failure to record this 
information leads to lost opportunities to capture intelligence and/or share 
relevant information with partners such as Trading Standards and potentially 
to crimes being overlooked and unrecorded, skewing the picture of the 
prevalence of offending and damaging the efficacy of crime statistics, as 
discussed.  
 
That potential lines of enquiry to expose these offences are being overlooked, 
seemingly routinely, and crimes being missed and unrecorded is cause for 
concern and suggestive of an urgent training need. The case below (case 37) 
is a rare illustration of an incident where such checks were made and recorded 
and shows how simple this line of enquiry would be for police to complete (and 
record) on a consistent basis: 
 
“Susknown [suspect known] carried out work at aggds h/a. 
Price increased greatly and susknown also failed to give 
proper paperwork relating to Trading Standards offences. 
Monies obtained through illegal means.” Case 37. 
 
The wording of the above record is in stark contrast to the preceding example. 
It is definitively (and properly) described as “monies obtained through illegal 
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means”, as opposed to the less precise and unhelpful “not a very good job has 
been done” which, setting aside the question of whether the officer is qualified 
to make such an assessment, lacks sufficient detail to ascertain whether or not 
it amounts to a crime. It is also evident, in terms of the investigative process 
that all lines of enquiry have been considered in case 37, whereas in the 
previous example (case 65) this cannot be said. Nevertheless, it is quite telling 
that even in this rare instance of sufficient regard for contracts and paper work, 
(1 of only 4 instances within the 95 cases) the officer explicitly refers to this 
check as relating to the identification of ‘Trading Standards offences’. Rather, 
this should comprise a routine part of the police’s investigative process in order 
to assess the presence or otherwise of notifiable offences that require 
recording as crimes under HOCR and the NCRS (Home Office 2011a; 2011b; 
2012a; 2012b). 
   
Case 56, below, is also an illustrative example where there is a need for, and 
absence of, cancellation rights. It can be seen lines of enquiry have been 
looked for, but are not present and that the incident is criminal. In such 
incidences of advance fee fraud it can often be difficult to ascertain whether 
deliberate dishonesty was present from the outset, or whether there was 
initially intent to carry out the work (Maguire, 2003). However, in this case, the 
detail is sufficient to indicate this was a practiced deceit and has been 
investigated thoroughly; the withholding of proper cancellation rights coupled 
with the removal of anything which might identify the offender is compelling 
evidence of deliberate dishonesty. 
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“The aggd… has no recepit [sic] or business card and no 
telephone number or business name… Aggd has received 
a knock on door from a male stating he could provide aggd 
with new front door. Aggd has then let the male in to offloc 
and male has also said he could replace aggds rear 
windows all for £4000. Male has req[uired] £2000 deposit 
and aggd stated he could only afford £1000. The next day 
aggd withdrew £1000 cash and male collected it providing 
no receipt or paperwork and advised would return in a 
couple of days to start work. Aggd has not seen male since 
and no work started. No contact details for male and 
believes male took his business card back from him and no 
note made of any company.” Case 51. 
Poor police performance was not confined to a lack of awareness of the 
importance in investigative and legal terms of paperwork, contracts, cooling 
off periods and cancellation rights. There were also repeated incidents of a 
failure to identify other offences and aspects of criminality, coupled with a 
generally superficial investigation. For instance, the (5) cases recorded 
against the occurrence type category ‘Harassment (First Single Incident) 
Non Recordable Crime’ on the police database (case numbers 1, 2, 14, 34, 
54) also provide evidence of a failure to identify criminal offences. As the 
category states, these are not recordable according to the Home Office 
Counting Rules (HOCR) because for the offence of harassment to be 
completed, it requires the incident to form a course of conduct rather than a 
one-off. However, the offence of aggressive commercial practice under 
Regulation 7 of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 
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requires no such course of conduct for the offence to be completed. At least 
3 of the 5 incidents contain demands for payment likely to constitute 
aggressive commercial practices (a recordable crime under HOCR), yet the 
offence is not mentioned, or seemingly considered, in any of them. 
Importantly, the superficial investigation and overlooking of criminal offences 
was not confined to so-called ‘regulatory’ offences. The most striking and 
acute example of a failure to recognise criminality or investigate 
appropriately came in the form of (case 60). As this provides such a clear 
example, it has been quoted extensively. The case likely represents the 
greatest financial detriment of all the cases within the sample (it resulted in 
a financial loss of £30,000 and the victim bequeathing 50% of his property to 
one of the offenders) and the notes describe a situation whereby TVP failed 
in its duty to a vulnerable victim, resulting in his being repeatedly defrauded 
by unremitting criminals. The record also describes that this is the third 
occasion on which the individual has been victim to this offence type (though 
it does not detail how much was lost in the previous incidents), and that it is 
believed the offender in the incident in 2009 was the same as one of the 
suspects in the 2013 offending: 
“This crime report has been reopened and should be 
classified as a fraud offence. This matter is being 
investigated by… [neighbouring police force area] as part of 
a conspiracy (rouge [sic] trader) matter. The case relates 
to… a series of eight rogue trader frauds all perpetrated 
against vulnerable elderly people… The victim… paid 
£10,000 cash on 11th March and wrote a cheque to [sus 1] 
for £20,000 on 12th March. That cheque was… paid into 
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[sus 1's] bank account. After the main roof was finished the 
victim was told that the timbers inside the roof needed re-
spraying. He told the men he could not afford this. He was 
told that if he changed his will to leave 50% of his estate to 
[sus 1] that this would cover the cost. He duly changed his 
will. An assessor asserts that there was no need to replace 
the roof, some of the work done was of very poor quality and 
the costs charged were overly excessive. Cell site data on 
one of the phones involved in the investigation puts it in… 
[the area] on 28th March, 9th April and 20th April, 
furthermore it was in contact with [sus 1] on those dates and 
the number was printed on the side of one of the vans the 
workers used on one occasion…. [Sus 1, sus 2 and sus 3] 
have… all been charged with conspiracy to commit fraud by 
false representation.” Case 60. 
It is evident that this incident was previously reported to TVP and went 
unrecorded as a crime, hence the call for reclassification in the opening line. 
Given the details outlined within the record, it is alarming this was not 
recognised as a crime immediately. Even setting aside the other seven victims 
within the series, there was a plethora of information within this incident; more 
than sufficient for the police to correctly identify serious criminality in the form 
of fraud and money laundering, particularly since the threshold for recording a 
crime, according to the NCRS is on the balance of probability. The lower 
burden of proof for recording an incident as a crime than is required for a 
criminal conviction (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is notable. Ultimately, 
given the matter was detected and offenders charged, the CPS clearly deemed 
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the matter had a reasonable prospect of conviction to the higher burden of 
proof so there can be little excuse for the initial failure by TVP to record it as a 
crime. 
There were numerous lines of enquiry which could and should have been 
followed (which when they were followed subsequently, by the neighbouring 
police force, resulted in identification of suspects and sufficient evidence for 
positive charging decisions against 3 suspects by the CPS). Such lines of 
enquiry included tracing the cheque paid by the victim, and the individual 
named by the victim in his will. Moreover, had a more thorough 
contemporaneous investigation been conducted, it may have resulted in the 
availability of further evidence. For instance, for a limited time there may have 
been CCTV footage of the suspect and/or any accomplices cashing the 
£20,000 cheque at the bank. Equally, there may have been opportunity for 
forensic analysis of the cheque to identify or prove a suspect’s involvement via 
fingerprints. Depending on how proximate to the offending the report was 
made, it may have also been possible to stop the cheque prior to the money 
leaving the victim’s account, as well as intervene prior to the alteration of the 
victims’ will. These measures would thus have saved the victim from 
considerable financial loss, and any associated distress (Sixsmith, 1990; Great 
Britain. Home Office, 2003b, 2005b; Button et al., 2010). The inaction and 
failure by TVP to recognise the criminality involved in this instance meant these 
opportunities evaporated, probably aggravating the negative impact of 
victimisation in the process (Great Britain. Home Office, 2003b).  
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It is also surprising to discover that it was only via another police force’s 
involvement that the victim’s will was altered back;  
“Victim stated he had no money left and suspect got around 
this by coercing the victim into changing his will leaving 50% 
of his property to… [suspect].  Since the commencement of 
this investigation the… [neighbouring police force’s] officer 
has ensured that victim has changed his will back.” Case 60. 
 
Again, the cursory nature of the TVP’s response and the failure to identify the 
crime meant that the victim was insufficiently safeguarded and further, 
substantial, financial loss was inevitable with the passing of time. As poor a 
response as this was from the original responding officer, it was apparently 
neither identified nor rectified until it was signposted by a neighbouring police 
force some time later. This suggests a wider, more institutionalised problem 
regarding a less-than-satisfactory police response at odds with the force’s 
commitment to combatting organised crime. Furthermore, as the neighbouring 
police force investigation related to a series, it is possible that the minimal 
response and failure to identify a crime originally may well have enabled the 
offender(s) to commit further crimes and defraud more victims (all described 
as vulnerable elderly people in the record). Had the response been satisfactory 
in the first instance, financial loss and any associated suffering could have 
been prevented, not just to the victim in question, but potentially to other 
victims subsequently defrauded. Whilst this case provides the most clear 
example of an unsatisfactory police response and a failure to properly identify 
and investigate criminal offences, there were further examples (in addition to 
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the aforementioned routine failure to identify cancellation rights offences). 
Case 59 for instance: 
 
“A rogue trader has attended address speaking to the aggd 
offering repair services to his property. The aggd welcomed 
this work to be carried out and 2 rogue traders began… 
repointing brickwork at front and side of the property. At this 
point police were contacted by aggd son. Police attended. 
Traders were spoken to and their details taken. Words of 
advice given and they left the scene.” Case 59. 
 
This case was recorded against the occurrence type category of ‘adult 
protection’ on the police crime recording system. This is a ‘non-crime’ or ‘crime 
related incident’ (CRI) category reserved primarily for those incidents involving 
vulnerable adults that either do not meet the threshold of a crime, or should 
not be recorded according to the HOCR. The use of this category indicates 
that the responding officer had concerns about the welfare of the victim 
(though these were insufficiently detailed for it to qualify for a referral to social 
services), and both the responding officer and any supervisors or scrutineers 
latterly involved, deemed there to be no criminality. This is at odds with the 
officer’s own description of the perpetrator(s) as rogue traders, and the victim’s 
son’s concerns, which were sufficient to deem police involvement necessary. 
In addition to the lack of consideration of the necessity of cancellation rights, 
this record failed to give due consideration to other legislation and lacked 
sufficient detail to be able to ascertain definitively whether offences were 
present. In all likelihood, unless the work was to be charged at less than £35 
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(which seems unlikely), the case would have qualified for the statutory 
provisions relating to cancellation rights and a cooling off period (the 
Cancellation of Contracts made in a Consumer’s Home or Place of Work etc. 
Regulations). Additionally, if the suspects failed to provide sufficient 
information about the cancellation rights, the work to be undertaken or the 
identity of the traders (as seems to be the case, or the suspect(s) would have 
been identifiable) they would have committed the offence of misleading 
omission (the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations, 
Regulations 6 and 10). Moreover, had the officer ascertained the level of work 
and the amount being charged by the suspect, or the basis on which it was 
sold to the victim (for instance if it was described as urgent or essential when 
it was not), it would have enabled an informed decision as to whether or not 
there were offences of misleading actions (Consumer Protection from Unfair 
Trading Regulations) or whether even the whole enterprise was based upon a 
fraudulent premise (Fraud Act, Section 2 or perhaps Section 9).  
 
This has been a superficial investigation and the officer’s concerns for the 
victim are unexplained, as is the description of the perpetrators as ‘rogue 
traders’ and the ‘words of advice’ offered to them. There is also no indication 
of what repairs the perpetrators were offering beyond ‘repointing’, or what it 
was about the work, or the claims made by the perpetrators, that meant the 
victim ‘welcomed’ it initially. 
 
Case 15 is a similarly shallow investigation involving a failure to adhere to the 
NCRS and the HOCR (Home Office 2011a; 2011, 2012a; 2012b; 2013) as 
previously identified by Aplin (2015): 
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“The aggd has had some workers attend his h/a and offer to 
carry out work on his driveway, roof and back garden. Aggd 
has agreed to this work… and has given the workers 3 
cheques. One for £1500. One for £2000 and the last for 
£800. As the aggd is elderly his bank have become 
suspicious and have called police regarding the 
transactions. The bank have confirmed that the cheque for 
£1500 has been cashed but the… [others] have been… 
cancelled at the request of aggd… from officers attendance 
it is clear that the aggd is vulnerable and has possibly been 
victim of rogue traders. It is clear to see that some work has 
ben [sic] carried out… but it is questionable as to if the 
standard of work or actual labour would amount to the 
amount aggd has been charged.” Case 15. 
 
Here too a vulnerable (according to the officer’s assessment) homeowner has 
been cold-called and agreed (though again it is unclear from the notes on what 
basis) to have multiple works carried out to their property. The bank has clearly 
identified concerns and the victim has cancelled two cheques indicating they 
may have had concerns despite having “agreed to this work”. That three 
separate cheques have been used to pay for the work indicates the job may 
have been ‘bounced’, increasing in price or scope beyond that which the 
homeowner originally anticipated. The cost of the job is such that it is unlikely 
to have required staged payments and therefore normally the full payment 
would have presumably been made in one cheque, paying in full for the work 
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upon its completion, or perhaps two at most, were a deposit required prior to 
the work with the outstanding balance upon completion. It would appear that 
the offenders’ belief that “the trick is to make sure you do a little bit of work” 
(Steele et al., 2001 p 61) to avoid police interest is borne out too readily in this 
superficial investigation. Concerns regarding the necessity for, and quality of, 
the work were never further explored (another recurring theme within the data 
which will be explored further shortly) and this case, as with the previous 
example, was recorded as an ‘adult protection’ occurrence type as opposed to 
a crime. 
This repeated failure to identify criminality and superficial investigation is 
concerning. In some instances, because of the lack of detail, it has not been 
possible to definitively state that criminal offences went unnoticed. 
Nonetheless, the implication of the lack of detail is that the investigations were 
perfunctory. Moreover, because the detail within the notes is insufficient to 
ascertain whether or not criminality was present but not identified, it follows 
that the officer and any supervisor or scrutineer must also have been similarly 
unable to make the same judgement. The next indicator of poor police 
performance relates to the lack of consideration given by police to the work 
that has been conducted in incidents of rogue trading. 
 
Lack of consideration of work conducted 
 
Case 15 (quoted previously, see p 191) was typical of incidents where work 
had been carried out by rogue traders; no consideration was given to the 
amount, quality, necessity or value of the work conducted. Without an expert 
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opinion on these matters it is incredibly hard to accurately assess whether an 
incident would qualify as a misleading action (the Consumer Protection from 
Unfair Trading Regulations, Regulations 5 and 9), or if it is fraudulent. Where 
a rogue trader deliberately falsely represents the cost of the work necessary, 
or the value of the work conducted, thereby exposing a potential victim to a 
risk of financial loss, it amounts to an offence (Fraud Act, section 2). As 
discussed in chapter 1, the principle that it is unlawful to deliberately charge 
extortionate amounts for work is well-established even if prior to the enactment 
of the Fraud Act it was somewhat more ambiguous. Now, as explained, even 
if the dishonesty element of the fraud offence cannot be proven, providing false 
information is still highly likely to constitute a criminal offence courtesy of the 
(Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations, Regulations 5 and 9). 
The only realistic way to ascertain whether a charge levied in rogue trader 
cases is excessive (and therefore amounts to a false or misleading statement), 
in practical terms, is through an expert opinion. Similarly, only a suitably 
qualified assessment as to the necessity or otherwise of work proposed by 
rogue traders is able to identify whether false representations have been made 
to induce a victim into the contract. Claims made by an offender that roofing 
work was urgently required because of a structural issue, for instance, would 
need proper investigation as a reasonable line of enquiry. The data evidenced 
this is simply not happening. Of the 44 incidents that involved work being 
conducted by a rogue trader, only 5 incidents (as shown in figure 13) involved 
the police seeking an assessment of the work. 4 of these incidents (cases 3, 
48, 60, 73) sought an opinion from an expert witness, and one (case 74) from 
a different trader. Though seeking opinion from another trader may not be 
sufficient to prove the matter beyond reasonable doubt, it could provide a 
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useful initial assessment as to whether commissioning an expert witness for a 
definitive opinion represents a cost-effective line of enquiry. 
 
Figure 13: Rogue trader incidents involving work conducted according to 
whether the work was assessed 
 
Case 60, quoted earlier in the chapter (see p 185 – 186 and p 188), provides 
an example of where work conducted is evaluated; “An assessor asserts that 
there was no need to replace the roof, some of the work done was of very poor 
quality and the costs charged were overly excessive.” (Case 60). Similarly, 
Case 73 provides a typical example of arranging to have work assessed, 
highlighting the role of Trading Standards in assisting with the gathering of 
expert testimony; “evidence is currently being gathered with the assistance of 
Trading Standards who have arranged for an expert to examine the house.” 
(Case 73). It is notable that 4 of the 5 incidents in which the work was assessed 
39
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referred to Trading Standards involvement, perhaps suggesting that a 
partnership approach has tangible benefits.  
The final theme of police partnership working will now be examined more 
closely; with joint-working and referrals to Trading Standards and Adult Social 
Care Services considered respectively. 
 
Partner agency referrals 
 
Referrals to Trading Standards 
 
Partnership working between these agencies is ordinarily to be welcomed, 
particularly given the overlap in remit regarding the crime type (ACPO, 2011), 
the seemingly more commonplace assessment of the work conducted in 
investigations in which Trading Standards are involved and the greater 
familiarity they have of the regulatory framework relevant to rogue trading. 
However, the officer’s notes of the records in the data themselves generally 
reflect a dysfunctional relationship between the two agencies. This research 
suggests, as has Aplin (2015), that referrals and so-called ‘partnership 
working’ may sometimes be a means by which the police can merely avoid the 
responsibility of leading the investigation or recording a crime (since crimes 
led by other agencies are not recordable by the police under HOCR (Great 
Britain. Home Office, 2013)). There were also examples of the police 
investigation having already exhausted all reasonable lines of enquiry prior to 
referring to Trading Standards. Again, this would result in the crime not being 
recorded by police meaning that a referral at this stage may simply be a means 
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for police to ‘legitimately’ (as per the HOCR)(Great Britain. Home Office, 2013) 
avoid recording the incident as a crime which has gone undetected. 
 
Case 10 provides an example of a record which has, correctly according to 
HOCR (Great Britain. Home Office 2012a, 2013), not been recorded as a crime 
by the police; 
 
“The aggd has paid workmen £1,500 for work to his gutters 
and facias. Aggd was visited by police and Trading 
Standards after a member of the public made them aware. 
There are concerns that the gentleman is vulnerable and 
appears to be a hoarder. It is felt that he is not looking after 
his own security. Trading Standards are following up the 
possible fraud/cowboy work.” Case 10.  
 
However, there is no record of why primacy (in what is described in the notes 
as a potential fraud investigation, involving a vulnerable victim) is being 
transferred to Trading Standards, and it appears that little or no investigation 
has been undertaken by police. This is an example of where an exploration of 
the circumstances appears to uncover a degree of abrogation of responsibility 
by police (Aplin, 2015), despite the recording being technically accurate 
according to the HOCR (2012a; 2013). Also common amongst incidents 
referred to Trading Standards, of which case 10 is an example, was scarce or 
non-existent updates following the referral. This makes it impossible (for the 
police as well as any researcher) to gauge the effectiveness of the action 
subsequently taken by Trading Standards. This is compounded by the HOCR 
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(Home Office, 2011a; 2012a; 2013) instructing that a crime should not be 
recorded, as consequently there is no disposal code that could reveal whether 
the case was ultimately detected. This recording process also makes scrutiny 
of the police performance impossible, since technically the process has been 
followed (albeit the suitability and effectiveness seems to go without 
challenge). There were no incidents of cases in the data where a referral to 
Trading Standards was overruled by supervisors or scrutineers and it seems 
there are no standardised or minimum investigation requirements. The lack of 
any notes following referral is also further suggestive of a mindset which, upon 
referral, sees the case as closed and no longer the responsibility of the police. 
There was very little evidence of cases involving truly joint or partnership 
working and this was common across all occurrence types. For instance, case 
31, recorded as an Action Fraud Call for Service, was taken on by Trading 
Standards and despite it being clear a suspect was identified and arrested, the 
case was then passed to Trading Standards and there was consequently no 
indication whether it resulted in the suspect being charged. 
 
By contrast, case 8 provides a further example of a case excluded from crime 
figures, because Trading Standards were leading the investigation but would 
otherwise have been recorded. However, the level of involvement of police 
despite transfer of the case to trading standards indicates a more thorough 
joint investigation and there is no suspicion the case has simply been ‘dumped’ 
with Trading Standards to enable police to avoid the investigation. The record 
depicts a vulnerable victim being repeatedly victimised by offenders; 
 
“Aggd[’s] have been suffering for a number of months of 
rogue traders attending the address they have been asking 
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aggd for large sums of money in relation to work to be 
completed on chimney to the extent that aggd drove to local 
bank to withdrawal a large amount of money… Rogue 
traders have been back twice since no dates or times given 
to ask for further work on the house… submitted telephone 
no’s for subscriber checks and an ABE interview has been 
arranged for one of the aggd. There are items submitted for 
SOCO analysis. Trading standards are leading on this 
investigation.” Case 8. 
 
 
This case provided a rare example of a thorough multi-agency investigation 
(including police, Trading Standards and Adult Social Care) where despite 
Trading Standards leading, police provided significant investigative and 
forensic support. Figure 14 below shows the number (25) of the cases 
involving Trading Standards. 
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Figure 14: Rogue trader cases where police involved Trading Standards 
 
 
All 95 cases of rogue trading could have included consultation with Trading 
Standards, and yet only 25 mentioned their involvement, despite long-standing 
advice to police to liaise with Trading Standards on this crime type (ACPO, 
2011). This resulted in a situation where 74% of cases were investigated 
without the benefit of Trading Standards’ held intelligence, or consideration of 
the relevant legislative and regulatory framework, which this research 
overwhelmingly demonstrates police to be lacking. 
 
Referrals to Adult Care Services 
 
There were fewer cases that would qualify for Social Care involvement than 
there were for Trading Standards, yet paradoxically there were more 
references to the involvement of Adult Social Care, as shown in Table 8.  
 
25
70
Rogue trader cases involving Trading 
Standards
Cases mentioning trading
standards involvement
Cases without mention of
trading standards
involvement
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Table 8: Adult Care referrals in cases involving victims perceived by police as 
vulnerable 
Adult Care referrals in cases involving victims perceived by 
police as vulnerable 
 
No. of cases 
which 
involved 
vulnerable 
victims 
No. of cases which 
were put forward by 
responding officer for 
social care referral  
No. of cases 
successfully referred to 
Adult Social Care 
55 42 32 
 
The data suggest that police are more au fait with working with, or referring to, 
Adult Care than Trading Standards, with 76% of relevant cases put forward by 
the officer for referral. Some of those put forward were declined a referral 
however, meaning that 58% of cases involving a victim deemed by the officer 
to be vulnerable resulted in a successful adult care referral, though this is still 
considerably more than the 26% of relevant cases involving referrals to 
Trading Standards. Perhaps this results from the recognition by police of the 
potential ramifications of Serious Case Reviews if vulnerable adults are failed 
by police. A referral to Adult Care Services is all that is required in order to 
discharge their obligations in this regard. Police are not expected to possess 
expertise in vulnerability or care needs and they are unlikely to face criticism 
for making a referral. Conversely, police are expected to have expertise in law 
enforcement. If police refer a rogue trader matter to Trading Standards having 
investigated only superficially, it may reveal the minimal investigation of 
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potential offences, thereby either requiring further investigation, or attracting 
criticism. 
 
Case 7, below, is a useful example of the vulnerabilities experienced by victims 
which led to police referring to Adult Social Care. 
 
“Aggd1 received a knock at the front door of offloc whilst 
aggd2 was at the day care centre. 2 males had cut off a 
large number of branches from a tree in the front garden and 
asked for £600 to clear it. Aggd1 handed over approximately 
£500 cash… Neither aggd1 or aggd2 had requested work to 
be done nor had any other member of their family… aggd1 
appears to be in the early stages of dementia and is going 
through numerous tests att [at this time]. Aggd2 has 
extremely advanced dementia being unable to interact at all. 
Both persons are extremely vulnerable due to their mental 
state… [referred] to adult social care.” Case 7. 
 
The notes describe an individual suspected of being in the early stages of 
dementia, also acting as carer of a spouse experiencing advanced dementia, 
being deliberately defrauded. Unknown offenders have cold-called and seem 
to have excessively overcharged for unsolicited and unwanted work. Though 
the notes also referred to family support, it seems right, particularly since 
offenders are known to repeatedly target (Steele et al., 2001; ACTSO, 2014; 
Phillips, 2016b, Day, 2017) and share information about vulnerable victims 
(Steele et al., 2001; ACPO, 2011; Alzheimer’s Society, 2011; Gorden and 
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Buchanan, 2013), that this case received a referral to care professionals. The 
number of incidents involving vulnerable victims demonstrates that Adult Care 
Services are key partners in work involving rogue trading and whilst the referral 
rate to Adult Social Care is better for vulnerable victims than the referral rate 
for Trading Standards there is still, at face value, room for improvement since 
42% of victims deemed vulnerable by police do not ultimately receive a 
referral.  
 
Findings show victims of crime most value an empathic, understanding and 
sensitive response (Stafford 2016), so being more attuned to the needs of 
victims should be a priority. Moreover, with victimisation causing adverse 
impacts such as increased fear of crime generally, increased fear in one’s own 
home, feeling down or depressed and negative health outcomes (ACTSO, 
2015) the superficial police response prevalent in these incidences may 
aggravate these outcomes. Indeed, with dissatisfied victims of doorstep crime 
found to suffer greater anxiety, and for longer, than those who were satisfied 
with the police response (Great Britain. Home Office, 2003b), it is incumbent 
upon police to provide a sufficient level of service to safeguard victims and 
mitigate them from the harm victimisation causes (HMICFRS, 2019a). Whilst 
some victims may decline consent to an adult care referral, where this is the 
case it could reasonably be expected that the notes would reference this. 
Moreover, even where a victim declines consent, should the concerns of the 
officer be sufficiently strong, or the vulnerability so profound, a referral can be 
made regardless. Two examples of cases that did not receive an adult care 
referral, where the matter could, and perhaps should, have been referred 
follow. 
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Case 18  
“Suspect attended aggds address stating he was cleaning 
her windows suspect took money but the windows were 
never cleaned. Suspect then returned to the address on two 
other occasions harassing the aggd for money aggd is 
elderly and vulnerable.” Case 18. 
 
In the absence of anything to imply the victim declined a referral in this record, 
it is surprising that one was not made. With sufficient concerns about the victim 
to have explicitly stated that vulnerability was recognised (albeit without 
explanation as to why), it seems at odds to then fail to inform the relevant care 
professionals. The perfunctory nature of the record as a whole is an example 
of an inadequate police response. It follows therefore that poor service is not 
necessarily confined to the investigative process, as the superficial regard for 
the wellbeing of the victim demonstrates. 
 
Case 50, (quoted previously on p 166) is a particularly pernicious incident of 
the financial abuse of a vulnerable individual that ought to have qualified for 
further support: 
 
“3 unknown suspects have knocked on aggd front door and 
offered to fix the guttering and roof at the rear of offloc. 
Suspects have… shown him an area of roof which is 
damaged and have advised aggd that they can fix the roof 
for… £5000... Aggd… has negotiated a price of £4000. 
Suspects have… stated they needed the money for 
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materials before they could start work… [and] told aggd they 
would take to the bank… whereby the aggd has withdrawn 
£4000… The aggd has then given £3000 to the suspects 
and the further £1000 on completion of the works. During 
the journey back to offloc the suspects have asked to look 
at the remaining £1000 which has been given to them and 
[they] have not returned it... Suspects have dropped aggd 
around half a mile away from offloc telling him they needed 
to visit some of their workers in connection with another job 
but have not returned and no work has been carried out. 
Aggd was home alone at the time suspects visited and 
suffers from vascular dementure [sic].” Case 50. 
 
Even assuming the victim’s stage of dementia is such that they are able to live 
independently (and one could posit that the responding officer is perhaps not 
the most qualified or best-placed to make that judgement, particularly in 
isolation), the trauma such an experience may create could significantly impair 
their future ability to do so. Chapter 2 highlighted how victims of doorstep crime 
are 2.4 times more likely to have died or gone into residential care in the 2 
years following victimisation than their non-victim peers (Great Britain. Home 
Office, 2003c) and this adverse health impact, and the situational vulnerability 
victimisation can bring, should be borne in mind especially when dealing with 
persons experiencing vulnerabilities, even where they seem mild. 
 
Equally concerning is the issue identified within the data of officers submitting 
cases for referrals to social services, but doing so with insufficient detail to 
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verify the necessity. There were 11 of these incidents, with 9 confirmed as 
subsequently not referred when no further information was forthcoming (1 case 
is unclear whether the referral was subsequently accepted). Notwithstanding 
that the initial assessment may not have been accurate meaning a referral was 
not required, it raises the concern that there are up to 9 (or possibly 10) 
vulnerable victims who, because of inadequate police involvement, have not 
qualified for support from care professionals, despite sufficient concern for 
their welfare for a referral to be initially suggested. The lack of detail within the 
records ipso facto precludes an accurate assessment of whether the initial 
concerns of the officer were warranted. Case 61 provides the only example 
where further detail was provided by the officer following the referral being 
initially rejected by the Protecting Vulnerable Persons (PVP) coordinator. The 
additional information describes a situation involving potentially vulnerable 
adult(s) at risk of financial abuse. Without the additional information, they 
would have gone without safeguarding and social care support. 
 
“Female aggd seemed to be overly trusting of callers to the 
address. Advice given re. security. Also spoken to daughter 
who received the same advice. Daughter also had concerns 
re: trusting nature of her mother... Male aggd suffers with 
dementia and mobility issues.” Case 61. 
 
If the 9 incidents where further information on the perceived vulnerabilities 
went unproduced involved similarly vulnerable victims as case 61, it would 
show how inadequate detail and response to rogue trader incidents have an 
adverse impact; not only on bringing offenders to justice, but also on 
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safeguarding and protecting vulnerable victims of crime. If sufficient concern 
existed for the officer to note vulnerability, it is curious that where these are 
queried, the officer does not then give further detail in the majority of cases. 
Failing to do so could potentially have left victims without the appropriate 
support and at risk of repeat victimisation. Indeed, case 28 involved just such 
a declined referral, but the notes indicate the 75 year old victim (who was the 
subject of a high-pressure cold-call offering building work) subsequently paid 
£350 to unknown individuals for “doing her driveway”. Though the details are 
insufficient to evidence further victimisation, it is suspicious and suggestive of 
a victim repeat-targeted for financial abuse after the failed referral attempt. 
Alternatively, perhaps officers hold a stereotypical view of older persons as 
inevitably vulnerable. Some of the 9 victims unsuccessfully referred to Adult 
Care may therefore have been subject to a generalised and inaccurate notion 
of rogue trader victims as a homogenous and inherently vulnerable group, 
rather than there being any specific concern about their vulnerability. 
Additionally, as with referrals to Trading Standards, once the referral had been 
made there was little evidence of joint-working between police and Social 
Care, and records commonly contained no further updates following the 
referral. This is suggestive of police passing responsibility for the case to social 
care and foreclosing the investigation as posited by Aplin (2015), or evidence, 
as Green (2007, p 97) has identified, of the harm caused to elderly victims 
being “routinely ignored or redefined as a welfare issue”. However, the 
performance in terms of referral to adult care services may not be as poor as 
is immediately apparent. Bearing in mind the theory outlined previously that 
the Adult Protection occurrence category may at times be used by police to 
avoid recording a crime, some victims within this category may not be as 
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vulnerable as received wisdom suggests. 11 of the 26 cases classified as Adult 
Protection did not receive a referral and 6 did not make a vulnerability explicit 
in the record’s notes. The lack of referral in these instances may therefore 
support the view that the Adult Protection occurrence type could be being used 
as a means of avoiding the recording of the case as a crime, rather than it 
being reflective of legitimate concerns as to the vulnerability of the victim going 
unaddressed. 
 
Summary 
 
 
This chapter has explained how, in general terms, investigation of incidents is 
superficial, that detection rates are very low, that consideration of legislation 
specifically designed to combat doorstep crime is minimal and that despite 
HOCR and the NCRS requiring it (Home Office 2011a; 2011b; 2012a; 2012b; 
2013), offences are going unrecorded and unrecognised. It further discusses 
how referrals and partnership working with Trading Standards is uncommon 
and that police are better at referring matters to Adult Care Services where 
they have concerns regarding the vulnerability of victims, but that referrals to 
both agencies are lower than they should be. Furthermore, in some cases, 
referrals may be a means of police transferring responsibility for the incident 
to another body, with little police follow up after the referral. Despite the higher 
referral rate for safeguarding concerns, detail was sometimes sparse and 
insufficient for a successful referral. 
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The results regarding referrals suggest consultation between police and both 
Social Care professionals and Trading Standards officers in relevant cases 
should be adopted as routine. This study shows it is crucial not only that the 
number of referrals increase, but that the level of joint-working, effective 
communication and shared ownership in such cases must also improve if 
investigations and victim outcomes are to improve. That cases in which 
Trading Standards have been involved more often utilise expert assessment 
of the work conducted by rogue traders (4 cases using evidence assessing the 
quality of work involved Trading Standards, whereas only 1 did not), supports 
this. The 9 cases originally put forward for Adult Care referral which ultimately 
remained without a referral might also speak to a need for closer partnership 
working at an earlier stage, so that a more accurate assessment of those that 
require support is made by professionals better placed than police. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
 
This study addresses the ‘dearth of literature’ concerning doorstep crime in the 
form of rogue trading (Gorden and Buchanan, 2013) and it is long overdue. It 
considers whether white-collar crime provides an adequate conceptual 
framework within which to situate rogue trading, explores the research 
barriers, and critically examines the victimology and anatomy of rogue trading, 
as well as the police response to it, positioning the findings against the extant 
literature to advance knowledge. The mixed method, qualitatively-driven 
approach enabled the exploration of the data from TVP’s crime recording 
database, and the results from the study contribute to the under-explored 
phenomenon of rogue trading, providing empirical, evidence-based findings 
with policy and practice implications. Moreover, the findings are often 
interrelated; those concerning the victimology and actus reus inform each 
other, and ultimately as the data were police records, all the findings further 
inform the picture regarding the police response.  
 
The considerable use of ‘grey literature’ throughout this study, as raised in 
chapter 2, results as much from a lack of peer-reviewed academic work as it 
does from the comprehensive nature of the reports (Steele et al., 2001; 
ACTSO 2014, 2015) and it is telling that Steele et al’s work (2001) predates 
nearly all of the legislation now relevant to the crime type. A thorough and more 
contemporary picture is provided by ACTSO (2014, 2015), but that research 
focuses predominately on Trading Standards, whilst identifying the 
considerably greater financial loss (and possibly resultant greater impact of 
associated harms) of reports received by the police. A detailed examination of 
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the police situation relating to those incidents of rogue trading is therefore 
imperative to increase understanding of the crime type. Specifically, it is 
important to identify whether the substantial legislative change in the 
intervening years has led to differences from the situation as discovered by 
Steele et al (2001), and how it compares with the Trading Standards’ 
enforcement landscape reported by ACTSO (2014, 2015). 
 
Many of the findings of this study are consistent with previous research into 
rogue trading specifically, and fraud (and white-collar crime more broadly), 
despite the vastly altered legislative framework since seminal research on 
rogue trading was conducted (Steele et al., 2001), as referenced throughout 
this study. Other areas of this research, such as the examination of the use of 
special measures for rogue trader victims, have never previously been 
examined academically, resulting in the generation of genuinely original 
findings that better illustrate the current situation relating to rogue trading. As 
findings concerning the retrieval process, and the lack of definition and crime 
flag for rogue trading, provide the backdrop against which all other results 
situate, it is here the chapter begins. Next, the chapter examines the findings 
and conclusions regarding the victimology of rogue trading. This study found 
a lower than might be anticipated number of incidents involving victims 
categorised as vulnerable, but a situation where those that were deemed 
vulnerable lost greater amounts to victimisation than those not categorised as 
such. Following this, the chapter examines findings unearthed from the study 
of the anatomy of rogue trading. This research discovered a varied and fluid 
M.O. which has altered little since it was first studied in detail. It shows that 
offenders attempt to maximise their financial gain whilst remaining difficult to 
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identify or apprehend, including through an overlap between rogue trading and 
distraction burglary, a common use of repeated or continuing victimisation and 
transporting victims to financial institutions to secure immediate financial gain. 
It also shows offenders generally preferring to undertaking ‘work’, as opposed 
to taking payment without conducting work, and that the most common, and 
lucrative, trade type is roofing. 
 
The chapter then explores the police response to rogue trading. As outlined in 
chapter 7, it discusses poor police performance, mostly manifesting in a 
routine failure to identify or consider directly relevant recordable offences, gaps 
in recording, a failure to investigate or assess work conducted by suspects and 
repeatedly reframing the issue as outside the police remit, including through 
case referrals to other agencies. The performance is examined in light of the 
other findings in the study and the wider academic landscape and the course 
of the journey of this research led to the consideration of police cultures and 
how these might impact the response to rogue trading. 
 
Following this, the chapter posits directions for future research into rogue 
trading, examines the location of rogue trading within the conceptual 
framework of white-collar crime and advances key recommendations driven 
by the findings of this research. 
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Data retrieval process: Lack of definition and crime flag inhibit research 
and performance management. 
 
This study reveals similarities between rogue trading, white-collar crime 
(Croall, 1989; Hartley, 2008; Smith, Button, Johnston and Frimpong, 2011), 
and fraud (Levi and Burrows, 2008; Gannon and Doig, 2010; Smith, Button, 
Johnston and Frimpong, 2010) which are similarly under-explored in academia 
and in practice (Shover, Coffey and Hobbs, 2003; Karstedt and Farrall, 2006; 
NW3C, 2006; Levi and Burrows, 2008; Gannon and Doig, 2010). The lack of 
a definitive, agreed upon definition is common to rogue trading, white-collar 
crime and fraud and invariably results in weaknesses and inconsistencies 
(Edelhertz, 1970; Pearce, 1976; Geis and Meier, 1977; Shapiro, 1990; 
Albanese, 1995; Slapper and Tombs, 1999; Levi and Burrows, 2008). 
Discussions are rendered abstract, leading to widely differing estimates as to 
prevalence and costs, depending upon which definition is employed (Tunley, 
2014) and the level to which under-reporting is accounted (ACTSO, 2014). 
This is problematic not only in academic terms, as the analogous conclusion 
in regards to stalking (HMIC, 2017) highlights (see p 41); a lack of definition 
results in crimes going unrecognised and mis-recorded (HMIC, 2017 p 7). 
 
The findings of this research starkly reveal a situation in which police are 
unable to easily retrieve incidents of rogue trading from their crime recording 
databases. Previous research (Day, 2015) has concluded that the lack of a 
crime flag by which to identify rogue trading makes locating such incidents on 
police databases time-consuming and problematic. Equally, prevalence 
estimates are affected, as has also been noted in reference to HTMS (House 
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of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2018) and elite deviance (Simon, 
1996). Previous research (ACTSO, 2015) highlights the effects of this on rogue 
trading, with 32% of police forces recognising it does not receive the same 
level of response as other crime types, and 62% acknowledging they are 
unable to analyse or monitor rogue trading crime rates. This is despite findings 
repeatedly identifying perpetrators predominately targeting older and 
vulnerable persons (Steele et al, 2001; Kent Trading Standards, 2008; ACPO, 
2011; Alzheimer’s Society, 2011; Gorden and Buchanan, 2013). With 95% of 
forces stating that protecting the vulnerable forms a priority area within their 
Crime Plan, or Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) strategy (ACTSO, 
2015), the inability to retrieve relevant records undermines the extent to which 
this can be achieved. The lack of both a definitive definition for the crime and 
a retrievable evidence base is indicative of a crime type perceived as low 
priority. Perhaps given findings about the relative lack of priority afforded to 
fraud generally (Levi and Jones, 1985; Button et al, 2007; Levi, 1986; 2008b; 
Levi and Burrows, 2008; Doig and Levi, 2009; Smith, Button, Johnston and 
Frimpong, 2011; Button et al, 2013), it is unsurprising that a sub-set of the 
crime is treated thus but nonetheless it impacts the response the crime type 
receives. In terms of performance, an increased ability to scrutinise a relevant 
dataset would enable evidence-based resource allocation (Roman and Farrell, 
2002), crime mapping (Groff and La Vigne, 2002; Townsley and Pease, 2002), 
assessment of the effectiveness of investigations, and scrutiny of crime 
recording practices (Great Britain. Home Office, 2000b), crime prevention 
(Tilley, 2002) or target hardening initiatives (Great Britain. Home Office, 1988; 
Ekblom and Pease, 1995; Cozens, 2014; Day, 2015) and partnership working 
(Great Britain. Home Office, 1988; Gilling, 2005; Kelling, 2005) that are 
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currently unfeasible. Moreover, eliminating the retrieval difficulties would also 
provide easier access for academics and practitioner-researchers alike. The 
scarcity of research could be easily addressed were the secondary data 
analysis of an empirical evidence base more accessible. A definitive definition 
and a crime flag by which to categorise incidents of rogue trading are therefore 
crucial in beginning to enable greater focus on, and understanding of, the 
crime type academically and in policy and practice. 
 
Using distraction burglary as a comparator, it is clear to see that since the 
introduction of a definition and crime code/occurrence type the levels of 
distraction burglary have decreased year-on-year, as Table 1 illustrates (see 
p 45). Whether the correlation is causal is unknown, but it could be posited 
that the introduction of the definition and crime code resulted in additional 
enforcement attention, in turn making offending less attractive. Likewise, any 
associated increase in awareness-raising and crime prevention initiatives 
(Bowers and Johnson, 2005) might have resulted in a more informed public, 
better able to repel criminal attempts (Day, 2015). Whilst the reduction is 
positive, the overlap between distraction burglary and rogue trading might 
result in any reduction in distraction burglary offending unwittingly leading to a 
corresponding increase in rogue trading (Day, 2015) as offenders alter their 
crime type according to the perceived risk of detection and likelihood of reward. 
The recording situation currently makes this hypothesis virtually impossible to 
test; as this study has demonstrated, revealing longitudinal data on rates of 
incidences will require a manual trawl, of approximately 11,000 records per 
year. The comparison between distraction burglary and rogue trading, in this 
study and previous research (Day, 2015) also highlights how the introduction 
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of a definition and crime code for the former is incongruous when weighed 
against the lack of such measures for the latter. Whilst historically it may have 
been impractical to focus more on rogue trading (as statute arguably did not 
sufficiently legislate against it) with the enactment of the Fraud Act and specific 
legislation designed to combat offending (Consumer Protection from Unfair 
Trading Regulations; Cancellation of Contracts made in a Consumer’s Home 
or Place of Work etc. Regulations and latterly Consumer Contracts 
(Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations) this is no 
longer the case. Given the now-strong legal framework and the greater 
prevalence and financial harm of rogue trading (Steele et al. 2001; ACTSO, 
2014, 2015), the time for a definition and identifier on police systems is 
overdue. 
 
Victimology of rogue trading 
 
The exploration of the victimology uncovered several themes that indicate that 
victims of rogue trading, and in particular vulnerable victims of rogue trading 
are not being supported as well as they could, or perhaps should be. This lack 
of provision of appropriate support potentially starts with the missing of, or 
superficial regard to, victim vulnerabilities, thereby excluding vulnerable 
victims from sources of support for which they could otherwise qualify. It 
transmits throughout the police involvement, including in terms of a lack of 
joint-working and appropriate referrals to care agencies, as well as a routine 
failure to consider safeguarding and crime reduction measures, or statutory 
protections specifically introduced to benefit vulnerable witnesses and victims 
of crime (Macpherson, 2001; HMICFRS, 2019a). The shift from victimisation 
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and crime prevention as the responsibility of the state to the individual 
(Mayhew and Hough, 1988; Daigle, 2013) is very apparent and there is a 
frequent recasting of the crime as a welfare issue (Green, 2007). The 
traditional association of fraud victimisation with undesirable personal traits 
(Cross, 2013, 2015) such as greed, gullibility and low self-control (see for 
instance Lee and Soberon-Ferrer, (1997); Holtfreter, Reisig and Pratt, (2008)) 
may also give rise to a perception of victims as undeserving or personally 
culpable. This would certainly explain the superficial response often provided 
to victims that would otherwise fit the label ‘innocent’ or ‘genuine victims’ 
(Fattah, 1992; Charman, 2017) which police officers themselves have 
proclaimed to most want to support and protect. 
 
Vulnerability 
 
The extent to which victims are vulnerable is difficult to categorically conclude, 
not least because the term vulnerability, like so many terms examined in this 
thesis, lacks an agreed definition. The assessment of vulnerability by police 
officers is inevitably subjective, based on their perception of the victim and 
their situation, but operating without any parameters as to what qualifies 
makes the term nebulous and of limited use. It is unknown in some cases 
whether the term is used to denote a perceived inherent vulnerability per se, 
or a situation-specific vulnerability based upon a perception of a risk of future 
victimisation. Inherent vulnerability, such as would render an individual lacking 
capacity to make their own decisions (Mental Capacity Act 2005) or qualify 
them for care and support (the Care Act) would likely be more acute than 
situation-specific vulnerability which may be broader in scope, potentially 
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encompassing temporary vulnerability, such as having recently been ill, or 
bereaved (Steele et al., 2001; ACTSO, 2015). The suitability of police officers 
to make a vulnerability assessment may also be questionable, in light of 
findings that suggest police officers themselves are often uncomfortable doing 
so, due to time constraints and lack of appropriate training and expertise 
(Wilson and Segrave, 2015; Charman, 2017). The veracity of the vulnerability 
assessments made by police officers is potentially unreliable from a potential 
under-representation and a potential over-representation. On the one hand, 
officers lacking the necessary training to identify vulnerability may miss 
individual’s vulnerabilities, on the other hand they may be susceptible to pre-
conceived stereotypes depicting victims as inevitably vulnerable, even where 
no such vulnerability exists. Research offers little assistance, tending to either 
ignore or marginalise older people (South, 2014; Phillips, 2016a). Rightly, what 
little research there has been in the area urges caution to avoid labeling 
victims, particularly older victims, as an inherently vulnerable, homogenous 
group (Thornton, Hatton, Ralph and Owen 2005), or disproportionately 
increase a fear of victimisation (Gorden and Buchanan, 2013). Nonetheless, 
since previous studies have consistently identified older and vulnerable 
persons as most likely to experience victimisation from rogue traders (Steele 
et al, 2001, p 19; Kent Trading Standards, 2008; ACPO, 2011; Alzheimer’s 
Society, 2011; Gorden and Buchanan, 2013) the number of victims recorded 
as elderly or vulnerable by police (55 of 95) in this study is lower than one may 
expect. Whether this results from previous research overplaying the level to 
which age and vulnerability is a factor in victimisation, or police failing to 
identify vulnerabilities (or record where a victim is an older person) in the data 
is unclear. It may also be that without a universally agreed definition for the 
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term vulnerable, the criteria used in previous studies differs from that 
commonly applied by police, making comparisons problematic. 
Notwithstanding the difficulty in making comparisons, the lower than expected 
number of reports referencing vulnerability needs to be viewed in conjunction 
with officer’s own concerns as to their suitability for assessing vulnerabilities 
(Wilson and Segrave, 2015; Charman, 2017), potentially unveiling a need for 
closer working between care professionals and the police to properly identify 
and cater for individual’s needs.  
 
Conversely, if victimisation does not correlate as closely with vulnerability and 
old age as previously posited, disseminating this more widely could address 
the social stigma attached to victimisation (Green 2007, p 96; Cross, 2013, 
2015). If the crime type is currently associated, rightly or wrongly, with old age 
and vulnerability (Steele et al., 2001; ACPO, 2011; Barratt, 2012; ACTSO, 
2014, 2015; Age UK 2015), victims may be less inclined to report an incident 
if they are unwilling to self-identify as vulnerable or they are not elderly. 
	
Vulnerability and financial loss 
	
This study provides the first quantitative analysis of the impact of perceived 
vulnerability on the financial loss experienced as a result of rogue trading. 
Although the study hints at vulnerability potentially being less of a factor in 
victimisation than traditionally thought (Phillips, 2016b), the financial detriment 
experienced by those deemed vulnerable is noticeably higher than 
experienced by those not recorded or deemed vulnerable. This might be due 
in part to officers recording the victims of higher financial loss as vulnerable 
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simply by virtue of their more acute victimisation, deeming it a sign in itself of 
vulnerability, though it is worth noting that any such assessment is not 
necessarily without foundation. It could also logically reflect a situation where 
acutely vulnerable individuals are more trusting of offenders who exploit this 
trust to the maximum, resulting in greater losses. It may be therefore that, 
regardless of whether offenders are skilled or unskilled in the trade, the amount 
that they ‘charge’ is based more upon the credulity of their victim than the 
actual ‘work’ either quoted or conducted. This should be borne in mind not only 
by police, but also those charged with providing the care and safeguarding of 
vulnerable adults. The research conducted for this thesis has identified that 
victims where there is no indication of vulnerability lose, on average, £4,098 
per successful incident, whereas those identified as vulnerable lose more. 
Losses are £4,963 on average in the case of incidents recorded as Adult 
Protection issues or where the victim was put forward for an Adult Care 
referral, and £6,583 for those explicitly described by officers as vulnerable. 
Professionals considering appropriate levels of safeguarding and crime 
prevention would benefit from this knowledge (alongside awareness of the 
wider harm victimisation can cause to health and wellbeing), to properly 
assess the cost-benefit and suitability of any proposed measures. For 
example, the potential benefit in working with clients in conjunction with 
financial institutions to safeguard them from crime and financial abuse is clear. 
The percentage of victims (22%) identified as experiencing cognitive 
impairment (broadly in line with that previously identified)(ACTSO, 2015)) is 
also an important consideration, both in how evidence is gathered and for the 
content and delivery method of target-hardening and crime prevention 
measures. 
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Joint-working between Adult Care Services and police, including  
CCTV 
 
The records examined in this study suggest there is little joint-working between 
social care professionals and police; where a referral is made by police (the 
majority of cases that appear to qualify), it generally signifies a handover to the 
care agency and the conclusion of the investigation, rather than the beginning 
of meaningful joint-working. This is also indicative of the originally reported 
crime being reframed by police as a welfare issue (Green, 2007 p 97) rather 
than a criminal matter, and parallels findings relating to how police refer 
matters to partner agencies (notably Trading Standards) as a means of 
abrogating responsibility for the case (Aplin, 2015). In keeping with this, the 
deployment of CCTV is rare (6 instances out of the 95 rogue trading incidents, 
of which 55 were deemed vulnerable and could therefore potentially benefit 
even more as a result of its use). Budgetary issues notwithstanding, CCTV 
could meet the aims of reducing fear of crime, decreasing the likelihood of a 
repeat incident by making the property a less attractive option for would-be 
offenders, and capturing evidence if future approaches are undeterred. As 
such, installation of CCTV could hold broad appeal to, and benefit for, victims; 
especially those deemed vulnerable. It is surprising therefore that it is deployed 
in so few instances, particularly in light of studies identifying that offenders 
routinely share information about potential victims (Steele et al., 2001; Barratt, 
2012 ACTSO, 2014), making repeat victimisation a risk. Moreover, the results 
of this study show some 50% of incidents involving vulnerable victims involved 
either a repeat or continuing offence and, the tactic of grooming and 
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befriending victims (ACTSO, 2014, 2015) inevitably involves repeated face-to-
face communication that CCTV could capture. This research provides the only 
known exploration of the installation of CCTV at the properties of rogue trader 
victims and suggests CCTV could be a useful tool in reducing repeat 
victimisation, or enabling successful enforcement action if it continued. 
Furthermore, there were no instances recorded of crime prevention or target 
hardening advice given by officers including discussion with victims about the 
potential to install CCTV at the property privately. Whilst this does not 
necessarily mean it was not communicated without being recorded, it is 
suggestive, alongside the relatively few cases in which it was deployed, of that 
being the case. CCTV, whether overt or covert, installed by police, partners or 
private individuals could be promoted more routinely as a method of reducing 
anxiety and fear of crime, target-hardening premises and increasing potential 
for successful detection of future offences. 
 
Special measures for vulnerable and intimidated individuals 
 
 
This study is also the only research examining the provision of special 
measures to vulnerable, and/or intimidated witnesses in cases of rogue 
trading. The quantitative analysis highlights it to be alarmingly scarce - more 
so even than the deployment of CCTV. Only 2 cases in the sample of 95 
involved a VRI to allow for the capture of the victim’s best evidence. Against 
the backdrop of a majority of victims being categorised by police as vulnerable 
(quite apart from any additional cases where vulnerability was missed, or that 
might have met the definition of an intimidated witness) this is cause for 
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concern. The qualifying criteria for special measures contained within the 
Youth Crime and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 is deliberately drafted widely 
(Macpherson, 2001) and was enacted in an effort to support those who are 
intimidated or experience a range of vulnerabilities in achieving justice, 
empowering them by enabling their voice to be better heard. Despite this, there 
appears to be a yawning gap between statute and practice (Elias, 1992), in 
much the same way as there is with the specific legislation designed to protect 
people from doorstep criminals. That statutory rights are routinely overlooked 
(HMICFRS, 2019a) is troubling, particularly since the legislation is neither new 
nor recent, and reflects Elias’ (1992, p 91) damning assessment that, “victims 
have gotten far less than promised. Rights have often been unenforced or 
unenforceable, participation sporadic or ill-advised, services precarious and 
underfunded, [and] victim needs unassisted.” 
 
Previous discussions regarding victimisation have often been too simplistic, 
viewing ‘the vulnerable’ and ‘older people’ as homogenous groups (Thornton 
et al., 2005), disempowering victims in the process. The lack of detail within 
the data made a more nuanced discussion of victims, their situation and their 
needs impossible. One can see from the scarce consideration of special 
measures, that police still seem to assume vulnerability is a barrier to 
investigation and foreclose investigations without providing the victim the full 
opportunities available to them by statute. More detailed identification of 
victims’ individual needs (HMICFRS, 2019a) could therefore advance 
safeguarding. We have seen already in chapter 2 how a detailed and empathic 
police response can help alleviate distress (Great Britain. Home Office, 
2003c), lower levels of anxiety and hasten recovery (Great Britain. Home 
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Office, 2003b), and a more detailed response may thus empower the victim 
and support in their recovery, whilst simultaneously increasing opportunities 
for enforcement action by enabling better evidence to be gathered. 
In terms of study, more attention has been directed (though resultant levels of 
success are arguable) towards crime prevention and understanding and 
protecting the victim, rather than focusing on the perpetrators (Steele et al., 
2001; Thornton et al., 2005; Gorden and Buchanan, 2013). Even the 
evaluation of crime prevention measures features to some degree in the 
literature (Gorden & Buchanan, 2013), whereas few studies focus on the 
perpetrators. Steele et al. (2001) conducted prisoner interviews as one part of 
their wide-ranging research into rogue trading and distraction burglary. before 
concluding that crime prevention would be more effective than enforcement 
(though this was prior to legislative changes which have reinforced the criminal 
law and the ability to deal effectively with rogue trading incidents). The only 
research that deals solely with the crime from the offender perspective is 
Phillips’ (2016a) and whilst important, this was a small-scale and necessarily 
self-selecting sample. Perhaps the lack of attention to offenders and their 
means of operating is again linked to the difficulty in retrieving data of this 
crime type, or difficulties in gaining access to an illicit group. Nonetheless, it is 
important the imbalance between concentrating on victims rather than the 
crime and criminals does not become too pronounced. If more can be learned 
about offenders and how they operate, perhaps crime prevention and target-
hardening advice and initiatives could become more specifically targeted 
potentially increasing their effectiveness rather than if they are studied 
arbitrarily divorced from the crime itself. Similarly, better understanding the 
crime may assist in improving the enforcement response, the data infers that 
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often the primary concern of responding officers is also crime prevention, 
presumably to ensure victims are not subject to further victimisation. However, 
whilst important, there is little evidence to suggest this advice is effective 
(Gorden & Buchanan, 2013). Where as many as 1 in 5 victims are 
experiencing cognitive decline or cognitive impairment, and a further 10% 
(resulting in a total of 1 in 3 victims within the sample) isolated, the crime 
prevention messages may not be retained or practiced. Moreover, to expect 
to effect long-term behavioural change in victims following brief advice vastly 
underestimates the proficiency of the offenders and the psychology of rogue 
trading, as well as the impacts of loneliness, social isolation, cognitive 
impairment and simple habit (Alzheimer’s Society, 2011; Gorden & Buchanan, 
2013; Olivier et al, 2016). Moreover, a greater focus on evidence gathering 
and enforcement may result in significant sanctions for crimes which have 
already been committed. This may assist in crime reduction by providing a 
more meaningful deterrent, as is suspected to be the case with distraction 
burglary. Moreover, as offenders are believed to be professional and prolific 
(Steele at al, 2001; ACTSO, 2015; Phillips, 2016b), the imprisonment of a 
relatively small number might significantly reduce the number of offences 
being committed. In order to fully understand the practice of rogue trading, it is 
necessary to complete the dyadic with examination of the offender. As such, 
attention now turns to the conclusions in respect of the offender and their 
offending methods. 
 
The anatomy of rogue trading: a varied and unaltered M.O.  
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The findings of this study show an M.O. that remains very close to that reported 
by Steele et al (2001). They reveal fluid and dynamic offending aimed at 
maximising the financial benefit from offending whilst simultaneously avoiding 
detection (Steele et al, 2001;  Barratt, 2012; Phillips, 2016a, 2016b). A lack of 
police focus on fraud generally (Police Foundation, 2018), and rogue trading 
specifically (Steele et al., 2001; ATSO, 2014) coupled with low detection rates 
(4% of recorded incidents, and the outcome of legal proceedings in these 
cases unknown) likely contribute to the unchanged M.O. High levels of under-
reporting ensure the majority of incidents never come to light (ACTSO, 2014, 
2015) and with opportunities for sizeable financial gain (ACTSO, 2014) it is 
unsurprising the offending techniques remain largely unchanged. Incidences 
of cold-calling, proactively targeting victims believed to be vulnerable, 
bouncing the job, reducing quoted prices, causing damage to properties to 
secure ‘work’, carrying out work, and theft in the form of taking payment upfront 
and never returning were all present (Steele et al., 2001; ACTSO, 2004, 2015) 
in the data. There were also a multitude of different trade types represented 
within the sample and a mix of one-off incidents and repeat or continuing 
offences. Some offenders also demonstrated a willingness to commit 
distraction burglary either in addition to, or instead of rogue trading where the 
attempt at rogue trading was rebuffed (Steele et al,. 2001; Barratt, 2012; 
ACTSO, 2014, 2015) and transporting victims to financial institutions was also 
common.  
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Roofing as the most common, and most lucrative trade type 
 
In keeping with previous research, the most commonly used trade was roofing 
(ACTSO, 2014). It also represented the trade type offering the potential for the 
greatest financial gains to perpetrators (and in all likelihood the most difficult 
for victims to assess in terms of cost and quality, or to decline if they think are 
led to believe it is required).  
 
A preference for carrying out ‘work’ 
 
This study has also identified that offenders appear to prefer to undertake work 
to the victim’s property as opposed to absconding without carrying out work, 
despite the increased opportunities for detection and apprehension of 
suspects this allows than in the majority of other acquisitive offences. It seems 
perpetrators believe the low number of cases where the work carried out is 
assessed by enforcement officers, the opportunity to defraud higher amounts 
by undertaking work to a property and the low overall detection rates make this 
worthwhile. 
 
Repeat and continuing victimisation 
 
With 39 of the 95 cases present within the data recorded as involving repeated 
or continuing offences, these practices are common. As explained in chapter 
7, this is likely to be an under-estimate as police focusing on responding to the 
specific issue may not have identified all instances of repeat victimisation. The 
high number of cases involving this technique shows that offenders will 
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maximise opportunities for financial gain and this has implications for the 
safeguarding of victims. If in the region of 40% of victims are likely to be 
targeted again, crime prevention and target hardening measures become vital 
to reduce further costs and associated harm to the victims, and the cost-benefit 
and invest-to-save potential of such measures are clear. 
 
Transporting victims to financial institutions 
 
Another striking finding in respect of the M.O. is the relatively high proportion 
(12 of 95 cases) of incidents where the offender transported or accompanied 
the victim to a financial institution in order to effect immediate payment. 
Additionally, there were 2 cases in which victims were followed to a bank by 
the offender and intercepted en route home and the two cases in which victims 
were instructed to visit the bank to withdraw funds to facilitate immediate 
payment. Almost one in five cases therefore involved face-to-face interaction 
by the victim with their financial institution. This is not normal trading behaviour 
and in terms of crime prevention and target hardening it should be publicised 
widely as a red flag; chapter 6 detailed how it is likely that such behaviour could 
in itself qualify as a criminal offence of aggressive commercial practice 
(Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Practices, 2008).  
 
However, this M.O should increase the opportunity for detection and 
apprehension, as well as curtail or eliminate victimisation. It remains to be seen 
whether the partnership between financial institutions and law enforcement, 
through the re-launched Banking Protocol, will prove successful, but in terms 
of reducing victimisation early signs are positive, with savings of almost £25 
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million reported in the first year (UK Finance, 2018). Nonetheless, without 
robust enforcement action accompanying these frustrated attempts, the 
scheme is unlikely to provide a meaningful deterrent, with offenders simply 
moving on to the next victim. With only 5% of emergency calls placed by 
financial institutions under the scheme resulting in arrest (UK Finance, 2018), 
it seems priority has been given to disruption rather than apprehension and 
prosecution, potentially limiting the success of the initiative. In order to 
enhance and improve the Banking Protocol scheme therefore, it is paramount 
that responding officers are clear on their responsibilities and the legislative 
framework in order that arrest, and effective and robust enforcement action is 
routine. This would provide a greater deterrent for offenders and would 
highlight to those within the financial industry the importance of their reporting 
suspicious activity through the protocol, and the seriousness with which it is 
dealt, thereby strengthening the initiative.   
	
As findings from this research show, police performance in respect of the 
response to rogue trader incidents is generally poor, across a range of areas. 
The recasting of rogue trading incidents as a welfare issue is not the sole area 
of concern, with this chapter already having explored the scarcity of the use of 
CCTV and the lack of consideration to measures designed to achieve best 
evidence as examples of this. Further conclusions relating to poor police 
performance will now be explored. 
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Poor police response to incidents of rogue trading	
 
This study overwhelmingly reveals a routinely poor police performance across 
multiple areas of the response, manifesting in a routine failure to consider 
recordable offences and a commonplace failure to record important 
information, such as whether work was carried out and how much the 
perpetrator benefited from the offending. Basic and essential investigative 
steps were often missed and there was evidence of transferring responsibility 
to other agencies, most often Trading Standards, but also Action Fraud. The 
level of response provided by police speaks to a situation whereby officers are 
routinely reframing rogue trading as an issue outside of their remit. 
 
Routine failure to identify or consider recordable offences 
 
In addition to the paucity of consideration to special measures already 
discussed, the routine failure to identify or even consider recordable offences 
directly relevant to rogue trading is alarming. This research directly explored, 
using empirical evidence, the situation in respect of the recording practices of 
police in rogue trader cases and found that cases commonly failed to record 
(or conduct such enquiries as would allow the accurate recording of) 
recordable crimes. The reason for this remains unclear; it may result from 
police cultures and practices that deem either the incidents or the specific 
legislative framework surrounding them unimportant (Steele et al., 2001; 
Loftus, 2010)(or somehow outside of the officer’s role). Equally, it could be a 
result of a knowledge gap around specific legislation not necessarily seen as 
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mainstream policing (Police Foundation, 2018) or perhaps a combination of 
both, but irrespective of the reasons, it requires further attention. 
 
If the prevailing backdrop of a lack of sufficient resources is in part responsible 
for a poor service provision in rogue trader cases, this should not preclude the 
proper recording of recordable offences as has been commonly identified 
within this research. The need for accurate recording remains and would allow 
a more accurate assessment of the prevalence of the offending and the 
demands on police, enabling evidence-based resource concerns to be raised. 
In failing to record incidents correctly the picture becomes obfuscated and 
results in victims going unsupported and criminals operating without 
apprehension. Likewise, if the view of the police is that these offences are for 
other agencies to investigate, namely Action Fraud and or Trading Standards, 
one would expect a greater number of referrals to those agencies by the police 
in instances in which they have been the receiving agency. However, in order 
to properly refer an incident it is reasonable to assume that police would first 
need to ascertain the presence or otherwise of criminality, in order to ensure 
the referral is appropriate, and the results of this study indicate such 
investigation is routinely absent. 
 
Failure to investigate ‘work’ conducted by suspects 
 
The commonplace failure to investigate or assess the work (and/or claims 
made) by suspects is troubling. If a knowledge gap in legislation outside of the 
‘core’ policing subjects could be understood to some extent, assessment of 
these issues needs no such ‘specialist’ knowledge. Whether work was 
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required, its true value (as compared to that which has been charged to the 
victim) and quality are all key determinants in assessing whether the suspect’s 
conduct was fraudulent. In the same vein, any claims made by the suspect as 
to the urgency, necessity and cost of proposed works are also crucial 
considerations in identifying whether offences have been committed. It is a 
reasonable line of enquiry to expect police to undertake, and therefore a legal 
requirement (CPIA section 23(1)), as well as a basic and routine investigative 
step, as outlined in the NCRS and HOCR, 
“An incident will be recorded as a crime for offences against an 
identified victim, if, on the balance of probability:  
(a) the circumstances as reported amount to a crime defined by law (the 
police will determine this based on their knowledge of the law and 
the counting rules) and 
(b) there is no credible evidence to the contrary.” (Home Office, 
2012a) 
Despite the free-market economy, it is unlawful to charge extortionate amounts 
for work, and this principle is well-established. Though there is a grey area as 
to what level of overcharge amounts to a fraud (as opposed to a civil law 
contractual breach pertaining to a ‘reasonable’ price), case law reveals trading 
which “goes beyond the bounds of what ordinary decent people engaged in 
business would regard as honest” amounts to fraudulent trading (R. V 
Grantham [1984] 1 QB 675). This was further validated (R. V Silverman [1998] 
86 Cr App R 213) when it was ruled that the criminal law applies,  
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“in matters of mutual trust where one party is dependent upon the 
other for fair and reasonable conduct where one party takes 
dishonest advantage of the other by representing as a fair charge 
that which he, but not the other knows is dishonestly excessive.”  
 
This is the case even in instances where no pressure has been applied to the 
consumer to accept the quotation, and irrespective of whether there was any 
explicit assertion by the offender that the price was fair. Therefore, without 
consideration of the work carried out by suspects, alongside an objective 
assessment as to the reasonable cost of it, there is no prospect of police 
compliance with the NCRS and HOCR. 
 
Joint-working with other agencies 
 
Examining the levels of referrals to Adult Care Services in cases involving 
victims described as vulnerable tends to support the theory that rogue trading 
is dealt with as a welfare issue, rather than a criminal matter (Green, 2007). 
Generally speaking, even where investigation of the potential offending was 
minimal, police gave regard to the victim’s vulnerability.  
Incidents involving referrals by police to Trading Standards generally involved 
a handover of responsibility for the case without significant further police 
involvement thereafter. As discussed in chapter 2, the agency to which the 
case is being referred lacks the power of arrest and forensic opportunities upon 
which the police can rely, making the transfer of investigations highly 
questionable. If there are lines of enquiry still to be pursued, the police would 
ordinarily be better equipped to conduct those enquiries. Similarly, if all lines 
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of enquiry have already been exhausted, then referring the matter at that point 
other than for information sharing is futile. This study shows that cases with 
involvement of both agencies are in the minority, and even where both 
agencies are involved, joint-working is rare. An increase in closer working 
between Police and Trading Standards would benefit both agencies. Trading 
Standards would benefit from access to a more robust and fulsome forensic 
toolkit, including enabling arrests, fingerprinting and Video Identification 
Parade Electronic Recording (VIPER) to confirm identity, whilst police would 
benefit from the skills and legislative knowledge of Trading Standards, 
particularly in regulatory areas where current knowledge appears minimal.  
Given the current backdrop of poor police performance towards victims of 
rogue trading, increasing rates of reporting might be of limited use. Whilst it 
would better evidence the prevalence of the crime, the service standard 
received by the majority of victims currently appears to be minimal. Fraud 
victims are known to place great importance on having their case investigated 
thoroughly and getting their money back (Button et al, 2013), whilst they also 
value a sympathetic police response (Button et al, 2013, p 55; Stafford, 2016). 
Conversely, receiving a service they feel is unsatisfactory increases and 
prolongs the negative impacts caused by victimisation (Great Britain. Home 
Office, 2003c). Increasing in volume the number of reports received will do 
nothing to increase the standard of response received by victims and, with 
resources limited, it is likely a significant increase in service demand might 
lead to an even more superficial police response which is likely to further 
aggravate the impact of the crime and re-victimise those experiencing it. Whilst 
ordinarily a more accurate picture of the extent of the criminality would be a 
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worthy aim, if this comes at a cost, with little or no corresponding benefit, to 
those who have experienced victimisation it may prove detrimental to victims. 
 
Gaps in recording 
 
The research also shows the failure by police to record key incident details, 
such as the financial loss (a determining factor in sentencing for fraud 
offences) and whether work was carried out to the victims property. This 
speaks to superficial investigation that not only reflects poorly on the relative 
importance police attach to investigating this crime type, but also results in a 
lack of appropriate service provision to the victims. As discussed, previous 
findings relating to the value victims of fraud place on being dealt with 
sympathetically (Button et al, 2013; Stafford, 2016) and having their case 
thoroughly investigated (Button et al, 2013), and the adverse effect where this 
is not the case (Great Britain. Home Office, 2003b), indicate that this poor 
service provision could result in revictimisation, and causing detriment to the 
health and wellbeing of victims.  
 
Reframing the issue of rogue trading as one that exists outside the police remit. 
 
There is, throughout each of the areas explored, a consistent reframing of the 
issue of rogue trading as one that exists outside of the police remit (Green, 
2007; Aplin, 2015). In addition to the failure to properly record incidents as 
crimes, or to investigate appropriately the work undertaken or the claims made 
by suspects, this is often achieved through the use of referrals – most often to 
Social Care Services, but also to Trading Standards or Action Fraud. Once 
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referrals are made, the majority of cases were closed by police without their 
further involvement. The higher rate of referrals to Adult Care Services as 
opposed to law enforcement, coupled with the superficial investigation of many 
of the incidents also contradicts Mawby’s (2007 p 215) finding that “victim-
oriented work is accorded less priority than crime-fighting”. In fact, the results 
of this study suggest although victim support could be improved upon, it is 
generally given greater prominence than investigation of the criminality, which 
is rare, superficial and ineffective. 
 
Summary 
 
Whilst this research has highlighted a broad range to the superficial police 
response to rogue trading, given the backdrop extant literature describes, 
these findings are perhaps unsurprising. As detailed throughout this study, 
police view white-collar crime and fraud as low-priority (Levi and Jones, 1985; 
Button et al, 2007; Levi, 1986; 2008b; Levi and Burrows, 2008; Doig and Levi, 
2009; Smith, Button, Johnston and Frimpong, 2011; Button et al, 2013; Police 
Foundation, 2018, HMICFRS, 2019b). As such, appetite for complex, time-
consuming investigations, particularly ones involving out-of-force-area 
enquiries, is limited (Levi, 1986; Phillips, 1996; Steele et al., 2001; NW3C, 
2006; Aplin, 2015). Amplifying this, public sector budget cuts (Phillips, 2016b; 
Tombs, 2016; Police Federation, 2018) may have affected the ability of 
enforcement agencies to respond effectively to rogue trading. Understandably, 
the harshest budget reductions fall disproportionately on to low-priority areas, 
with politically-charged and higher-profile areas faring better (MHICFRS, 
2019); as a sub-set of a low-priority crime type, rogue trader enforcement is 
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likely to suffer. Further compounding cuts to resources, police have had to deal 
with a concurrent increase in demand; particularly in non-crime areas such as 
mental health calls as other public services reduce provision (particularly in 
out-of-hours services) as a result of their own resource reductions (Police 
Foundation, 2018). As the last-resort agency police absorb these (often 
resource-intensive) service demands by default, even where suitability to do 
so is questionable due to lack of training or appropriate expertise.        
 
The low priority rogue trading is afforded is reflected in, and adversely affected 
by, police crime recording practices, as detailed in chapters 2, 3 and 5. What 
is, and perhaps more importantly what is not, recorded may give insight into 
the perceived importance of an issue (Levi and Burrows, 2008) and the lack of 
definition and identifier for rogue trading (ACTSO, 2014; Day, 2015) reinforce 
the belief they are deemed unimportant. A focus on targets and performance 
indicators (Loftus, 2009) within the police, and Steele’s (2001, p 15) warning 
that “what is not measured does not get done” speak to the significance of the 
current lack of definition and identifier on police systems for rogue trading 
incidents. The consequential difficulty in retrieval of relevant data may further 
explain its neglected status in criminology (Day, 2015). Moreover as a subset 
of both white-collar crime and fraud, themselves peripheral within the discipline 
(Tappan, 1946; Box, 1983; Shover, Coffey and Hobbs, 2003; Karstedt and 
Farrall, 2006; NW3C, 2006), considerable academic attention is unlikely. The 
introduction of Action Fraud, rather than local force areas, as the reporting 
mechanism for fraud may have unwittingly further marginalised fraud and 
rogue trading from mainstream policing or created confusion and ambiguity 
about the role of local police (HMICFRS, 2019b, p 24), or given local officers 
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a ‘get-out’ by providing a disposal route that enables them to avoid 
responsibility for the crime type via signposting to Action Fraud, even where 
this is inappropriate.  
 
Further consequences of the low priority status of rogue trading may also 
explain the superficial response it receives from police; for instance, the 
seeming ignorance of police officers of much of the relevant legislative 
framework may arise from a lack of training because it is a low priority area, 
resulting in officers that are ill-equipped to deal with incidents. Alternatively, 
police may be aware of the law, but because of its low priority status, effectively 
decriminalise (HMIC, 2014), or abrogate responsibility for it (Aplin, 2015). 
Negative cultures resulting in police routinely ignoring the harms committed 
against elderly victims (Green, 2007, p 97) have been identified and whilst 
Sklansky (2007, p 20) talks of researchers experiencing “cognitive burn-in”, 
reporting cultures no longer present, the results of this study and others (Steele 
et al., 2001; ACTSO, 2014, 2015; Aplin, 2015) imply the term aptly describes 
the way police respond to rogue trading. There is seemingly a remembered 
imprint being given permanence despite the true picture have long since 
changed, with police consistently dismissing or reframing the issue as though 
it were outside their role and remit, despite the criminal law framework (Fraud 
Act; Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations; Cancellation of 
Contracts made in a Consumer’s Home or Place of Work etc. Regulations) 
now providing a formidable backdrop with which to deal with it robustly. Not 
only does legislation now enable such enforcement, the HOCR (and the CPIA 
section 23(1)) now effectively require it. The police response identified by this 
research accords closely with that found by Aplin (2015) and Green (2007), 
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involving a consistent overlooking of rogue trading, or reframing it as a welfare, 
non-crime matter. This provides a valuable original contribution to literature on 
police culture which is at odds with wider police culture studies in which police 
officers’ own narratives describe a desire to support ‘genuine victims’, fight 
crime and make a difference (Charman, 2017). Instead, the findings fit more 
with the victimological paradigm that casts individuals, in this case victims, as 
responsible for crime prevention and safety (Mayhew and Hough, 1988; 
Daigle, 2013). The practical results of the reframing of rogue trading identified 
throughout each of the results and analysis chapters of this research are 
manifold and strongly indicate police cultures having a negative effect on the 
response to rogue trading. The recording mechanism obfuscates accurate 
retrieval and prevalence estimates, performance management, and further 
study, and along with the failure to adhere to HOCR, damages the efficacy of 
crime statistics. The lack of provision of special measures or crime reduction 
initiatives to vulnerable victims results in such victims routinely going 
unprotected and unsupported, with the unfortunate consequence of the 
cursory police involvement likely creating feelings of re-victimisation and an 
exacerbation of associated harms. The largely unchanged actus reus points 
toward the police response being inadequate, resulting in professional 
criminals able to operate with near impunity. As the data in this study do not 
explain why the response was as it was, further research is required to explore 
this rationale and better understand the potential impact of police cultures on 
the response to rogue trading. 
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Topics for future research 
 
As outlined above, in order to increase understanding of police cultures and 
their possible effects on the response to rogue trading, it is paramount to 
conduct primary, qualitative research, in the form of focus groups or in-depth 
interviews examining the police perception of rogue trading as a crime type. 
This could incorporate the response they provide to the crime type, and their 
perceptions of the perpetrators engaged in the offending, and those that are 
victimised by it. This could help to determine whether negative narratives 
about fraud victims are borne out by police in their perception of victims, 
whether the relative low profile afforded to the crime type has real-world 
impact on their perception of the response it requires, and how they view 
those that carry out such offending.   
 
In order to ascertain whether the results of this research are representative of 
the wider picture, it would be useful to repeat the research in other police force 
areas. Similarly, if data can be anonymised, it would be beneficial to repeat the 
exercise using TVP data to assess whether and to what extent the picture has 
altered since 2013. Moreover, in order to begin to gauge the size of the dark 
figure of unrecorded crime, it would be valuable to conduct similar research 
using the ‘command and control’ database used by police call handlers, to see 
the number of rogue trader cases that are labeled as non-crime and foreclosed 
at source, rather than being added to the crime recording database that is the 
subject of this study. Further research would also be valuable to gauge officer 
knowledge and understanding of the Regulatory framework and their 
perception of this in respect of its perceived relevance to rogue trading. Finally, 
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from a more academic and theoretical perspective, further research would also 
enable consideration of where rogue trading is best situated in academic 
terms, since this research suggests that currently white-collar crime does not 
provide an adequate conceptual framework, as will now be discussed. 
 
The location of rogue trading within the conceptual framework of white-
collar crime 
 
In examining current understandings of white-collar crime, and its parameters 
and limitations, in addition to the definitional difficulties of the concept, it is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that the current concept is inadequate for 
framing the phenomenon of rogue trading despite this being where it is 
currently situated. The lack of the ‘status’ and ‘respectability’ elements of early 
definitions by Sutherland (1949), the founding father of white-collar crime, 
invariably make rogue trading an awkward fit, despite commonalities, in 
particular with regards victims and repeat victimisation (Croall, 2016). 
Furthermore, the broadening of the scope of white-collar crime to include state 
crimes, health and safety and environmental regulatory breaches by 
corporations (Tombs, 2010; Croall, 2016) has migrated the subject further from 
its origins in more traditional forms of status-related fraud. The widening in 
scope of the concept of white-collar crime is understandable, not just in terms 
of the importance of study of these broader phenomena and the potential for 
vast and widespread harm they cause, but also because of the changing 
nature of fraud as a crime type since the 1920s and 1930s when white-collar 
crime began to appear as a concept, partly in response to the Great 
Depression. As explained in chapter 2, technology and internet access 
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changed enormously the way in which fraud could be performed and made 
accessibility for potential offenders more straightforward, whilst simultaneously 
increasing the size of the available audience, effectively transforming fraud 
into a volume crime (Police Foundation, 2018) not necessarily requiring any 
specialist status. As a result, traditional understandings of white-collar crime, 
outside the rather narrow field of unauthorised trading at investment banks, 
have become less relevant. Nonetheless, this shift in focus has occurred 
before any real consensus as to the scope and definition of ‘traditional’ white-
collar crime and it is therefore unclear whether rogue trading is within scope, 
with some definitions arguing for its inclusion, whilst others exclude it, as 
described in chapter 2.  
 
With each new study concentrating on white-collar crime, it is tempting for the 
author to propose a new or slightly altered definition relevant to their particular 
field of study. However, in repeatedly re-defining the subject, the danger is that 
definitions ultimately become almost meaningless, with much time and effort 
spent in explaining and justifying which specific version is employed in any 
given study. Therefore, rather than propose a new definition, it may be time to 
accept that, whilst providing a historical academic backdrop, the concept of 
white-collar crime is ultimately now inadequate for explaining the topic of rogue 
trading and contemporary fraud studies may now provide a more appropriate 
framework. 
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Key recommendations 
 
 
To improve the situation regarding rogue trading would appear to require 
significant structural and cultural changes within policing and the 
recommendations that follow may help to effect this. 
 
• A definition and crime flag for rogue trading should be adopted by the 
Home Office to ensure consistency and allow scrutiny and evidence-
based decision-making locally and nationally. 
 
The confusion and inconsistency resulting from a lack of definition has been 
discussed at length, in respect of several phenomenon, including rogue trading 
and it represents a considerable barrier to research, performance-
management and effective response. It is clear in some cases within the data 
that there is a lack of understanding of rogue trading as criminality, or else the 
lack of scrutiny is taken advantage of by officers to give a superficial response 
(see for example case 59 on p 189) and a definitive definition would help 
address this. The introduction of a crime flag alongside this would enable 
proper scrutiny of the response afforded to the incidents, a necessity given that 
only 38% of police forces are currently able to analyse or monitor rogue trading 
incidents (ACTSO, 2015). It would also enable the building of an intelligence 
base that could help link offences and develop understanding of the anatomy 
of rogue trading in academia and in practice at force level and nationally. 
Longitudinal trends could also start to be measured and any crime prevention, 
target hardening or enforcement initiatives implemented could be better 
assessed for effectiveness. Additionally, those categorised as non-crimes or 
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adult protection incidents could be scrutinised to ensure the categorisation is 
valid, rather than a means by which to avoid recording an incident as a crime, 
thereby increasing confidence in recorded crime statistics. 
 
• Closer partnership working between police, Trading Standards and 
Local Authority Adult Care Services, including co-location, information-
sharing agreements and multi-agency teams should be adopted to 
improve safeguarding and enforcement outcomes. 
 
The improved identification of vulnerable victims could be supported with the 
inclusion at an early stage of adult care professionals in the evaluation of 
victims where officer perception is that they may be vulnerable. Moreover, this 
could also ensure victims are not deemed vulnerable simply as a result of 
stereotypical views of victims, particularly older victims, as inevitably 
vulnerable. This could provide potentially more reliable data for the future 
assessment of levels and rates of vulnerability of rogue trader victims, 
guarding against under and over-recording simultaneously. Closer working 
with Adult Care Services move may also help to improve the very low uptake 
(2 cases within the 95 incidents) in the use of special measures (HMICFRS, 
2019a) and victim/witness support for those that are vulnerable and/or 
intimidated if vulnerabilities can be definitively identified earlier in 
investigations, and addressing this should be a priority. Partnership-working 
could also assist in promotion of crime prevention and target hardening 
initiatives such as the use of CCTV (only utilised in 6 instances within the data) 
to reduce repeat victimisation (and simultaneously increase enforcement 
potential) especially where vulnerable victims are identified. With this research 
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showing that 40% of victims (and 49% of vulnerable victims) experienced more 
than a one-off episode of offending, this could have tangible benefits for victims 
and detections alike. More in-depth support for victims, thorough investigation 
and an empathic response could also improve the signposting of victims to 
relevant support agencies (HMICFRS, 2019a), benefitting health and well-
being outcomes for victims, even without a corresponding improvement in 
detection rates (Great Britain. Home Office, 2003b; Great Britain. Home Office 
2003c; Button et al., 2013, p 55; Stafford, 2016). Enforcement agencies 
working together may also improve the response to rogue trading, through 
shared intelligence and the sharing of investigative best-practice. For instance, 
it seems that those cases involving Trading Standards more routinely involved 
assessment of work conducted by suspects than those cases in which police 
conducted investigations in isolation (4 cases involving Trading Standards 
resulted in evaluation of the work conducted by suspects, compared with only 
1 case in which police worked the case alone). Joint-working would provide 
mutual benefit to each enforcement agency, with Trading Standards able to 
share their seemingly greater familiarity with the Regulatory framework with 
police, in return for access to forensic tools that they would otherwise be 
without. Intuitively, the pooling of resources also reduces the potential for both 
agencies duplicating work by unwittingly resourcing the same cases 
separately, this may therefore build capacity (as well as capability) within each 
agency at a time when public service resources are strained as a result of 
repeated budget reductions. The sharing of resources and information could 
also enable creation of problem profiles, more effective risk-scoring of potential 
OCGs, and evidence-based decisions regarding the direction of resources to 
those suspects believed to be most prolific or causing the greatest harm. 
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Finally, shared ownership of cases between police and Trading Standards 
could eliminate referrals potentially being used as a means of foreclosing or 
avoiding responsibility for investigations, with multi-agency cases instead 
following the model illustrated in case 8 (see p 197 - 198). 
 
• Training in the legislative framework (in particular the Consumer 
Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations and the Consumer 
Contracts (information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) 
Regulations) and investigative options (including special measures) in 
rogue trader cases could be provided to police forces.  
 
Police officers, managers and scrutineers would seemingly all benefit from 
training in the relevant legislation, particularly given findings from this research 
which show only 4 cases gave regard to the provision of cancellation rights, 
cooling off periods contract or paper work, despite these being key factors in 
determining criminality (Consumer Contracts (information, Cancellation and 
Additional Charges) Regulations and Consumer Protection from Unfair 
Trading Regulations) in such cases. Similarly, the seeming failure by police to 
consider the offence of aggressive commercial practice (Consumer Protection 
from Unfair Trading Regulations) in cases of this type that are investigated as 
harassment could also be remedied (see p 184 - 185). Moreover, cases where 
dishonesty is difficult to evidence could still be proceeded against using 
misleading action and misleading omission offences (Consumer Protection 
from Unfair Trading Regulations), which largely mirror the offences of fraud by 
false representation and fraud by failure to disclose but do not require 
deliberate dishonesty to be evidenced. Training relating to investigative 
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options available in rogue trader cases would also seemingly be of benefit to 
officers, given the poor response routinely highlighted by this research. 
Training could include evidence of the victimology, the extent of financial 
losses and the wider harm rogue trading causes to demonstrate the need for 
a greater emphasis on effective enforcement action against professional 
criminality causing significant detriment. This could be combined with training 
in how to deal effectively with calls from financial institutions under the Banking 
Protocol, and the adoption of minimum standards of investigation so that police 
officers are aware of what is expected of them. For instance recording of both 
the actual and the intended financial loss could be made mandatory (given the 
data show only 58 of the 95 cases recording the financial loss), as could 
consideration of the contracts, paper work and cancellation rights. Senior 
officer input or endorsement of the training would further reinforce the 
message regarding expectations relating to service-level response.  
 
• A Government backed official registration or licensing scheme for the 
building (including roofing) industry, legally requiring contractors to 
register and evidence competence should be introduced. 
 
A scheme, akin to Gas Safe or NICEIC, could save considerable financial 
detriment for consumers, as highlighted by this study showing just 1 of 95 
rogue trader incidents involving a trade with such a scheme. The scheme could 
hold multiple benefits for consumers and legitimate traders alike. It could 
ensure trader competence through qualification criteria and would increase 
consumer confidence in the trade sector and provide a directory of legitimate 
traders for consumers to employ as a result. Qualification criteria could ensure 
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regulatory compliance and trader traceability as well as competence of 
members. This would enable pursuit of civil law claims by consumers against 
traders where issues arose. For more serious matters involving criminal law 
breaches, enforcement agencies would be able to identify and locate those 
responsible far more easily than is currently the case. Moreover, if traders 
undertake to abide by a code of conduct to gain membership of the scheme, 
failing to abide by that code would constitute an offence under the Consumer 
Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations (regulations 5(3)(b) and 9). If 
knowledge of the regulations is a prerequisite for joining, if consistent non-
compliance is identified the proving of mens rea in such incidents may also 
prove easier, enabling appropriate sanctions upon conviction. Moreover, the 
scheme could introduce a fit and proper persons test to exclude, for instance, 
anyone convicted of doorstep crime type offences to protect consumers and 
improve confidence in the trade, and the scheme. 
 
Concerns regarding potential for HTMS within the construction industry could 
also be addressed by the scheme adopting an audit process and registration 
fees could be staggered such that larger firms pay higher rates, thereby 
growing a pot of money to enable funding for expert witness surveys to be 
carried out to suspect works and/or a compensation or redress scheme for 
victims in a similar way to the registration to NICEIC assists with the funding 
of the charity Electrical Safety First.  
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